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# **PUB 5 INTELLIGENCE FOR JOINT FORCES**

**FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY**

**NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY  
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## **PREFACE**

This manual has been prepared for instructional use at the Armed Forces Staff College. Particular emphasis is placed on those portions of the intelligence process applicable to joint forces and the related aspects of the national intelligence process which are of greatest interest to officers of joint staffs. Other items have been treated briefly or omitted. Readers desiring to pursue subjects beyond the scope of this manual may refer to the numerous official publications available, many of which are classified. Users are cautioned that the material presented is valid only as of the publication date.

Material contained in this manual conforms to existing approved joint doctrine. Where no joint doctrine has been formally approved, the manual reflects terminology, procedures, and policies which are acceptable to the Services concerned.

Users of this manual are asked to submit any comments or recommendations for improvement to LTC Thomas H. Rhoads, USA, Armed Forces Staff College.

## CHAPTER 1

### INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN JOINT FORCES

#### 1.1 INTRODUCTION

a. Development. World War II marked the beginning of an era in which joint operations became the normal means of conducting warfare. The employment of land, sea, and air forces in concert under a single commander became a common, rather than an exceptional, method of waging war. Since World War II this pattern has continued and U.S. forces have planned and conducted many types of joint operations. Intelligence, as a major responsibility of the joint commander, followed the historical development of joint operations. Initially, there was wide disagreement on the mission of intelligence in joint forces. Much of this disagreement stemmed from the differences in the roles and missions of the respective Services, their size and composition, and their relationships to one another. Once these differences were resolved, joint intelligence could be put in proper perspective.

b. Intelligence in Joint Forces and National Intelligence. When compared with national and departmental intelligence, joint force intelligence is concerned with smaller geographic areas, focused on only a part of the enemy forces, concerned mainly with combat intelligence, and primarily interested only in that strategic intelligence required by the mission of the joint force. It is therefore narrower in scope than national intelligence, regardless of the command level of the joint force, its size, or the extent of the area in which it operates. However, operational intelligence in a joint force depends to a great extent on the strategic, technical, area studies, and current intelligence produced by national and departmental agencies. Those agencies, in turn, require intelligence collected by joint forces to produce more accurate and effective intelligence for use of such forces. The intelligence relationship of national intelligence agencies and joint forces is therefore one of interdependence.

c. Responsibilities. The intelligence responsibilities of any joint force commander are to

(1) Establish plans, policies, and overall requirements for the intelligence activities of his command, ensuring that his policies are in accordance with national and DOD intelligence directives.

(2) Collect, produce, and disseminate on time the intelligence needed for the operations of his mission, including that needed by any subordinate elements of the command to which a mission is assigned.

(3) Initiate and direct counterintelligence measures to identify, neutralize, or destroy enemy agents and supporters who might penetrate forces of the command for espionage or sabotage and to detect evidence of treason, sedition, or subversive activities.

(4) Discharge special intelligence responsibilities assigned by higher authority.

d. Tasks. These intelligence responsibilities are met by doing the following five traditional intelligence tasks.

(1) Collection--acquiring information on a given intelligence problem

(2) Production--judging the credibility of collected information, drawing pertinent inferences from its analysis, and when appropriate, interpreting such inferences in the perspective of planning

(3) Dissemination--distributing intelligence to agencies needing it

(4) Counterintelligence--destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and protecting information against espionage, personnel against subversion, and installations or material against sabotage (NOTE: Counterintelligence in the Air Force is not part of the intelligence function. The Air Force Security Policy/Office of Special Investigations is responsible for counterintelligence.)

(5) Special Intelligence--discharging special intelligence responsibilities assigned by the national-level agencies

1.2

## JOINT INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS

a. Nature and Responsibilities. There are certain differences between the nature and responsibilities of a unified command at theater level and those of a joint task force.

(1) The unified command is a permanent, long-term organization, whereas the joint task force is temporary.

(2) The area where a unified command conducts military operations and supports them is usually much larger than the operating area of the subordinate joint task force.

(3) The unified command is concerned with a campaign or series of related operations. In contrast, the joint task force is concerned with only one, or at the most a few, closely related operations.

(4) The commander of a unified command must not only plan for joint task force operations and supervise their execution (sometimes more than one such operation at a time), but also plan for further operations to begin after his presently constituted joint task forces have been disbanded.

Each of these factors affects the intelligence organizations of the unified command and the joint task force differently.

b. Typical Joint Intelligence Organizational Structures

(1) **Unified Command Intelligence Organization.** There are two types of unified command intelligence organizations. One type, shown in two versions (Appendixes H and J), includes all the staff personnel and equipment required for planning, policy formulation, management, and a substantial capability to process and disseminate intelligence. It is a large organization. The other type includes only a small number of personnel and a limited amount of equipment and confines itself primarily to policy formulation, planning, and management. It relies on the intelligence organizations of the subordinate component commands of the theater for collecting information and producing and disseminating intelligence.

(2) **Typical Joint Task Force Intelligence Organization.** Appendix K portrays a typical joint task force intelligence organization. The division consists of a J-2 with three major intelligence groups: an administrative group, an intelligence collections and plans group, and an operational intelligence group. In a joint task force, the size and type of organization of the intelligence division will vary greatly according to the scope and nature of the operation. A relatively small division may be able to handle the intelligence load during the actual operations phase, but the division must be large enough to prepare the detailed plans in the relatively short time allowed for such planning. Economy in the use of personnel is required, particularly if two or more joint task forces are making concurrent demands on unified command headquarters for the personnel necessary to staff their divisions. The size of the division will depend on the intelligence workload and personnel resources available. The workload generally will result from the factors which influence organization, the intelligence requirements, and the type and quantity of intelligence support which higher headquarters provides.

c. Organization Principles. To ensure that the intelligence division of a joint command considers information on the enemy in its entirety and not in separate air, naval, and ground force aspects, the organization of the division should consider the following:

(1) **Senior Assistants.** The director of the intelligence division should have a senior assistant from each component Service other than his own to ensure adequate comprehension of particular Service operational intelligence requirements.

(2) **Staff Composition.** The joint intelligence staff which plans the collection, collation, and evaluation of enemy information should be composed of qualified personnel from each of the participating Services to ensure proper representation of Service interests.

(3) **Needs.** The joint intelligence staff must consider the needs for intelligence not only of the parent command and its subordinate units but also of higher and adjacent headquarters. In addition, the full spectrum of intelligence planning must be taken into account, including such sub-hostility



operations as U.S. citizen/property protection, evacuation of U.S. citizens, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping.

(4) **Centralization.** The joint intelligence staff should centralize specialized intelligence techniques to best benefit all elements of the command. The Joint Operational Intelligence Agency (JOIA) is one means of accomplishing this.\*

(5) **Location.** Where distance or special operating conditions would cause undersirable delay in the production or dissemination of intelligence, forward agencies of the division may be established to prevent them.

d. **Avoidance of Duplication of Effort.** The primary function of the intelligence division (J-2) is to assure the availability and dissemination of intelligence. Each Service component in a joint force must participate in the collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence needed as much as is compatible with the requirements of their commands. Each subordinate element of a joint force thus must know the intelligence requirements of other elements of the force. For efficiency and economy, the joint force commander should ensure that duplication of the intelligence effort is avoided. It can be avoided if, on establishment of the joint force, the commander issues standing operating procedures on matters that lend themselves to such procedures, whose scope depends on the nature of the command, the type of forces in it, and the character of operations to be conducted. The following types of procedures should be considered for inclusion in intelligence directives by the joint force commander.

(1) Responsibilities of each component for intelligence collection and dissemination, counterintelligence operations, and the production of basic intelligence

(2) Standard procedures for intelligence collection, production, and dissemination; interrogation of prisoners of war; intelligence exploitation of friendly evaders and escapees from hostile territory; processing of documents and equipment and other items of a technical intelligence nature; and the collection of meteorological data

(3) Standard procedures or measures to control subversion, prevent sabotage and espionage, maintain secrecy discipline, and maintain communication security, censorship, and control of personal photography

(4) Standardization of intelligence and counterintelligence reports and channels of communications

\*JOIA is an intelligence agency in which the efforts of two or more Services are integrated to furnish that operational intelligence essential to the commander of a joint force and to supplement that available to subordinate forces of his command. The agency may or may not be part of such joint force commander's staff.

e. Collection. Within the scope of the essential elements of information (EEI), the intelligence division directs the effort to ensure that adequate information is available when needed. Each Service identifies its intelligence needs, and available assets are used to satisfy these requirements. Each Service will ensure the free exchange of such information with the other Service components concerned. The EEI and other intelligence requirements of all components of a joint force determine the missions for the various collecting agencies and for securing proper coordination of the whole effort. The assignment of tasks should be based on the capability of the collecting agency, whatever Service it is. The staff division responsible for planning must be fully aware of the intelligence requirements and collecting capabilities and limitations of the diverse elements of a joint force, which requires close liaison with the intelligence division.

f. Production. It is essential that information on the enemy be considered in its entirety and not separately in its air, sea, and ground force aspects. Only by complete integration of information can the enemy situation be estimated in its entirety. Time and distance from the national and departmental intelligence agencies may make it desirable for the joint force to perform certain intelligence functions normally performed by those agencies. Included among those functions might be publication of

(1) Technical intelligence bulletins.

(2) General orientation intelligence.

(3) Other intelligence studies and documents which would lose their usefulness if delayed in transit to the recipients.

Whenever, for expedience and decentralization, the intelligence division of a joint force undertakes to perform any of those functions, it must so advise the higher echelon concerned. It should also ensure that such action does not interrupt the flow of information back to the higher echelon. Such actions are subject to review by higher authority in order to guard against unnecessary duplication.

g. Dissemination. There is little room for service parochialism in the dissemination of intelligence during joint task force operations. Openly shared information serves to significantly reduce the confusion in such operations, increases the confidence of commanders in their decisionmaking, and serves the principle of economy of force.

h. Coordination. The many facets of the joint intelligence effort must be planned, coordinated, and actively supervised. This is necessary so that the Service components can support one another and avoid duplication of effort. Where there is coordination by mutual cooperation of commanders, intelligence policies should be enunciated by each commander for his own command. The respective commanders are mutually responsible for the standardization of intelligence policies of mutual interest.

## FACTORS AFFECTING THE CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

a. General. Several factors affect the conduct of intelligence operations. Since joint forces differ considerably in missions, organization, and size, the effect which each factor will have when applied to specific joint forces will vary in weight and importance. This section deals with some of these factors.

b. Level of Command of the Joint Force. A high-level joint force may have extensive intelligence responsibilities, including those assigned by higher authority. Among these responsibilities might be the conduct of continuing intelligence liaison between the joint force and other U.S. and foreign governmental representatives. A joint force at a lower level of command might have no such responsibilities assigned and thus be concerned only with the intelligence functioning required to support the force mission.

c. Nature of the Mission. The conduct of intelligence operations on a long-range, permanent basis by a joint force may involve a transition from peace to war and perhaps again to peace. In such a force the concept of intelligence, the organization for intelligence, and even its conduct must each be geared to adjust rapidly and effectively to changing conditions. With each change in conditions, the type and extent of intelligence support by external sources, the volume of information and intelligence to be processed, the force intelligence requirements, and the intelligence capabilities of component commands will change. In contrast, a joint force activated to accomplish a mission limited in scope usually conducts the intelligence functions in accordance with that single consideration.

d. Participation in Combined Operations. To ensure an adequate flow of required intelligence to all components in a combined operation, arrangements must be made for this exchange early in the intelligence planning. Failure to complete arrangements may drastically affect intelligence functioning in the force by compartmenting or isolating certain functions, limiting the flow of intelligence to commands which require it, and unnecessarily duplicating one or more intelligence functions in the force by establishing uninational intelligence divisions or agencies within the force. Further, since the intelligence organizations, techniques, and procedures of the armed forces of countries employed in a combined operation differ from one another, their integration into a joint effort often is accomplished only with difficulty. In recent years, however, significant strides have been made toward increasing the degree of standardization required to overcome many of these difficulties. Other complicating factors which may affect the conduct of intelligence when joint forces participate in combined operations include differences in language, differences in the evaluation and interpretation of intelligence caused by varying national interests and attitudes, and differences in national military concepts concerning the role of intelligence and its application in planning.

e. Organization of the Force. The internal command relationships and the relative positions, sizes, and capacities of the intelligence divisions of each staff in the force have a marked effect on the conduct of intelligence. In the larger joint forces there is usually a large capacity for the conduct of intelligence operations at the level of the Service component commander.

This capacity, particularly in intelligence production, often is greater than that at the higher joint force command level. Usually the Service component commander's intelligence organization is geared primarily to produce intelligence required by the Service component. Such intelligence also is required for integration into the total intelligence needed by the joint force. A joint force which includes Service component command intelligence organizations can designate those organizations as primary producers for the joint force of certain specified types of intelligence within their capabilities. This decentralization of the production task permits a smaller intelligence division at the joint force level and eliminates duplication in intelligence functions. On the other hand, more centralized control can be retained at the joint staff level through the establishment of a joint subordinate operational command under the staff and managerial direction of the director of intelligence (J-2) for the timely production of target and other substantive intelligence production requirements. The August 1974 activation of the Intelligence Center Pacific (IPAC) created an example of this type of organization, designed to support all Service forces in the Pacific Command area. (See Appendix I for IPAC organization and mission.)

f. Areas in Which Operations are Conducted. The characteristics of areas in which operations are planned and conducted often have a pronounced effect on intelligence functioning. Areas of great size often overextend intelligence collection agencies and cause communications difficulties in the transmission of intelligence. Conversely, small areas may impose special requirements for intensive intelligence liaison with forces in adjacent areas. Land areas reduce the requirements for naval intelligence collection activities and water areas increase that requirement. Areas in which there is a large, potentially hostile population require an extensive counterintelligence effort. Areas devoid of civilian inhabitants reduce the requirement for extensive counterintelligence. Areas where there is a large friendly population contain sources of possibly valuable information. The evaluation of such information, however, may cause a very heavy production workload. Each area characteristic therefore can have a special effect on the conduct of intelligence operations within a joint force.

g. Type of Enemy Threat. If the enemy forces consist of air, ground, and naval units, intelligence on these forces in their entirety must be integrated at the joint force level. Proper integration is accomplished only by the combined, coordinated efforts of air, ground, and naval intelligence personnel. If the enemy threat is predominantly posed by one type of force (air, ground, or naval), there usually is a greater requirement for intelligence personnel familiar with assessing that type of force. If the joint force is operating against enemy forces of a single type only, which rarely happens, the requirement for joint integrated intelligence is reduced. Thus, the type of enemy threat affects both intelligence organization and functioning in a joint force.

h. Intelligence Requirements. The intelligence requirements of each component of the joint force and the requirements imposed by higher authority substantially determine the nature and extent of the intelligence function in the force. If the requirements are purely military, the intelligence function can be conducted by military personnel only. If there are also requirements

for production of economic, political, sociological, or scientific intelligence, specialists in one or more of those fields may be required. Further, the amount of effort required to satisfy each of such intelligence requirements will, in general, determine the nature and degree of emphasis of each intelligence function in the force. In every case, the timeliness of the intelligence required is of the utmost importance in support of military operations. Time constraints must be identified as early as possible in the process.

i. Intelligence Available. If the area of operations and the enemy in that area have been primary targets of the intelligence effort for a considerable time, the information already available will assist in reducing the collection requirements. If the information already available has previously been refined into basic encyclopedic and other types of intelligence, the intelligence production task will be even lighter. The amount of pertinent information and intelligence available at the time operations are initiated in the area will therefore directly affect the extent of the collection and production tasks and thus greatly influence the conduct of the intelligence function. Conversely, if the area in which operations are conducted has not been a primary intelligence target until very recently, or the enemy strength, disposition, and activities in the area are not known precisely, or have changed very recently, both the collection and production tasks will be heavier. For these reasons, the scope and conduct of the intelligence effort, particularly in collection and production, will be determined in part by the required intelligence available both when operations are planned and when they are conducted.

j. Intelligence Support from Other Agencies. Because the type, nature, currency, frequency, and quality of the intelligence support from other agencies are such important considerations in the conduct of intelligence operations in any joint force, an evaluation of this support must be made early in the intelligence planning phase. Thereafter, assessment of this support is required on a continuing basis.

k. Location of Force Headquarters. If the joint force headquarters is distant from supporting intelligence agencies, provisions for the extensive production of intelligence within the headquarters might have to be made. Likewise, if the headquarters is permanently located, more extensive intelligence facilities can be developed than in situations where the headquarters moves frequently. The weight and value of each of these factors vary among joint forces. Since each factor has a different weight and importance to each joint force, the organization, policies, procedures, and conduct of intelligence activities in joint forces vary considerably. Therefore, directives which prescribe a standardized method of functioning for all aspects of intelligence and which are uniformly applicable to any joint forces are meaningless.

l. Time Available for Planning. A consideration in the conduct of intelligence operations is the time available for planning. Let us take the case of a joint task force which is assembled and assigned a mission 120 days before the scheduled target date of the operation. The intelligence division of this

force will be able to participate in much of the initial planning. On the other hand, take the case of a joint task force which is assembled and assigned a mission only three weeks before D-day. Here most of the preliminary intelligence planning would have to be accomplished by outside intelligence agencies. Obviously, the organization of the intelligence division of these two forces would be affected by the time available.

m. Temporary Nature of Joint Task Force. Most joint task forces are organized to execute a single operation or a series of closely related operations. The personnel and equipment are assigned to the force on a temporary basis. Thus, the principle of economy of force, both in personnel and equipment, must be observed and will certainly influence the intelligence organization.

n. Combined Intelligence Operations. Operations of combined forces will necessitate special arrangements for the exchange of intelligence. National aims generally limit the free exchange of intelligence. These limits apply to all components of the U.S. Armed Forces involved in combined operations.

## CHAPTER 2

### THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE

#### 2.1 INTRODUCTION

a. The national foreign intelligence structure consists of the agencies and organizations of the federal government which manage and conduct intelligence activities in support of national security. All of these are concerned with activities in foreign areas and all have some type of intelligence unit supporting the operating or planning interests of the parent organization. The intelligence unit may be active in the collection of information, the processing of it, or both. This chapter mentions the most important of these organizations and describes briefly their authorities, responsibilities, and relationships in the field of intelligence.

b. The history of the national intelligence structure, more frequently called the Intelligence Community, dates from the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947. Before that act certain governmental departments (notably the Departments of State, War, and Navy) carried on intelligence functions, but without overall national coordination and integration. The National Security Act of 1947 has been amplified by Presidential orders. However, it remains the legal foundation for the national intelligence structure.

#### 2.2 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

a. The National Security Act of 1947 established the National Security Council (NSC) as an advisory council to the President. The act prescribed the function of the NSC as follows:

To advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the National Security.

The NSC is the highest executive branch entity that reviews, guides, and directs the conduct of all national foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities.

b. Council Members. By statute the council is composed of the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. The Director of Central Intelligence and CJCS, as appointed by the President, are advisors to the NSC.

c. Senior Interagency Group-Intelligence (SIG-I). This group advises and assists the NSC in exercising its authority and discharging its responsibilities for intelligence matters and policy. The SIG-I consists of the Director of Central Intelligence (Chairman); the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Deputy Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Representatives of

departments and agencies attend on invitation by the chairman when such departments and agencies have a direct interest in intelligence activities under consideration. When meeting to consider sensitive intelligence collection activities referred by the Director of Central Intelligence, the membership of the group is augmented, as necessary, by the head of each organization within the intelligence community directly involved in the activity in question. When meeting to consider counterintelligence activities, the group is augmented by the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Director, National Security Agency. Interdepartmental Groups (IG) are working groups of the SIG-I and are responsible for deciding issues which can be settled at assistant secretary level, including implementation of NSC decisions, preparing NSC policy papers, and preparing contingency papers on problem areas for SIG-I review and eventual submission to the NSC for a final decision.

d. Intelligence Directives. In addition to other activities, the NSC has issued several National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCID). They express the policy by which the national intelligence effort is guided and coordinated and delineate responsibilities in designated fields of intelligence. National intelligence policy calls for integration of all departmental intelligence relating to national security and the coordination of foreign intelligence activities by the Director, Central Intelligence. Thus, the Director, Central Intelligence, is the senior intelligence advisor to the council and the President. The National Security Council structure is shown in Appendix E.

e. NSC Staff. The NSC staff includes a secretariat, geographic groups, and functional groups. With the assistance of other governmental agencies, the staff produces studies for policy guidelines and background information on a number of specific problems; reviews and evaluates intelligence products; and produces net assessments including comparisons of the capabilities of U.S. forces and those of potential enemies.

## 2.3 DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (DCI)

a. The DCI, pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947, is responsible directly to the NSC and the President. His responsibilities are to

(1) Act as the primary advisor to the President and the NSC on national foreign intelligence and furnish the President and other officials in the executive branch with national foreign intelligence;

(2) Develop objectives and guidance for the Intelligence Community to enhance capabilities for responding to future needs for national foreign intelligence;

(3) Promote the development and maintenance of services of common concern by designated intelligence organizations on behalf of the Intelligence Community;

(4) Ensure implementation of special activities;

(5) Formulate policies concerning foreign intelligence and counterintelligence arrangements with foreign governments, coordinate



foreign intelligence and counterintelligence relationships between agencies of the Intelligence Community and the intelligence or internal security services of foreign governments, and establish liaison procedures for any department or agency with such services on narcotics activities;

(6) Participate in the development of procedures approved by the Attorney General governing criminal narcotics intelligence activities abroad to ensure that these activities are consistent with foreign intelligence programs;

(7) Ensure the establishment by the Intelligence Community of common security and access standards for managing and handling foreign intelligence systems, information, and products;

(8) Ensure that programs are developed which protect intelligence sources, methods, and analytical procedures;

(9) Establish uniform criteria for the determination of relative priorities for the transmission of critical national foreign intelligence, and advise the Secretary of Defense concerning the communications requirements of the Intelligence Community for the transmission of such intelligence;

(10) Establish appropriate staffs, committees, or other advisory groups to assist in the execution of the director's responsibilities;

(11) Have full responsibility for production and dissemination of national foreign intelligence, and authority to levy analytic tasks on departmental intelligence production organizations, in consultation with those organizations, ensuring that appropriate mechanisms for competitive analysis are developed so that diverse points of view are considered fully and differences of judgment within the Intelligence Community are brought to the attention of national policymakers;

(12) Ensure the timely exploitation and dissemination of data gathered by national foreign intelligence collection means, and ensure that the resulting intelligence is disseminated immediately to appropriate government entities and military commands;

(13) Establish mechanisms which translate national foreign intelligence objectives and priorities approved by the NSC into specific guidance for the Intelligence Community, resolve conflicts in tasking priority, task departments and agencies having information collection capabilities that are not part of the National Foreign Intelligence Program with advisory collection of national foreign intelligence, and develop plans and arrangements for transfer of required collection tasking authority to the Secretary of Defense when directed by the President;

(14) Develop, with the advice of the program managers and departments and agencies concerned, the consolidated National Foreign Intelligence Program budget, and present it to the President and the Congress;

(15) Review and approve all requests for reprogramming National Foreign Intelligence Program funds in accordance with guidelines established by the Office of Management and Budget;

(16) Monitor National Foreign Intelligence Program implementation and, as necessary, conduct program and performance audits and evaluations;

(17) Together with the Secretary of Defense, ensure that there is no unnecessary overlap between national foreign intelligence programs and Department of Defense intelligence programs consistent with the requirement to develop competitive analysis, and give to and obtain from the Secretary of Defense all information necessary for this purpose;

(18) In accordance with law and relevant procedures approved by the Attorney General under this order, give the heads of the departments and agencies access to all intelligence developed by the CIA or the staff elements of the Director of Central Intelligence relevant to the national intelligence needs of the departments and agencies; and

(19) Facilitate the use of national foreign intelligence products by Congress in a secure manner.

b. The DCI has full and exclusive authority for approval of the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget submitted to the President. He reviews and evaluates the budget submissions of the various national programs and develops the consolidated National Foreign Intelligence Program budget and presents it to the President through the Office of Management and Budget. He then presents and justifies the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget to the Congress.

c. The DCI has the full responsibility for production and dissemination of national foreign intelligence and has the authority to levy analytical tasks on departmental intelligence production organizations.

## 2.4 THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD (NFIB)

The NFIB is chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence and includes as members the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, the Directors of DIA, NSA and DOD Reconnaissance, and the directors of the intelligence elements of the Departments of State, Treasury, Energy, and the FBI. The service intelligence chiefs sit as observers on the NFIB.

## 2.5 THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL (NFIC)

a. The NFIC is also chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence, but, given its concerns, has a somewhat different membership than does the NFIB. In common with the NFIB is the presence of the Directors of DIA, NSA, DOD Reconnaissance, and FBI intelligence, and the four service intelligence chiefs. In addition, there are representatives from the intelligence policy divisions of the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Treasury, Energy, and Commerce, and a representative of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

- b. The NFIC assists and advises the DCI on
  - (1) Priorities for national foreign intelligence;
  - (2) The National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) budget; and
  - (3) Other matters as the DCI may direct.

## 2.6 PRESIDENTIAL OVERSIGHT BOARDS

### a. Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB)

(1) The IOB is a legal oversight board that functions within the White House and has three members appointed by the President. The members are from outside the government and are qualified on the basis of ability, knowledge, diversity of background, and experience. No member can have any personal interest in any contractual relationship with any agency within the Intelligence Community. One member is designated as chairman, and this member also sits on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB).

(2) The duties of the IOB are to

(a) Inform the President of intelligence activities believed to be in violation of the constitution, laws, orders, or directives;

(b) Forward to the Attorney General reports of intelligence activities believed to be unlawful;

(c) Review agency guidelines concerning lawfulness of intelligence activities;

(d) Review practices and procedures of inspectors general and general counsels for reporting unlawful activities; and

(e) Conduct any necessary investigations.

(3) Corollary Legal Responsibility

(a) Inspectors General and General Counsels with responsibilities for agencies within the Intelligence Community are required to report to the IOB any intelligence activities that raise questions of legality or propriety.

(b) The Attorney General receives and considers reports of impropriety or illegality received from the IOB and agencies within the Intelligence Community and reports to the President and the IOB decisions made or actions taken in response to them.

(c) Congressional Intelligence Committees, consisting of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select

Committee on Intelligence, are kept fully and currently informed by the DCI concerning intelligence activities that are illegal or improper and corrective actions that are taken or planned.

(d) Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community are expressly directed by executive order to ensure that all activities of their agencies are carried out in accordance with applicable laws and executive orders and to report possible violations to the Attorney General.

b. President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB)

(1) The PFIAB reports directly to the President and advises him concerning the objectives, conduct, management, and coordination of the various activities of the agencies of the intelligence community. It assesses the quality, quantity, and adequacy of intelligence collection, of analysis and estimates, of counterintelligence, and other intelligence activities; has the authority to continually review the performance of all agencies of the government that are engaged in the collection, evaluation, or production of intelligence or the execution of intelligence policy; and, is further authorized to assess the adequacy of management, personnel, and organization of the intelligence agencies.

(2) The membership of the PFIAB is composed of some 20 individuals with long and distinguished service to the government, industry, and academia. Many have years of experience in the military, intelligence, and as senior government officials. None of the members is currently a government employee.

(3) The duties of the PFIAB are to

(a) Advise on measures to support and improve the intelligence community

(b) Advise on objectives, conduct, management and coordination of national intelligence activities.

(c) Conduct a review and assessment of intelligence activities

(d) Receive, consider and take action on matters identified to PFIAB by the DCI, departments and agencies, and

(e) Report findings and appraisals to the President and make recommendations to achieve increased effectiveness.

## CHAPTER 3

### INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS

#### 3.1 INTRODUCTION

a. Goals. There are currently 13 members of the National Foreign Intelligence Community (NFIC). While this number has fluctuated slightly since passage of the National Security Act of 1947, the primary interest of the community has remained constant: to give to the government and its officials information and services necessary to insure the nation's security and survival. Today, the community's basic goals are set forth in President Reagan's Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities:

"The United States intelligence effort shall provide the President and the National Security Council with the necessary information on which to base decisions concerning the conduct and development of foreign, defense and economic policy, and the protection of United States national interests from foreign security threats."

b. Membership. The Intelligence Community includes the following agencies and organizations:

- (1) The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA);
- (2) The National Security Agency (NSA);
- (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA);
- (4) The offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs;
- (5) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State;
- (6) The intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of the Treasury, and the Department of Energy; and
- (7) The staff elements of the Director of Central Intelligence.

#### 3.2 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

a. Establishment. The National Security Act of 1947 also established the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA was placed under the NSC, with a director and deputy director appointed by the President and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

b. Functions. For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, the CIA

- (1) Collects foreign intelligence information.
- (2) Produces and disseminates foreign intelligence relating to the national security, including foreign political, economic, scientific, technical, military, sociological, and geographic intelligence to meet the needs of the President, the NSC, and other elements of the U.S. Government.
- (3) Develops and conducts programs to collect political, economic, scientific, technical, military, geographic, and sociological information, not otherwise obtainable, relating to foreign intelligence, in accordance with directives of the NSC.
- (4) Collects and produces intelligence on foreign aspects of international terrorist activities and traffic in narcotics.
- (5) Conducts foreign counterintelligence activities outside the United States and, when inside the United States, in coordination with the FBI, subject to the approval of the Attorney General.
- (6) Carries out such other special activities in support of national foreign policy objectives as may be directed by the President or the NSC and which are within the limits of applicable law.
- (7) Conducts for the Intelligence Community services of common concern as directed by the NSC, such as monitoring of foreign public radio and television broadcasts and foreign press services, collection of foreign intelligence information from cooperating sources in the United States, acquisition and translation of foreign publications, and photographic interpretation.
- (8) Carries out or contracts for research, development, and procurement of technical systems and devices.
- (9) Protects the security of its installations, activities, information, and personnel. In order to maintain this security, the CIA conducts investigations of applicants, employees, and other persons with similar associations with the CIA as necessary.
- (10) Conducts administrative, technical, and support activities in the United States or abroad as may be necessary to perform the functions described.

c. Contributions to National Intelligence. The CIA has primary responsibility for the writing and coordination of The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE), and National Intelligence Analytical Memorandum (NIAM). The NIE is an estimate produced by complex coordinating machinery representing the entire national Intelligence Community. Dealing with appraisals of a foreign nation's current and future capabilities and actions, the NIEs are regarded as vital building blocks of national security policy. They are classified secret or higher and released on a "need to know" basis.

a. General. Since the Department of Defense (DOD) performs most U.S. intelligence collection operations, its intelligence resource levels and the scope and direction of its intelligence efforts take into account national intelligence needs, defense intelligence needs for support of research, development, and planning, and the needs of military commanders to maintain intelligence capabilities and assets that are essential to operations.

b. The DOD is responsible for overt collection outside of the United States of foreign military and military-related information; the production and dissemination of such information; conducting counterintelligence activities outside the United States in coordination with the CIA and within the United States in coordination with the FBI; directing, operating, monitoring, and performing fiscal management for the NSA and for defense and military intelligence and national reconnaissance entities; conducting signals intelligence and communications security activities except as otherwise directed by the NSC; monitoring intelligence programs; and carrying out or contracting for research, development, and procurement of technical systems and devices relating to authorized intelligence functions.

Before November 1971 the five major intelligence organizations within the DOD were the NSA, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the offices of the chiefs of intelligence of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Since then some important changes in intelligence organization and management were made to assure that the Secretary of Defense can better meet his intelligence responsibilities and ensure better management of resources within the DOD. These intelligence-related changes within the DOD include the establishment of the Central Security Service, the Defense Investigative Service, and the position of Director of Net Assessments.

c. The positions of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) and Director, Telecommunications, Command, and Control Systems, were abolished, and their resource management and systems development functions consolidated under an Assistant Secretary of Defense (Communications, Command, Control, and Intelligence).

d. A Deputy Under Secretary (Policy) was established to monitor and develop overall intelligence policy for DOD. Separation of this function from the hardware-oriented responsibilities of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering) assured that full consideration is given to the needs of product users.

e. Roles and Responsibilities of Specialized Services

(1) The Defense Investigative Service

The establishment of the Defense Investigative Service centralized in one agency control of all personnel security investigations and some related matters within DOD. Before 1972 personnel security investigations were conducted by investigative agencies in each of the military departments. The Defense Investigative Service was created in order to obtain monetary savings,

managerial efficiencies, and a prompter response to overall defense needs for personnel security investigations, as well as a more uniform product. At the same time it is another management tool for assuring that investigative activities of the defense establishment are conducted with due respect for the rights of all citizens. The Defense Investigative Service operates under staff supervision of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). It receives advice and counsel from the Defense Investigative Review Council, thus enabling top-level civilian leadership to establish detailed guidance for investigative activities and to assure that these activities are consistent with law and tradition on civil-military relationships.

## (2) The Defense Mapping Agency

On 1 January 1972, DOD was directed to combine the three Service mapping organizations for optimum efficiency and economy in production without impairing legitimate requirements of the separate Services. Resources and personnel were transferred from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Defense Intelligence Agency to form DMA. The agency became operational on 1 July 1972. The mission of DMA is to furnish Mapping, Charting, and Geodetic (MC&G) support and services to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military departments and other DOD components through the production and worldwide distribution of maps, charts, precise positioning data, and digital data for strategic and tactical military operations and weapon systems. DMA is a separate agency of DOD under the direction, authority, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering). DMA also has a very close relationship with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, especially in the requirements approval process. It has the responsibility for validating all MC&G product or service requirements (submitted by the Services and unified and specified commands) for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and for reporting the approved requirements to the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), who has oversight responsibility.

## (3) National Security Agency (NSA)/Central Security Service (CSS)

(a) NSA was established in 1952 as an agency within the DOD.

(b) NSA's responsibilities include

1. Establishment and operation of an effective organization for signals intelligence (SIGINT) activities;

2. Control of SIGINT collection and processing activities;

3. Collection of SIGINT information both for the support of military commanders and for national foreign intelligence purposes in accordance with guidance from the DCI;

4. Processing and dissemination of SIGINT information in accordance with guidance from the DCI;



5. Collection, processing, and dissemination of SIGINT information for counterintelligence purposes;

6. Conduct of research and development to meet the needs of the United States for SIGINT and communications security; and

7. Prescribing, within its field of authorized operations, security regulations covering operating practices, including the transmission, handling, and distribution of SIGINT and communications security material within and among the elements under control of the Director of the NSA.

(c) The Central Security Service was established in 1972 under the Director, NSA, who serves concurrently as the Chief, CSS. The purpose of this organization is to be an effective structure for controlling or guiding operations by Service Cryptologic Elements (SCE). SCEs include all Service resources performing SIGINT activities, fixed and mobile, including integral cryptologic elements of tactical or combat commands. The CSS supports national and military requirements. Combined cryptologic program (CCP) resources primarily support national requirements in peacetime, while tactical cryptologic program (TCP) resources support military operations. In addition, CCP resources also support military operations in peacetime, and portions are in a direct support mode in crises and war. Military departments retain command, administrative, and logistic support responsibilities."

#### (4) Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

(a) General. The continuous task of collecting, processing, evaluating, analyzing, integrating, producing, and disseminating military intelligence for the DOD rests with the DIA. This agency was established in 1961 to improve the coordination and management of defense intelligence collection and production activities, and to reduce the considerable duplication which then existed among the Service intelligence organizations. As a first step, the Directorate of Intelligence (J-2) of the Joint Staff (Joint Chiefs of Staff) was disestablished and its functions assigned to the Director, DIA.

1. DIA consists of about 5,000 people in four locations in the Washington area, with an additional 900 people abroad in the Defense Attache System operating in 92 foreign countries.

2. The Director, DIA, is responsible to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(b) Mission. The DIA Director's mission is to satisfy the foreign military intelligence requirements of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and major components of the Department of Defense. This is done through the use of DIA's own assigned resources, through the management and coordination of other DOD components, or through cooperation with other intelligence organizations such as CIA. Director, DIA, is the DOD spokesman and member of the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB), and is also manager of the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) part of the NFIB.

(c) Major Functions. DIA's functional responsibilities are encompassed within the broad areas of collection, production, and support. Although production is not the initial step in the intelligence process, it occupies most of DIA's resources. Four general categories of intelligence are produced by DIA and, under DIA guidance, by the military departments and the unified and specified commands.

1. The first production category is basic intelligence, which forms the database for all military intelligence studies, estimates, and short-term assessments. It contains, for example, basic information on strengths and capabilities of forces, target information, and biographic data on foreign military personalities.

2. The second category is time-sensitive current intelligence, which reports on major worldwide happenings and evaluates their significance. To support this function, DIA operates the National Military Intelligence Center on a 24-hour basis to identify and report indications of impending foreign developments that may have major impact on DOD responsibilities.

3. The third category is estimate intelligence. DIA furnishes the military input to national intelligence estimates prepared by the DCI and produces DOD estimates for departmental, joint, and international use. Both types include estimates of foreign capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action.

4. The final category is scientific and technical intelligence, which is produced by DIA and by the military departments under the overall management of DIA. Foreign scientific and technical intelligence includes research in natural and applied sciences, applied engineering techniques, and all aspects of weapons technology.

5. These categories are supplemented by specialized production units operated by the military departments and unified and specified commands. These are under DIA's management and include special imagery, electronics, and fleet intelligence/ocean surveillance analysis.

6. To obtain the information needed by U.S. intelligence producers, DIA coordinates all defense intelligence collection and processing activities. The Defense Attache System is the only collection activity directly controlled by DIA. Other intelligence collection resources, including those belonging to NSA and the Services, respond to DIA collection requirements together with the requirements of other non-defense intelligence customers.

7. In the collection process, DIA assembles, integrates, validates, and assigns relative priorities to all defense intelligence requirements. These are evaluated to determine the most economical means of collection and to avoid unnecessary duplication in tasking. Collection results are routinely checked to determine whether stated requirements are being satisfied and whether tasking should be reassigned or terminated.

8. In the area of support, DIA operates the Defense Intelligence College. Here, both military and civilian career personnel who are selected to fill key intelligence assignments and personnel preparing for foreign duty in the Defense Attache System are given extensive instruction.

9. Other DIA support functions include broad planning and managerial efforts to ensure proper coordination of DIA activities with those of other U.S. entities involved in foreign intelligence; control and direction of DOD general intelligence information (ADP) systems and associated communications; counterintelligence and internal security; and the usual housekeeping activities, such as personnel and administration.

(d) Organization and Command (See Appendix G). The DIA is an all-Service agency and consists of a director and such elements, facilities, and activities as are specifically assigned by the Secretary of Defense. The Director, DIA, reports to the Secretary of Defense through the Deputy Secretary of Defense. However, the Director reports to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and is under their operational control for the purposes of obtaining the intelligence support required to perform their statutory and assigned responsibilities, including the strategic direction of the unified and specified commands; and ensuring that adequate, timely, and reliable intelligence support is available to the unified and specified commands. DIA is organized into five directorates—Management and Operations, Foreign Intelligence, Resources and Systems, Intelligence and External Affairs, and JCS Support. Functionally, these directorates handle the attache system, plans and policy, resources and support, current intelligence estimates, intelligence research, and scientific and technical research. Elements of these directorates perform the following tasks:

1. Furnish intelligence and intelligence staff support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and ensure that adequate, timely, and reliable intelligence is available to the unified and specified commands.

2. Coordinate the operational and planning aspects of the DOD Indications System and support the National Military Command System through the National Military Intelligence Center.

3. Validate, prioritize, register, assign, and monitor the satisfaction of DOD collection requirements.

4. Direct, operate, and support the Defense Attache System.

5. Participate in operation of the National Photographic Interpretation Center and the Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center.

6. Establish, maintain, and operate facilities for DOD imagery indexing, processing, duplication, evaluation, exploitation, and central repository services in support of DOD and other authorized recipients.

7. Supervise a DOD-wide intelligence dissemination program and furnish centralized dissemination services in support of DOD and other authorized recipients.

8. Furnish intelligence bibliography, reference library, and research services as required to fulfill the DIA mission.

9. Establish and conduct or recommend RDT&E programs or projects required to fulfill responsibilities assigned.

10. Operate the Defense Intelligence College.

11. Recommend priorities for military intelligence production and collection.

12. In coordination with other intelligence agencies concerned, plan for intelligence operations, including the use of national intelligence systems to support military operational commanders; as directed, coordinate the execution of approved intelligence operations plans.

13. Act as central technical and management authority for all DOD intelligence information systems except those systems dedicated to SIGINT operations and support functions; plan for the integration of DOD intelligence information systems and the interfacing and, where appropriate, the interoperability of these systems with command and control systems, tactical systems, and Intelligence Community information systems.

14. In conformance with policies of DOD and the Director of Central Intelligence, guide DOD components concerning the release of defense intelligence information to foreign governments, international organizations, and the public.

15. Administer DOD security policies and programs to protect intelligence and intelligence sources and methods, and direct the Defense Special Security System.

16. Adjudicate clearance eligibility for DIA civilian personnel and eligibility for access to compartmented intelligence for all personnel assigned to Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the defense agencies, with the exception of NSA, including contractors and consultants.

17. Be represented on national and international intelligence committees, boards, and working groups, as appropriate.

18. Act as the DOD focal point for non-SIGINT relationships with foreign intelligence services.

19. Prepare and submit to the Director of Central Intelligence the DIA and Services' intelligence programs and budgets.

20. Ensure that all DIA policies, plans, programs, and activities are carried out in accordance with law and the provisions of

executive orders and other directives from higher authority establishing oversight controls on foreign intelligence activities.

21. Report to the Inspector General for Defense Intelligence any activities that raise questions of legality or propriety.

(e) Relationships. In the accomplishment of its mission, the DIA, under its director coordinates actions with DOD components and governmental agencies having collateral or related functions in the field of its assigned responsibilities and maintains liaison for the exchange of information and advice with them. The military departments and other DOD components support and assist the DIA as necessary.

(5) Department of the Army

(a) Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI). The ACSI is responsible to the Chief of Staff for overall coordination of the intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the U.S. Army. He has general staff responsibility for U.S. Army intelligence; counterintelligence; censorship; cryptologic, personnel, and information security; threat analysis; foreign liaison; IMINT/HUMINT/SIGINT/electro-optical collection; and meteorologic and topographic activities. The ACSI participates in the preparation of national intelligence and also serves as Chairman of the Army Information Security Review Board, Army Representative to the Military Intelligence Board, Army Alternate Member to the Defense Intelligence Board, and Army Principal to the National Foreign Intelligence Board. He is Director for Army Budget Program 3 (Intelligence) and Functional Chief of the Civilian Intelligence Career Development Program. The ACSI is responsible for monitoring Army intelligence training, force structure, organizations, and readiness, and supervises and controls some intelligence elements of U.S. Army field activities. His relationship to the Chief of Staff U.S. Army corresponds to that of a deputy chief of staff.

(b) The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence is functionally organized as follows:

Plans, Program, and Budget Office  
Management Support Office  
Foreign Liaison Directorate  
Foreign Intelligence Directorate  
Counterintelligence Directorate  
Intelligence Systems Directorate  
Intelligence Automation Management Office

These directorates and offices have the following responsibilities:

1. Serve as the official point of contact and channel of communication between Department of the Army and foreign military and civilian representatives in the United States and act as representative at functions hosted by foreign embassy personnel.

2. Fulfill Department of the Army and certain major command requirements for substantive intelligence support and manage the Army's general and scientific and technical intelligence production programs.

3. Perform counterintelligence analysis for the Army staff; exercise operational control of the U.S. Army Intelligence Operations Detachment; and act as Program Element Director for Human Resources Intelligence and Counterintelligence and Investigative Activities.

4. Formulate and justify Army intelligence resource requirements.

5. Develop and coordinate intelligence aspects of tactical Army intelligence, including tactical and strategic command and control in support of the Army in the field.

(c) The following are General Staff responsibilities:

1. Formulate and justify the Army's portion of the National Foreign Intelligence Program that includes the Consolidated Cryptologic Program, General Defense Intelligence Program, the Foreign Counterintelligence Program, and the Army Security and Investigative Activities Program.

2. Formulate, justify, and supervise, within overall guidance and policies developed by the Comptroller of the Army, the Army Budget for Program 38 Intelligence Activities.

3. Develop policy on intelligence organization, force structure, and installations; develop and coordinate intelligence aspects of strategy applications in joint and Army plans.

4. Formulate policy for the Army's cryptologic effort.

5. Exercise general staff responsibility for intelligence doctrine and assist DCSOPS and DCSPERS in the development of policy and in other matters of intelligence training and readiness of intelligence units.

6. Formulate Army policy on intelligence aspects of organization and operations concepts to support the Army in the field, including standardizing office intelligence activities relating to reconnaissance and surveillance; act as the Army Staff point of contact for environmental services (excluding environmental protection and pollution control programs); make program and budget recommendations and justification to the DCSOPS for intelligence units in Program 2.

7. Develop policy, act as national level liaison, and coordinate within DOD and other federal agencies on counterintelligence (CI), special investigations, operations, and related matters Army-wide.

8. Formulate Army personnel and information security policy and plans and perform program development and resource utilization of CI elements as they pertain to the DOD Personnel and Information Security Program.

9. Formulate Army policy for foreign disclosure and for censorship, give associated guidance and Army General Staff supervision, and review material to ensure proper level of classification.

10. Formulate Army policy for human resource intelligence (HUMINT) collection activities and take general staff responsibility for U.S. Army attache matters within the Defense Attache System and for intelligence on U.S. Army prisoners of war and members missing in action.

11. Exercise general staff responsibility and act as the Army Staff point of contact for reconnaissance and surveillance imagery collection, exploitation, security policy, and research and development; joint reconnaissance matters; Special Activities Office (SAO) policy; mapping, charting, and geodesy (MC&G), and military geographic information (MGI); and Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) collection requirements.

12. Give intelligence support to the Army Staff and CONUS major Army commands and activities by interpreting and adapting finished intelligence; contribute to formulation of departmental, joint, and national intelligence through participating in national- and DOD-level boards, committees, and working groups; furnish current intelligence assessments for Headquarters, Department of the Army, elements.

13. Produce scientific and technical intelligence and related matters, relying on the Army Intelligence Agency (Provisional) and the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center.

14. Formulate policy and supervise the implementation of foreign liaison.

15. Formulate policy for the use of intelligence contingency funds; program and budget for these funds; and through the Intelligence Inspector General conduct inspections to verify their proper use.

16. Manage and coordinate Army technology transfer.

(d) The U.S. Army Intelligence Agency (Provisional) is a field operating agency of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (OACSI). Its mission is to manage and produce general and scientific and technical intelligence to support strategic planners, force and material developers, and tactical commanders. Its major subordinate elements are the Missile Intelligence Agency, the Foreign Science and Technology Center, and the Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center.

(e) The U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) has the mission to perform nontactical intelligence operations above

corps level; conduct counterintelligence investigations and operations; give Army-wide all-source, multidiscipline operational security (OPSEC) and intelligence support; and furnish technical advice and operational assistance as required to help other functional and operating major Army commands in the discharge of their electronic warfare, intelligence, and security responsibilities.

(6) Department of the Navy

(a) The Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI), as Chief of Naval Operations' intelligence executive, exercises overall authority throughout the Department of the Navy in matters pertaining to intelligence and security and maintains liaison with all federal intelligence and counterintelligence agencies. The person in this position is also the Commander of the Naval Intelligence Command. The DNI

1. Reviews all interdepartmental and DOD directives and plans on matters related to his mission for impact on the requirements and responsibilities of the Department of the Navy and recommends actions to be taken thereon by the Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations.

2. Represents the Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations at NFIB meetings and on duly established interdepartmental and DOD committees for the consideration of matters related to his mission and maintains liaison with intelligence and security agencies, foreign and domestic, to ensure coordination of Navy participation in or support to activities conducted by those agencies.

3. Directs the development, coordination, and issuance of guidance and directives to implement within the Department of the Navy approved policies, plans, programs, and procedures on matters related to his mission.

4. Directs the development and coordination of mid- and long-range intelligence and security policies and objectives and sponsors the related requirements of manpower, equipment, facilities, and services within the framework of the Navy Planning and Programming System and the DOD Programming System.

5. Coordinates, publishes, and monitors compliance with criteria and standards to ensure that training, readiness, effectiveness, and responsiveness of intelligence and security personnel and activities are adequate to meet the current and mobilization requirements of the Navy.

6. Acts as a point of contact for liaison with foreign officials accredited to the Department of the Navy and advises and assists on protocol matters.

7. Sponsors requirements for research, development, testing, and evaluation of new and improved equipment and techniques related to his mission and collaborates on actions to fill these requirements.



(b) Commander Naval Intelligence Command directs and manages the activities of the Naval Intelligence Command to ensure the fulfillment of the intelligence and security requirements and responsibilities of the Department of the Navy as directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

1. Task Force 168 was established to give more responsive intelligence support to the fleet. Acquiring additional duties over the years, this organization now serves as the Naval intelligence collection manager. The Task Force is composed of a headquarters in Washington and units at nine locations around the world. Forward Area Support Teams support major fleet commands to facilitate operational responsiveness, and TF 168 personnel often deploy aboard ships and aircraft. Scientific and technical intelligence groups also carry out essential collection functions at major theater locations. The Commander, Task Force 168, also serves as Assistant COMNAVINTCOM for Operations.

2. Naval Intelligence Processing System Support Activity supports the Chief of Naval Operations, Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and commanders of major commands in the development and implementation of naval intelligence-sponsored automatic data processing systems for incorporation into the Navy Command and Control Systems, the National Military Command System, and the Worldwide Military Command and Control System.

3. Navy Operational Intelligence Center (NAVO-PINTCEN) produces finished operational intelligence, including indications and warning, ocean surveillance information, merchant shipping analysis, applied special naval support, and in-depth analysis of Soviet strategy, doctrine, tactics, and readiness in response to requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of the Navy, Defense Intelligence Agency, and joint commands, and disseminates the intelligence in time to support planning and execution of military and naval operations. It also operates the Naval Ocean Surveillance Information Center (NOSIC), one of six nodes of the Navy's Ocean Surveillance Information System (OSIS).

4. Naval Intelligence Support Center (NISC) produces scientific and technical intelligence of naval interest as directed by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Director, DIA; gives scientific and technical intelligence support to the Navy establishment; and maintains close scientific and technical relationships with the U.S. Government research and development community. It also operates facilities for image interpretation and merchant marine intelligence support to the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, and DIA; gives S&T intelligence support to the NSIC; produces image-derived information in support of the National Tasking Plan for the Exploitation of Multisensor Imagery; furnishes miniaturized and automated intelligence data bases and intelligence production support to the operating forces of the Navy; gives targeting intelligence support, including Single Integrated Operating Plan, to the Chief of Naval Operations, Commander, Naval Intelligence Command, Navy Planning Staffs, and Fleet Commanders; and conducts research, development, testing, and evaluation of image exploitation equipment, materials, and techniques.

(c) Naval Investigative Service under the DNI and the centralized control of the Defense Investigative Service operates a worldwide organization to fulfill the investigative and counterintelligence responsibilities of the Department of the Navy (less those combat-related counterintelligence matters within the functional responsibilities of the Marine Corps).

(d) The Naval Security Group (NSG) performs specialized technical functions relating to national security. NSG is managed and controlled by the Central Security Service, while the Department of the Navy retains administrative and logistic support responsibilities.

(e) The Director of Intelligence U.S. Marine Corps is responsible for the formulation of plans and policies pertaining to intelligence, counterintelligence, signals intelligence, and electronic warfare. Functions include connection with intelligence estimates, plans, reports, and studies. The Director

1. Discharges Marine Corps responsibilities in connection with intelligence estimates, plans, reports, and studies.

2. Handles the analysis and dissemination of pertinent intelligence to the Commandant and the staff of Headquarters Marine Corps.

3. Develops, in coordination with appropriate staff agencies, plans, policies, operational concepts, doctrine, and responsibilities in intelligence, counterintelligence, signals intelligence, and electronic warfare.

4. Formulates, in coordination with appropriate staff agencies, research and development requirements in combat intelligence, signals intelligence, and electronic warfare; monitors progress on R&D projects in response to those requirements.

5. Analyzes JCS papers which are of Intelligence Division cognizance and recommends positions for approval and use by the Commandant at meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

6. Monitors the actions of other U.S. intelligence agencies concerning intelligence and counterintelligence matters of interest to the Marine Corps.

7. Monitors Marine Corps participation in the naval attache system.

#### (7) Department of the Air Force

(a) The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (ACS/I), supervises the overall execution of departmental intelligence responsibilities to develop, maintain, and monitor a coherent intelligence program which will ensure the proper application of intelligence in all Air Force activities, and furnishes adequate, timely, and reliable departmental intelligence for use within DOD. The specific responsibilities of the ACS/I fall into three

categories: substantive intelligence; intelligence management and systems development; and administration, representation, and supervision.

**1. Substantive Intelligence.** The ACS/I is responsible for giving to the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff, the Air Staff, and, as required, Air Force commands and the Joint Staff substantive intelligence support regarding threats, including capabilities and physical composition, to the security of the United States and allies which affect the U.S. Air Force. This responsibility includes

**a.** Furnishing current all-source intelligence affecting, or potentially affecting, U.S. Air Force policies, resources, missions, or force deployments and employments.

**b.** Participating in preparation of joint and national intelligence estimates.

**c.** Adapting and formatting substantive intelligence for Air Force use and assuring its appropriate inclusion in departmental, joint, and unified/specified commands' planning, programming, and operational documentation.

**d.** Evaluating all-source aerospace-related intelligence to determine capabilities of foreign aerospace forces and associated military, political, economic, and psychosocial strengths and vulnerabilities.

**e.** Determining substantive all-source intelligence voids and initiating appropriate requirement satisfaction actions.

**f.** Performing intelligence research and analytical, gaming, and assessment support for Air Staff, Joint Staff, and Office, Secretary of Defense, and OSD study groups.

**g.** Furnishing staff guidance and review services for intelligence aspects of mapping, charting, geodesy, target materials, and scientific and technical intelligence activities.

**h.** Assisting in satisfying substantive intelligence support responsibilities to the USAF Contingency Planning Staff, the Air Force Emergency Operations Center, and USAF Alternate Headquarters.

**2. Intelligence Management and Systems Development.** The ACS/I gives the Secretary of the Air Force, Chief of Staff, and the Air Staff advice, technical evaluations, and recommendations for developing, planning, programming, funding, and managing intelligence personnel, equipment, and systems. This responsibility includes

**a.** Formulating policy and staff guidance for developing, managing, and operating U.S. Air Force intelligence collection, processing production, data handling, and dissemination systems.

b. Monitoring development and acquisition of advanced systems.

c. Furnishing staff guidance on concerning U.S. Air Force intelligence collection and exploitation activities.

d. Collaborating in the generation of substantive intelligence requirements.

e. Developing and reviewing intelligence aspects of concepts, doctrine, policy, plans, and programs.

f. Issuing guidance and exercising, in coordination with affected Air Staff offices, primary staff direction for submitting the USAF General Defense Intelligence Program and the Consolidated Cryptologic Program.

g. Assisting with intelligence systems and management information support for USAF Contingency Planning Staff, the Air Force Emergency Operations Center, and USAF Alternate Headquarters.

3. Administrative, Representational, and Supervisory Responsibilities. These responsibilities include

a. Interpreting and implementing U.S. National Disclosure Policy and other applicable instructions concerning security and use of compartmented intelligence.

b. Sitting on the National Foreign Intelligence Board, the National Military Information Disclosure Policy Committee, and the Military Intelligence Board.

c. Directing the activities of the Air Force Special Activities Center (AFSAC), which conducts worldwide human resources intelligence (HUMINT) collection and coordinates and gives staff, policy, and special support to ACS/I and other USAF elements on HUMINT matters.

(b) The Inspector General, USAF, handles the functions of security and counterintelligence. Within that office, the responsibilities for physical security, law enforcement, and security police have been delegated to the Director of Security Police, who directs base chiefs of security police. The responsibilities of the Inspector General for counterintelligence operations and activities within the Air Force are assigned to the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI). AFOSI is a separate operating agency which conducts criminal, counterintelligence, and special investigative services for all Air Force activities. It collects, analyzes, and disseminates information of investigative and counterintelligence significance and collects and reports information for base security available from human sources near overseas U.S. Air Force installations. As the commander of AFOSI, the Director of AFOSI acts for the Chief of Staff and for the Inspector General in conducting investigative and counterintelligence programs through subordinate districts,

detachments, and other operating locations throughout the Air Force. This includes the investigation of treason, sedition, subversion, security violations, disaffection, and espionage and sabotage activities and threats which affect the Air Force and are within AFOSI jurisdictional authority.

(c) The Foreign Technology Division (FTD) is a subordinate field activity of Air Force Systems Command (AFSC). Its mission is to produce scientific and technical intelligence in response to tasks that are levied by the DIA on the Department of the Air Force or that originate within the Department of the Air Force. FTD collaborates with other AFSC subordinate elements to increase and improve use of foreign technology and intelligence in AFSC research, development, test, and evaluation programs, systems projects, and studies. Overall management control and general staff supervision of scientific and technical intelligence production in the Air Force is accomplished by the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, under the general guidance of and tasking from DIA.

#### 3.4

### DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Department of State is charged with the following intelligence missions:

- a. Overtly collect foreign political, political-military, sociological, economic, scientific, technical, and associated biographic information.
- b. Produce and disseminate foreign intelligence relating to U.S. foreign policy as required for the execution of State Department responsibilities and in support of policymakers involved in foreign relations within the U.S. Government.
- c. Disseminate within the U.S. Government reports received from U.S. diplomatic missions abroad.
- d. Coordinate with the Director of Central Intelligence to ensure that U.S. intelligence activities and programs are useful for and consistent with U.S. foreign policy.
- e. Transmit reporting requirements of the Intelligence Community to U.S. chiefs of missions abroad and guide their collection efforts.
- i. Support chiefs of missions in discharging their responsibilities to direct and coordinate the activities of all elements of their missions.

#### 3.5

### FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Under the supervision of the Attorney General and pursuant to such regulations as the Attorney General may establish, the FBI is responsible for the following:

- a. Detecting and preventing espionage, sabotage, subversion, and other unlawful activities by or on behalf of foreign powers through lawful counterintelligence operations within the United States.

b. Conducting within the United States and its territories, when requested by officials of the Intelligence Community designated by the President, those lawful activities, including electronic surveillance, authorized by the President and specifically approved by the Attorney General, to be undertaken in support of foreign intelligence collection requirements of other intelligence agencies.

c. Collecting foreign intelligence by lawful means within the United States and its territories when requested by officials of the Intelligence Community designated by the President to make such requests.

d. Disseminating, as appropriate, foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence information which it acquires to appropriate federal agencies, state and local law enforcement agencies, and cooperating foreign governments.

e. Coordination and Dissemination of Security Data. The FBI has the responsibility of referring matters under the jurisdiction of any other federal agencies in these fields to the appropriate sources. During the course of the bureau's investigations, particular attention is given at all times to information indicating any Soviet communist hostile action. As a part of this overall program, the FBI makes name checks of its files for the various agencies of the government.

f. Specialized Security Programs. Executive Order 10450, 27 May 1953, assigned the FBI responsibilities concerned with various sensitive types of applicant and employee investigations. This order, which established the security procedure covering "all persons seeking the privilege of employment or privileged to be employed in the departments and agencies of the government," directs that all investigations conducted by any other agencies which develop adverse information involving loyalty or information showing coercion of an employee to act contrary to the interests of the national security should be referred promptly to the FBI for a full field investigation. Other legislative enactments and Presidential directives require the FBI to ascertain facts pertinent to the loyalty and security risks of certain employees and applicants for positions in the government service or in activities incident to which the government has an official interest.

### 3.6

#### DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

The Department of Energy is represented on the National Foreign Intelligence Board and

a. Participates with the Department of State in overtly collecting political, economic, and technical information about foreign energy matters.

b. Produces and disseminates foreign intelligence necessary for the secretary's responsibilities.

c. Participates in formulating intelligence collection and analysis requirements where the special expert capability of the department can contribute.

d. Gives expert technical, analytical, and research capability to other agencies within the intelligence community.

### **3.7**

#### **DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY**

The Secretary of the Treasury is represented on the National Foreign Intelligence Board and

- a. Overtly collects foreign financial and monetary information.
- b. Participates with the Department of State in the overt collection of general foreign economic information.
- c. Produces intelligence required for the execution of the secretary's interdepartmental responsibilities and the mission of the Department of the Treasury.
- d. Contributes intelligence and guidance required for the development of national intelligence.
- e. Disseminates within the U.S. Government foreign intelligence information acquired.

### **3.8**

#### **DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION**

Under the supervision of the Attorney General and pursuant to such regulations as the Attorney General may establish, the administrator of DEA

- a. Collects, produces, and disseminates intelligence on the foreign and domestic aspects of narcotics production and trafficking in coordination with other intelligence agencies.
- b. Participates with the Department of State in the overt collection of general foreign political, economic, and agricultural information on narcotics production and trafficking.
- c. Coordinates with the DCI to ensure that the foreign narcotics intelligence activities of DEA are consistent with other foreign intelligence programs.

## CHAPTER 4

### COLLECTION OF INFORMATION FOR JOINT FORCES

#### 4.1 INTRODUCTION

a. Significance of Collection Function. Since earliest recorded time, the collection of information\* about other lands and peoples has had great political, economic, and military significance. The oldest military treatise known, written by the Chinese leader Sun Tzu about 500 B.C., sets forth some clear notions about the importance of collecting information. Sun Tzu said, "To remain in ignorance of the enemy's condition is the height of inhumanity. . . .What enables the good general to strike and conquer and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men is foreknowledge." The Duke of Wellington once remarked that he had spent half his military career wondering what was "on the other side of the hill." In brief, the vital necessity of obtaining information about an actual or potential enemy has been recognized down through the ages.

b. Definition. Any undertaking to collect information, whether it be on a small or large scale, must be carefully guided, for any weakness in the collection phase is reflected in the intelligence effort as a whole. Information should contribute to the production of accurate and timely intelligence and be applicable to the intelligence mission of the command. Hence, collection may be defined as "the procurement and selection of information pertinent to a given intelligence problem" (DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms).

c. Difficulties in Collection. Many difficulties are involved in obtaining helpful information and using it to arrive at reliable conclusions. These difficulties are due principally to the efforts of the actual or potential enemy to foil attempts made to gain valuable information. Enemies will enforce strict censorship and communication security measures to prevent leads of useful information. They may distribute false information and institute other measures to deceive or mislead collecting agencies. They will sometimes adopt a course of action that may appear illogical. The opposition of enemy interests to our own, as well as their independence of will, makes collection of information difficult.

d. Collection Responsibilities. The broad collection responsibilities of the various departments of the U.S. Government are established by the National Security Council (NSC). The collection effort is broad, intensive, and continuing, as it is a vital element of national security. A description of the general responsibilities of the respective departments is contained in Chapter 3 of this publication.

e. Assisting Departments and Agencies. Governmental departments and agencies, other than purely intelligence oriented organizations, assist in the collection of information. For example, the Library of Congress acquires

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\* Also called "intelligence acquisition."



books, newspapers, and magazines from all over the world on nearly all subjects and is probably the best governmental source for general information. The Treasury Department and the Departments of Justice, Interior, Agriculture, Labor, and Commerce all participate in the overall U.S. collection effort. These agencies compile worldwide statistics and other types of information which are pertinent to their respective fields of endeavor. Such information has a continuing intelligence value.

f. Defense Instructions for Collection. Within the Department of Defense, collection is undertaken in accordance with the Defense Intelligence Agency Manual (DIAM 58-1) and corollary Service and unified and specified command instructions. These publications furnish direction and guidance for the planning, coordination, and employment of Department of Defense (DOD) resources in the collection and reporting of intelligence information for DOD missions.

g. Collection in a Unified Command. In a unified command, the commander is responsible for the coordination of all normal collection activities in his area. In practice the joint intelligence organization at unified command level coordinates collection activities and formulates policy for the collection of information. This organization generally does not engage in the immediate control, direction, or supervision of collecting agencies. The latter functions are usually handled by the component commanders of the unified or specified command. In wartime, geographical locations, means of communications, and economy of resources may dictate that the direct control and supervision of collecting agencies be vested in the unified and/or joint force commander. In other circumstances the collection agencies may, as in peacetime, come under the direct supervision and control of the component commands. In any event the collection effort in peace or war must be responsive to the intelligence requirements of the unified command as well as the component commands. These requirements are set forth in a collection plan, which is prepared by the unified command and by all subordinate commands. (See paragraph 4.2c.)

## 4.2

### COLLECTION PLANNING

a. General. The mission of the joint command establishes the guidelines for the intelligence collection requirements. Thus the first step by the intelligence organization of a joint force is to determine what types of information (military, political, economic, scientific, sociological) and in what detail are required to support the mission. This first step should be done in consultation with the commander to obtain his views on the intelligence aspects of the mission. This initial consultation may generate some specific collection requirements in areas which will initially receive sufficient information from higher authority to prepare a preliminary intelligence estimate. The intelligence estimate should include all pertinent intelligence currently available.

b. Essential Elements of Information (EEI) and Intelligence Collection Tasks

(1) EEI are "the critical items of information regarding the enemy and his environment needed by the commander by a particular time, to relate with other available information and intelligence in order to assist him in reaching a logical decision" (DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms). For example, an element could be "Will the enemy forces facing the command launch an early attack on our forces?" EEI are usually enunciated in the form of questions posed to focus the attention and activities of all collection agencies on the high-priority information which is needed at a particular time.

(2) The assignment of collection tasks is predicated on the availability and capability of the collecting agencies to accomplish them, with due consideration being given to the time required for collection and transmission of the raw intelligence information to the requesting headquarters.

(3) Origin. Intelligence is designed not to control, but to contribute to the operation or the planning. For this reason the commander, as well as the operational staff of a joint command, should participate in the final formulation of the essential elements of information. In short, although the intelligence staff prepares and proposes the EEI, they emanate from the commander and his staff. However, the commander may have other EEI to satisfy. (See 4.2b (5).)

(4) Dissemination. The EEI may be disseminated to the command in an operation order, in the intelligence annex to the operation order, or as a separate communication.

(5) Scope. The EEI for a given situation will not be the same at all echelons composing a unified command. At each lower echelon the EEI will change in character to meet the needs of that particular command. Therefore, EEI which are announced by a higher headquarters are not copied verbatim, although some may be the same. Generally speaking, the EEI of a higher headquarters will tend to be broader, while those of the lower echelons will tend to be narrower. Often the indications of the higher headquarters are considered and treated as EEI by the lower, which may prepare more specific indications for it. (See para. 4.2d.)

(6) In addition to the EEI generated by the commander, the intelligence officer may have others to satisfy. These would be specifically requested of him by other staff officers or higher headquarters as well as lower and neighboring units. The Intelligence Collection Requirements Manuals (DIAM 58 series) are the basic documents in the DOD collection requirements program. They cover in general terms the subjects of worldwide collection interest to all DOD agencies having requirements for intelligence. They are intended for use by all elements of the DOD intelligence structure. In the field, DOD collection agencies are expected to plan and accomplish tasks in accordance with DIAM 58 series and related requirements.

c. Collection Plan. In order to direct a systematic search for the desired information, a plan of action must be devised. (For an example, see Appendix C.) This plan, generally referred to as an intelligence collection plan, may be a work sheet solely for the use of the intelligence staff, or it may be a more formal document. It is not normally disseminated in its entirety. It should include a statement of what information is wanted, when it is needed, and who is to get it. The plan is designed to eliminate conflict, omissions, duplication, and confusion by

- (1) Analyzing and transforming elements of information into missions.
- (2) Assigning the missions (collection tasks) to collecting agencies.
- (3) Designating the method of reporting.
- (4) Setting the time when the information is due.

The plan, when completed, forms the basis for orders governing the search for information by the agencies available and for requests to higher agencies for information that cannot be obtained otherwise.

d. Indications

(1) Description. An essential element of information question can seldom be answered by a single item. To answer the broad EEI question, it is first broken down in terms of indications or related component questions which are actually lesser questions arising from the same problem. Indications are clues, tokens, signs, or symptoms that reveal all or part of the answer to the EEI question. Before the enemy can implement a particular line of action, he must make some preparations. For example, with an EEI question about enemy attack, one of the indications may have to do with reinforcement, another with redeployment, and another with unusual activities. An increased number of deserters coming into friendly lines, issuance of combat rations, and frontal deployment of artillery or bridging equipment are all indications of impending attack. The development of indications requires imagination and a searching analysis for clues to the enemy's capabilities and adoption of specific courses of action.

- (2) Criteria. Indication questions should
  - (a) Confirm each other without unnecessary duplication.
  - (b) Be specific.
  - (c) Relate to essential items only.
  - (d) Identify the broad areas of collection action required.

e. Formulation of Orders and Requests

(1) After analyzing the EEI and other intelligence requirements and recording the indications corresponding to each, the actual orders or requests for information are then prepared from fragmentary notes contained in the collection plan. Although in fragmentary form in the collection plan, these notes should be in sufficient detail to permit the formulation of orders or requests for information which, when met, will completely satisfy the need without additional collection action. However, partial satisfaction may be expected and is acceptable. These orders and requests may be issued separately or combined into an intelligence plan.

(2) The intelligence officer's collection plan includes instructions for reporting. It states the degree of urgency of the request, the date when the information is desired, and any instructions necessary. This information is included in the written requests (or orders) for information when they are sent to the selected collection agencies. In determining the time of reporting, the intelligence officer is guided by the fact that information arriving too late is of no value and information arriving before needed is likely to be out of date and inaccurate when projected operations are undertaken. Consideration must also be given to the time factor for issuing orders in all echelons of command involved in the mission, the time required to execute the collection mission, and the time to report its results.

f. Summary. In summary, the EEI and other intelligence requirements constitute the general missions for the various collecting agencies of all forces in the unified command and form the basis of the unified collection plan. The preparation of a collection plan is a systematic approach for directing a search for information. It is an essential step in determining the tasks of the various collecting agencies and in effecting proper coordination of effort of all forces in the command. When completed, the plan forms the basis for orders governing the search for information by the agencies available, and for requests to higher and adjacent headquarters for information that cannot be obtained by means available to the commander of the unified command.

4.3

**TYPICAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR JOINT FORCES**

a. The total intelligence required by a joint task force is the intelligence needed by all components of the force. The following are typical intelligence requirements or essential elements of information.

b. Intelligence for Air Force Units. The intelligence requirements of air units in a joint task force are, with few exceptions, the same as the requirements of air forces in any other type of operation. They are

(1) Complete order of battle information on the enemy force in order to plan properly an air operation in hostile territory, including characteristics and performance data on aircraft, the location of air base complexes, combat tactics and doctrine, and the status of training of units.

(2) Information on ground and naval targets in the area and detailed information on the terrain over which close air support for surface forces will operate. For interdiction missions, information on enemy lines

of communication with particular emphasis on terminals or bottlenecks will be required.

(3) Photographs of drop zones and landing zones plus detailed information on existing defense facilities in order to conduct airborne operations.

(4) Intelligence supporting survival, escape, resistance and evasion (SERE). Such information is essential for aircrews and will include such items as safe area intelligence descriptions, climatological and demographic information, and basic guidance on resistance to interrogation. An important by-product of an effective escape and evasion system, often supported by special operations forces, is the valuable information evaders and escapers can often bring back to friendly lines.

(5) The nature and extent of the enemy air defense system. This should include the location and characteristics of surveillance radar plus information on antiaircraft artillery, missiles, and interceptor force.

(6) Climatology studies and accurate day-to-day weather information in the proposed area of operations. This information is mandatory for successful air operations and is, of course, of great importance to all elements of the task force.

(7) Enemy nuclear threat. This is possibly the most significant item of intelligence required, including all possible information on the enemy capability, such as weapons, storage sites, and delivery systems, as well as their intent and willingness to use such weapons.

c. Intelligence for Naval Units. The intelligence requirements of naval units in a joint task force vary with the type of units assigned and their missions and tasks. Naval forces need to know

(1) Firsthand knowledge of the enemy naval order of battle. This would include information on which ships can interfere or oppose the approach, the landing, the resupply, and the withdrawal.

(2) The enemy submarine threat en route to and in the objective area.

(3) The location and character of enemy minefields and mine warfare capabilities.

(4) Data on coast and landing beaches. Hydrographic information on waters off potential landing beaches must be supplied. This must include very detailed information on the beaches themselves, as well as such items as location and types of underwater obstacles, character of the beaches, identifying marks, tides, and currents.

(5) Weather and climate information, visibility, temperatures, wind storms, etc.

(6) Location and types of coastal defense artillery in order to take proper countermeasures. In this connection, information as to contours at and beyond the beaches in order to properly control and deliver naval gunfire on shore targets is required. This contour information is also useful in predicting and interpreting radar presentations.

(7) The location of enemy troop concentrations and coastal lines of communication. This data is needed to permit advantageous use of naval gunfire in support of troops.

(8) Air intelligence. This is needed for naval air operations and is essentially the same as that required by the Air Force units involved.

(9) Extent of the enemy nuclear threat. The Navy, like the other Services, must know the extent of the enemy nuclear threat.

d. Intelligence for Army and Marine Corps Ground Units. Ground force units in a joint task force operation do not normally have the variety of missions and tasks which air and naval units are assigned. However, the intelligence they require is considerable, and the major requirements are listed below.

(1) Characteristics of the Area. Intelligence required by ground units is included in the frequently used term "characteristics of the area." Ground forces, since they use the terrain foot by foot, need to know practically everything about the topography of the land occupied by the enemy over which they will advance. Examples of necessary information are data on where the soil and vegetation will permit infantry units to advance most easily and where these characteristics will hinder foot movement; where the terrain is trafficable to wheeled and tracked vehicles and where it is not; and what terrain is most suitable to the enemy for their operations and where it restricts and limits their movements.

(2) Hydrography. Amphibious operations require very detailed and explicit information on the hydrography off landing beaches to properly employ landing craft and amphibious vehicles.

(3) Beaches. The best information possible is required, for both tactical and logistic purposes, on the nature of the beaches themselves and the routes inland from such beaches. These affect the scheme of maneuver and the type and amount of supplies and equipment to be made available.

(4) Landing Areas. A great deal of information on the landing areas is required for airborne operations. This includes details on drop zones, enemy troop dispositions, and activities in the drop area, particularly on enemy armor, the greatest threat to airborne operations during the early stages.

(5) The Enemy Ground Order of Battle. All ground forces need information on the enemy ground order of battle. This includes knowledge of the strength, organization, equipment, identity, location, disposition, and

combat efficiency of the enemy forces, as well as the means and manner of moving and supplying these forces. This information, plus the details of defensive installations, will furnish what is called the enemy's "organization of the area for defense."

(6) **Air Intelligence.** Like the air and naval forces involved, the ground forces need some air intelligence. Sufficient details must be made available on the enemy planes and their characteristics to take effective active and passive defensive measures against air attack, including nuclear attack.

e. **Climate, Weather, and Biographic Information.** The military commander, regardless of environment, must consider the effects of climate and weather when he plans for and executes his mission. Biographic information is important as an aid to identifying enemy units and in some cases predicting the course of action the enemy will take.

f. **SUMMARY.** No single organization can be devised which will meet the requirements for all situations. Variations in organizations will be dictated by such considerations as strategic requirements, amount and type of initial intelligence available, the degree to which the separate Services are involved, the scope of the mission, the characteristics of the area, the training and experience of the commander and his staff, and the time available for planning.

4.4

#### **SOURCES AND COLLECTION AGENCY TERMINOLOGY**

a. **Definitions.** The following definitions of the terms "source" and "collection" are accepted DOD intelligence terms, as defined in DIAM 58-1. The definition of "collection agency" is the one agreed on for NATO.

(1) **Source**--a person, thing, or activity from which intelligence information is obtained.

(2) **Collection**--the exploitation of sources of information by the collection agencies and the delivery of this information to the proper intelligence processing unit for use in the production of finished intelligence.

(3) **Collection Agency**--any individual or specialized organization used in collecting or processing intelligence information.

b. **Categories of Sources.** Sources of intelligence information are best considered under three major categories: human, documentary, and material. While collection opportunity varies in scope according to the political, climatic, sociological, and economic circumstances that prevail, these three basic sources are always present. No collection plan is complete until the potential of these three sources is considered in the light of military intelligence requirements.

c. **Evaluation of Information.** Information can be evaluated only if there is knowledge of the accuracy and reliability of the source, the

circumstances under which the information was obtained, and the relationship of the source and collection.

d. Determination of Sources to be Exploited. In determining which sources of information to exploit, the following questions must be considered:

- (1) What type of information is required?
- (2) Of the available sources, which are the most reliable?
- (3) Will the appropriate collectors be able to exploit the sources in time?

e. Assignment of Collection Tasks. The capabilities and limitations of collectors must be kept in mind in assigning collection tasks. Effectiveness of the collectors is impaired if they are given too many tasks. Duplication of tasks is warranted only if it is designed to lead to confirming information or if it increases the likelihood of obtaining the information needed.

#### 4.5

#### TYPICAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION

a. Aerial Surveillance. Aerial reconnaissance and surveillance give both strategic and tactical intelligence. Accurate and timely intelligence for the commander can be obtained by visual, photographic, or electronic means. Aerial imagery (photography, radar, and infrared) is a prime source of information for land, sea, and air targets development; mapping and charting; terrain studies; and battle damage assessment. It can amplify or substantiate other sources.

b. Captured Enemy Documents. A document is any recorded information, regardless of its physical form or characteristics. This includes, but is not limited to, written material; printed, drawn, or engraved material; sound or voice recordings; photographs and exposed film; and reproductions of any of these.

c. Captured Enemy Material. Technological advances and weaknesses of an enemy are often reflected in material production. Careful scrutiny of actual equipment, including its factory markings and related data, can give a reasonably accurate estimate of the enemy's ability to wage offensive and/or defensive war. Samples or photographs of "hardware" give researchers an insight into the enemy's technical achievements and trends.

d. Weather Forecasts and Studies. The most effective employment of military forces requires consideration of the influence of weather from the inception of a plan through its final execution. Accurate interpretation of the effects of weather increases the probability of success in operations and helps deduce probable enemy courses of action. Weather reconnaissance aircraft furnish valuable forecasts of weather immediately ahead. Often this is the only method of learning about weather fronts and changes over enemy territory.



e. Enemy Press, Radio, and TV. The information that a nation releases to its public, even in time of war, often contains items of value in completing the overall intelligence picture. Enemy news media are sources of information on enemy organization, assignment of important military and political matters, status of the national economy, psychological reactions of the enemy population, and casualty data.

f. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). SIGINT comprises both electronics intelligence (ELINT) and communications intelligence (COMINT). Ground stations, ships, and aircraft are employed to intercept and record enemy communications, early warning, antiaircraft, and ground-controlled intercept signals. By analyzing the type, volume, and direction of radiations from enemy electronic equipment, it is possible to obtain much information about the enemy. Electronic reconnaissance is particularly valuable in helping to determine the location of enemy radar and high frequency radio circuits, which have relatively short transmission ranges. If enemy communications are intercepted and decrypted, valuable specific information is gained about the strength, disposition, movement, and projected operations of enemy forces. SIGINT is the single most reliable source of intelligence and is particularly useful in confirming information received from other sources.

g. Prisoners of War. Prisoners of war divulge information, advertently or inadvertently, through interrogation. Maximum information is obtained only through continued skillful handling from time of capture throughout all interrogations. Information obtainable includes data on unit identifications, troop dispositions, contemplated movements, state of morale, fortifications, and effects of psychological warfare operations.

h. Deserters. Deserters are handled as prisoners of war. They may exhibit ideas and attitudes which are not typical of the bulk of opposing forces and may include false deserters.

i. Refugees. Refugees and civilian escapees are ordinarily not trained in noting things of military significance. However, with proper interrogation much valuable information may be obtained.

j. Evadees. Evadees can supply considerable information if they are equipped with maps or have a good knowledge of the enemy terrain.

k. Aircrews. Aircrews can furnish valuable combat information about the enemy's concentrations, tactics, order of battle, and statistical data. The report of visual observations is highly valuable as a source of information on new targets--fleeing or stationary.

l. Military Attaches. Military attaches represent the armed Services of the United States in foreign countries. It is their duty to collect information which is of interest to the United States. In addition, they are members of the ambassador's or minister's diplomatic family.

m. Allied Forces. Just like U.S. Armed Forces, the intelligence collecting agencies and sources of allies can furnish much information and intelligence. The problems involved in establishing and conducting exchanges

of intelligence with allies vary greatly and their successful solution requires wisdom, tact, careful planning, and consistent effort.

n. Underground Forces. Intelligence information collected by underground forces has limitations similar to that collected by clandestine means. In addition, it has the added disadvantage that the reliability of underground agents must always be carefully evaluated.

o. Civilian Sources. Fortunately for military intelligence, a great many organizations, both governmental and private, collect data from industry for their own needs. In many instances the military Services can take this data and reorganize it to fit their own needs, thus saving time and effort in collecting information. Larger companies and industries compile data for trade groups that buy from them. Other sources are banks, international trading companies, transportation companies, book companies, and the film industry. Films are valuable sources of intelligence information, as are widely traveled, intelligent tourists. There are, however, legal constraints on U.S. intelligence activities collecting information from United States citizens.

p. The Library of Congress maintains a comprehensive research section to prepare studies requested by specially authorized personnel.

q. The Department of State obtains information from its embassies and consular offices all over the world. The Treasury Department and the Departments of Justice, Interior, Agriculture, Labor, and Commerce also furnish valuable intelligence information.

r. Miscellaneous governmental agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission, the Smithsonian Institution, and the U.S. Tariff Commission, are sources of various kinds of information.

#### 4.6

### MILITARY COLLECTION ORGANIZATIONS AND CAPABILITIES

a. General. In addition to the many agencies at national level concerned with the collection of information, the military commanders in the field have their own organic units to assist in this effort. It is also customary to enhance a command's collection capabilities by the attachment of specialized units and personnel as the need arises. Air reconnaissance units, ground combat patrols, and surface and submarine naval forces are but a few examples of the diverse units that gather information in the combat areas.

b. Air. Air reconnaissance units obtain military information, including weather, by photographic, visual, and electronic methods from aircraft normally belonging to the reconnaissance elements of the Air Force, Navy, and Army. Air reconnaissance is an effective and reliable collection means capable of penetrating more deeply into enemy territory than other overt agencies and giving more detailed information than is otherwise available.

c. Ground. Normally this type of reconnaissance should be by stealth and observation of the enemy and should be conducted without enemy

knowledge. Combat should be resorted to only when necessary to save the reconnaissance force from annihilation or capture or when the mission requires that the enemy be forced to reveal dispositions through combat. Ground reconnaissance agencies consist of personnel manning observation posts, reconnaissance patrols, and parties of any size from all arms and Services. Reconnaissance patrols can obtain a wide range of information on strength and disposition of enemy units; conditions of roads, rails, and bridges; enemy traffic; effects of friendly gunfire and bombing; enemy casualties; and terrain. To carry out this type of reconnaissance the Army uses units from infantry squad up to armored cavalry regiments. The Marine Corps has similar units up to company size and specializes in amphibious reconnaissance.

d. Sea

(1) **Surface Forces.** Practically all of the surface naval reconnaissance effort is carried out by units tailored for the particular mission by drawing on the various type commands for material and personnel. Exceptions to this general rule are underwater demolition teams, landing parties, and small boat groups.

(2) **Submarines.** In addition to surface forces, submarines are dispatched on independent patrols. The need for certain information on channels, depths, currents, landfalls, and enemy minefields requires both surface and subsurface reconnaissance. Submarines can also assist in filling gaps in electronic reconnaissance conducted by long-range aircraft.

e. **Human Resource Intelligence (HUMINT) Collection.** People are among the intelligence collector's most valuable sources of information. Whether their attitude is friendly, hostile, or indifferent, those who have knowledge of, or access to, information of intelligence interest can possibly be exploited for intelligence purposes. Such exploitation gives intelligence which normally is not obtainable through other means, and it complements and backs up other collection methods. HUMINT collection operations are conducted in peace and war by component commands having organic HUMINT collection elements. Collection support also is given by departmentally controlled HUMINT collection units. In a combat environment, interrogation centers may be established for joint or combined exploitation of prisoners of war and other non-U.S. detainees. Interrogation of such sources is not only the most important means of obtaining information concerning enemy intentions, but is also the primary means of obtaining order of battle information beyond unit type and subordination. In tactical applications, interrogation information supports the planning of military operations by identifying potential targets for airstrikes and ground sweeps.

f. **Communications Intelligence (COMINT).** There are facilities designed to intercept foreign radio communications and to acquire information on the location and identification of enemy radio communications facilities. These units perform field cryptanalysis and traffic analysis of intercepted communications. There are also facilities engaged in the monitoring of foreign electronics emissions to determine locations, types, and capabilities of equipment.

g. Technical Intelligence Teams. The bits of information used in piecing together the whole picture of enemy war potential are collected by technical liaison officers and technical intelligence teams trained to collect items of enemy equipment in theaters of war. In the U.S. Air Force, technical exploitation teams manned by officers, civilians, and airmen of the Foreign Technology Division of the Systems Command are specifically trained for this duty. In the U.S. Army technical intelligence detachments collect and report information obtained from the study of enemy or other foreign material. In the U.S. Navy the technical intelligence function is integrated into the overall intelligence effort.

h. Counterintelligence Agencies. A counterintelligence agency is any unit, office, organization, group, or individual that contributes to the successful accomplishment of the counterintelligence mission. Some agencies have specialized counterintelligence functions arising from the nature of their mission. These include U.S. Army Military Intelligence Units, the Office of Special Investigations (USAF), the Naval Investigative Service, the Coast Guard's Intelligence Division, the State Department, the Treasury Department, and the Justice Department. In addition, when U.S. Forces are deployed in overseas areas, close and continued liaison must be established with counterintelligence agencies of allied nations.

4.7

#### THE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PLAN

a. Appendix C is a reproduced page from an intelligence collection plan. Such a plan would have a number of pages roughly equivalent to the number of EEI it contained. For convenience in maintaining the plan in current status, usually only one element is listed per page or on several pages. Thus, as EEI are fulfilled and no longer required in the plan, orders are sent to the units to remove the page or pages and destroy them.

b. In the example listed, only one element is shown with six indications. There might be more. The specific orders to the collection agencies are typical. Probably many more collection agencies would be contained in the real plan. Note that our example does not show the specific orders and the collection agencies for the last three indications.

4.8

#### INTELLIGENCE STORAGE AND RETRIEVAL

a. One problem that is frequently given inadequate or belated attention is storage of and access to the collected information. As the quantity of information collected increases, so does the problem of rapid retrieval. There is a growing effort to standardize storage formats, particularly in those collection organizations that support computer-served intelligence efforts.

b. Since semiautomated or automated retrieval systems are costly, the intelligence officer of a joint or unified command should coordinate closely with adjacent commands and with component intelligence units within his command to achieve maximum standardization of information storage and retrieval. Command support is usually assured if commanders can be shown that faster and more complete exchange of information will result.

## CHAPTER 5

### PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE FOR JOINT FORCES

#### 5.1 INTRODUCTION

a. Definition of Intelligence Production. Intelligence production is the logical process of judging the credibility of collected information, drawing pertinent inferences from an analysis of it, and, when appropriate, interpreting such inferences in the perspective of planning. The production phase is complete when the previous analytic efforts have been applied to the preparation of the appropriate intelligence product. The major joint force production effort, particularly in time of war, centers on the production of operational and combat intelligence. This chapter emphasizes these areas.

b. Scope of Intelligence Production. The functions conducted to produce intelligence include

- (1) Research on the availability of appropriate information and intelligence.
- (2) Assembly of that information.
- (3) Reading, review, and discussion of the information.
- (4) Assessing the credibility of the information.
- (5) Comparison of the various parts or elements of the information.
- (6) Integration of the elements into new information and intelligence.
- (7) Drawing pertinent inferences from the information.
- (8) Interpretation of such inferences in the perspective of planning.
- (9) Grouping the result into complete and finished intelligence.
- (10) Determination of the specific additional information and intelligence required.

c. Production as Related to Levels of Command. These production functions are listed in the chronological sequence in which they usually are performed. The sequence, however, is subject to alteration as special considerations may dictate. Further, not every function listed is always performed at every level of command. Higher echelons often perform certain production functions as part of the intelligence support for their subordinates. For example, the production function which involves grouping the result into complete and finished intelligence may be performed at national or departmental level, or at other echelons higher than the joint force. Joint forces

often have a very limited capacity to produce political, economic, sociological, and scientific intelligence and, consequently, depend almost completely on external sources for the production of such intelligence. Joint forces also often depend on external sources for the production of certain types of military intelligence, such as strategic, basic, and technical intelligence.

d. Production Responsibilities Assigned by Higher Authority. Certain joint forces, in particular those which operate at high levels in the chain of command, may be assigned responsibility to produce specific intelligence. They may have particular production capabilities or special access to information which is only available locally. For example, the production of finished intelligence for a study of an area in which a joint force is located or an area which is of great intelligence interest to a joint force may be assigned as an intelligence responsibility by higher authority. On the other hand, joint forces operating at a comparatively low level of command only occasionally are given production responsibilities by higher authority. An amphibious task force operating as a component of a joint force, for example, may be assigned the responsibility for producing certain intelligence on coasts and landing beaches when the force contains within its intelligence structure the specially qualified personnel to produce such intelligence.

e. Production to Support the Force Mission. The major intelligence production effort in any joint force is devoted to producing the intelligence required to support the force mission. This effort consists of (1) routine daily production required to furnish all elements of the force with the current intelligence needed to accomplish their tasks, (2) background intelligence on an area, and (3) estimates of the enemy situation. The most effective means of exploring the intelligence production effort of a joint force is to examine two documents which represent the results of intelligence production: the area study described in paragraph 5.3 and the intelligence estimate, described in paragraph 5.4.

## 5.2

### PLANNING TO CONDUCT INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

#### a. Coordination

(1) An intelligence staff section, like the other staffs, plans all the activities for which it is responsible. Intelligence planning must begin before the planning of other staff sections. Until an intelligence estimate is available, detailed operations planning cannot be completed, as parts of the other staff estimates will require certain intelligence data. Intelligence planning provides for identifying and securing the information required for the other staff sections to begin and to complete their planning. The intelligence officer also must be ready to estimate the next operation and to revise the current one to meet changed operational conditions.

(2) As other staff officers need intelligence data, so does the intelligence officer need their help. Only rarely can he conclude his actions by himself. Almost invariably, any plans he proposes, orders he recommends, or

actions he takes require coordination with one or more general or special staff sections. The importance of coordination is strongly emphasized. An intelligence officer who fails to recognize where coordination is necessary may cause confusion and delay in his headquarters, with subsequent confusion and delay in operations.

(3) The following list shows some of the areas in which staff coordination is necessary in intelligence planning and the officers with whom the coordination is made.

<u>AREA</u>	<u>OFFICER</u>
Prisoner of War	J-1, provost marshal, security officer, J-4, and surgeon
Censorship	J-1 and public affairs officer
Operations	All
Use of combat personnel for intelligence missions	J-3
Escort, supervision, and briefing of visitors	J-1, J-3, public affairs officer, and headquarters commandant
Location and construction of observation posts	J-3, engineer, and artillery officer
Examination of captured equipment	J-4
Need for maps, photos, and studies	All
Map procurement, storage, and distribution	J-3 and support command commander
Air reconnaissance, imagery, and visual	J-3, air liaison officer, and artillery officer
Invasion beach reconnaissance	J-3, Navy liaison officer
Ground reconnaissance	J-3, artillery officer
Civilian internees	J-1, provost marshal, security officer, and J-5
Intelligence training	J-3
Procurement and replacement of intelligence specialists	J-1
Procurement of weather data	Commander, weather detachment

b. Scheduling Intelligence Planning Activities. Intelligence planning is a continuing process. The sequence of intelligence activities concerned with the joint planning process is generally as follows:

(1) Before the completion of a current operation and before the commander receives any directives or orders for further action, his staff considers what this further action is likely to be. This applies particularly to the intelligence officer, for when the commander receives a directive or warning for further action, the intelligence officer must have sufficient information immediately available for the commander to analyze the assigned or deduced mission and issue preliminary planning guidance. A similar situation may exist when a headquarters is activated or at the beginning of any war, campaign, or operation.

(2) When a unit receives a new mission, information on the enemy and the area of operations is furnished to the commander and the staff so that definite operational, administrative, and logistical planning may be initiated. The security measures contained in the unit SOP are reviewed to determine whether they are adequate for the security of the planning and the operation. Additional information is presented at the initial staff conference to assist the commander in analyzing the mission and giving definite planning guidance.

(3) Next is a planning period which features the concurrent preparation of various plans and studies. The most important from the intelligence viewpoint are

(a) Determination and recommendation of the essential elements of information (EEI) and other intelligence requirements to complete the planning phase.

(b) Preparation of a counterintelligence plan for the security of the operation (including countersurveillance).

(c) Completion of plans to obtain all necessary information not immediately available.

(d) Preparation of a plan for security and distributing intelligence aids. These aids include material such as charts and models of the area of operations, maps, photos and mosaics, photointerpretation reports, sketches and diagrams, hydrographic charts, and intelligence reports.

(e) Revision of the intelligence estimate after evaluation and interpretation of all available information. The estimate, which is based on initial and subsequent assumptions and changes in the known enemy and friendly situations, is constantly revised throughout the planning phase.

(f) Revision and recommendations of EEI and other intelligence requirements, including those prepared earlier that are still applicable and those that concern the operational phase.



(g) Preparation of a collection plan, based on the EEI that were approved by the commander and on other intelligence requirements. This plan is used by the intelligence section to develop collection missions. The collection plan is altered as the situation develops so as to reflect current intelligence needs.

(h) Preparation of an intelligence annex to the operation plan. This intelligence annex is sometimes called an intelligence plan. Intelligence planning during the operational phase results from implementing the operation plan or order, arranges for collecting and reporting information as obtained, and disseminates intelligence produced from this information. Existing intelligence is revised continuously as new intelligence is developed. Finally, preliminary planning continues in order to anticipate some other future action. The planning periods for prospective operations may vary from hours to years. Time permitting during this period, an Intelligence Planning Schedule of Events should be prepared (See Appendix B) which depicts the intelligence tasks to be performed, along with the dates the tasks are begun and finished. While it is impossible in an academic publication such as this to list all intelligence activities in which an intelligence section will be engaged in all situations, it is possible to prepare a typical list in abbreviated form. These activities are not always pursued in the sequence shown, do not always begin on dates indicated, nor do they always require the same length of time to complete. However, the list should prove helpful to J-2s in establishing their intelligence sections and recognizing their workloads. Several of the first few items listed pertain only to newly formed or partially formed intelligence sections. The specific mission directive is received on D-60 in this example. The fact that this example is cut off at D-day does not mean that such a calendar or schedule could not be maintained into the operating period.

c. Intelligence Documents Used in Planning. Not all the intelligence steps or activities listed above are listed fully or accurately in any single document or series of documents in a joint force. Documents which list these steps may be divided into two categories: (1) nonintelligence documents and (2) intelligence planning documents. The nonintelligence documents are those directives from higher authority and the joint force commander which specifically affect the intelligence function. They include directives on the force mission, functions, and tasks; orders, requests, and information papers from sources outside the force; standing operating instructions; and force organization and command relationship charts. The intelligence planning documents which are in common use in nearly all joint forces and which reflect the conduct of the force intelligence function include the intelligence collection plan, the intelligence estimate, and the intelligence annex to the operation plan or order.

### 5.3

#### BASIC INTELLIGENCE STUDIES

a. - Definition, Purpose, and Scope. Basic intelligence studies are documents which contain the basic background or encyclopedic information on a country, group of countries, or geographical area of strategic or tactical significance. The purpose of these studies is to give planners the information and intelligence required to conduct initial strategic or operational planning.

The scope and content of basic intelligence studies vary with the purposes for which they are specifically prepared, the degree of detail required to accomplish the purposes, the relative military importance of the various characteristics in the area covered, and the requirements of the types of forces which will use the study.

b. Contents of Basic Intelligence Studies. Although the contents of these studies vary with the considerations mentioned, most studies include treatment of the land, the people, their political organization, their means of making a living, their religions, and their armed forces.

c. Format of Basic Intelligence Studies. Formats vary with the purposes of the studies. See Appendix D for a format acceptable for most area studies and to most U.S. agencies and military forces.

d. Production of Basic Intelligence Studies. Since a basic intelligence study prepared at any level of command is extensive in scope, it represents a large undertaking which, in terms of man-hours expended, usually exceeds that spent on any other type of intelligence document. Further, since the scope of basic intelligence includes so many different subjects, the collection of information for use of such a study also is a very large undertaking. In addition, since most area studies include military, political, economic, and sociological intelligence, specialists are required to produce the intelligence for such studies. These considerations limit the ability of the intelligence division at any level of command to produce more than a limited number of products and require a major intelligence production effort to maintain such studies in a current status.

e. Availability of Basic Intelligence Studies. The Register of Intelligence Publications (RIP) is published semi-annually by the Defense Intelligence Agency. The RIP lists citations, including brief abstracts, for intelligence products available in the DIA library.

#### 5.4 THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

##### a. General

(1) The Intelligence Estimate of the Situation is usually referred to simply as "The Intelligence Estimate." It may be in many forms and prepared at any level. It may be presented to the commander formally or informally and may be written or oral, detailed or summarized. It may be of scope sufficiently great to cover the entire situation of a large area or so narrow as to estimate only those factors concerning a special operation or series of related operations. In combat operations the varied forms of estimates may run from the simple intelligence briefing given to the personnel about to undertake a bombing mission, beach reconnaissance, or scouting patrol to the elaborate presentation of detailed data to an area commander whose assigned mission is the neutralization of the enemy's industrial potential and the destruction of military forces. Because sufficient time is normally available during the planning phase of an operation, the intelligence estimate should be a written document. In addition, for large operations, there is

usually such a vast amount of material available to the intelligence officer that it is almost mandatory that the estimate be written so all of the necessary and important material may be presented to the commander in a clear, concise form.

(2) On the other hand, the subsequent continuing or running estimates made as the operation progresses are generally called for on such short notice and normally based on such a small amount of new material that these estimates are presented orally, supported perhaps by a situation map and hurriedly compiled notes. However, these changes must be incorporated into the basic estimate as soon as time permits.

(3) Of primary concern in this publication are those intelligence estimates made at national, Joint Chiefs of Staff, departmental, unified command, component command, and joint force level. The requirements of each command level for an intelligence estimate determine the scope, form, and substance of the estimate. These requirements are based on a consideration of the following:

- (a) Purpose for which the estimate is made.
- (b) Ultimate uses of the estimate.
- (c) Degree of guidance in the estimate required by subordinate and adjacent commands.
- (d) Desires of the commander whose intelligence staff division prepares the estimate.

Since the requirements are different, there are differences in the types of intelligence estimates prepared at the national and the joint force level.

b. National Level. The estimate prepared at national level may have any one of a variety of purposes: to determine the war potential of a country or group of countries; to estimate the political, economic, and military courses of action a potential enemy can take in furtherance of a national policy; to assess the significance of enemy technological development in a given productive field; or to estimate total enemy military capabilities in limited or peripheral war or in event of a general war. Such estimates, prepared on all countries, serve to

(1) Furnish information and intelligence as a basis for the formulation of national policy and planning.

(2) Guide governmental agencies, including the military, at lower levels.

c. Joint Force Level. The intelligence estimate prepared by a joint force, on the other hand, is specifically intended to give the commander and his subordinates a basis for planning the conduct of military operations.

d. Purposes of the Intelligence Estimate

(1) The intelligence estimate is designed to bring together significant aspects of the area of operations and the enemy's situation, present the enemy's capabilities, analyze them in relation to one another, and consider each capability in its relation to the friendly mission. With the intelligence estimate, the commander can balance enemy capabilities against his own courses of action and choose the most favorable course of action.

(2) The primary purpose of the joint force intelligence estimate is to determine the courses of action open to the enemy or potential enemy and, if possible, the probable order of their adoption. Secondary purposes include the following:

(a) To disseminate information and intelligence on the possible area of operations and the enemy military situation to the commander, the staff, and interested superior, subordinate, and adjacent commands

(b) To disseminate to intelligence officers of subordinate commands the intelligence officer's assessment of the identification, strength, and disposition of enemy forces which might be employed against each such subordinate command

(d) To determine the essential elements of information on the possible area of operations and enemy forces which must be collected before or during operations

e. Responsibility

(1) The intelligence staff officer has the responsibility of assisting the commander in making sound and timely decisions and assisting other staff members in meeting their responsibilities. The intelligence officer does so by preparing an estimate of the enemy situation. But his duties are not finished with writing only one estimate, because intelligence estimating is a continuing process. As the factors with which it is concerned change, the estimate must be revised. Preparation of estimates is a constant and basic responsibility of the intelligence officer.

(2) An estimate of the situation will be furnished to the commander by the intelligence officer, either on his own initiative when warranted by developments in the situation or when required by the commander. It will summarize the enemy situation and capabilities. Although the intelligence officer will usually be able to anticipate the need for such an estimate, he must be prepared to furnish it to his commander when required.

f. Continuing Intelligence Estimate

(1) The commander must know immediately of any significant changes in enemy capabilities. To keep him apprised of such changes, the intelligence officer must maintain in current status a continuing intelligence estimate. This estimate--sometimes called a running intelligence estimate--continually recomputes enemy strength, reappraises the enemy situation, and performs new analyses of enemy capabilities. Outdated and irrelevant

intelligence is eliminated and new or newly appropriate material is added. The last formal estimate is only as current as the date and hour of its completion. It is constantly overtaken by new events and newly acquired intelligence. Whenever and wherever an intelligence item bears on the capability of the enemy to affect chances for success in the planned operation, there is a very probable need for a new intelligence estimate.

(2) The continuing estimate performs the same function as all other estimates: it analyzes enemy capabilities. But frequently it also reveals the need for specific friendly action caused by specific and new enemy circumstances. Occasionally, it is concerned with the overall enemy situation; but if the intelligence officer has been thorough in his previous estimates, the continuing estimate will illuminate some particular enemy capability of immediate concern.

(3) The continuing estimate is usually contained in a loose-leaf binder so that new material can quickly and easily be inserted without destroying the entire document. It must allow for new intelligence constantly being obtained and for operations continually changing. Maximum use is made of overlays, plots, and short summaries, as these media increase the flexibility of the estimate and make it easier to revise.

(4) Accuracy in determining the most probable enemy courses of action is particularly important in preparing the continuing intelligence estimate, since its effect on a command's own tactics is immediate. Occasionally, it produces intelligence of so drastic a nature as to change completely the commander's decision. In these circumstances, the continuing estimate would be a valuable basis for the new formal intelligence estimate of the situation.

g. Form and Scope

(1) The form and scope of the intelligence estimate are designed specifically for the primary purpose of determining enemy capabilities against the command preparing the estimate. They are not particularly suitable for accomplishing the secondary purposes listed in paragraph 5.4d. In accomplishing its primary purpose, the intelligence estimate serves as an initial essential step in the process by which the commander evaluates and compares the enemy and friendly situations, decides on a course of action in light of these situations, and plans the conduct of that course.

(2) The degree to which the intelligence estimate accomplishes its secondary purposes is limited. The estimate can never include all the information and intelligence required by other staff divisions and subordinate commands. Such an estimate would be too lengthy and unwieldy. Likewise, it cannot always suffice for determining all the essential elements of information required. Some essential elements of information often are not determined until the commander's estimate of the situation, or perhaps the operation plan, is being prepared. For these reasons, it is essential during

preparation of the intelligence estimate that its form, scope, and content be geared to its primary rather than secondary purposes. After all, there are other intelligence vehicles specifically designed to accomplish the secondary purposes. When there is difficulty and conflict in preparing an estimate intended to accomplish both the primary and secondary purposes, the primary purpose of determining enemy capabilities receives overriding consideration.

(3) The intelligence estimating process contributes significantly, however, to the intelligence collection plan. The glaring gaps in the estimator's knowledge of the enemy may frustrate even the seasoned intelligence officer. Never does one have sufficient information on the enemy. It is easy to see why this can occur when one recalls that even the operations officer seldom has all the information he wants on his own friendly forces, but for him the information is relatively easy to obtain. However, the enemy has an extensive security program designed to prevent disclosure of information concerning his own forces. As the intelligence estimate is prepared, these gaps in the knowledge of the enemy are phrased into questions (EEI) to be answered by the intelligence collector. When the questions are answered, the new information will probably change the estimate. As the estimate is revised, new questions will be indicated by new gaps in known information, so that a new series of EEI is formed. Thus, a cycle of estimating, collecting, and other intelligence activities is formed.

h. Intelligence Estimate Forms. Many forms or outline guides for the preparation of the intelligence estimate have been prepared and published. They differ according to the purpose for which the estimate is prepared and the nature of the Service or agency preparing the estimate. The differences can be appreciated when a comparison is made between the requirements of an intelligence estimate for the Strategic Air Command and those for an Army corps. However, in spite of the differences in requirements, there is considerable uniformity in all intelligence estimates made by military organizations. They include a statement of the mission, intelligence on the enemy and the area, and enemy capabilities. Forms for intelligence estimates in current use are

(1) The form for an "Intelligence Estimate of the Situation" in Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). This is the basis for the expanded version of the form used in the Joint Staff Officer's Guide (AFSC Pub 1).

(2) The form for an "Intelligence Estimate" in the Joint Landing Force Manual.

i. Relation to Problem Solution. Intelligence estimating, like estimating in other staff sections, is basically problem solving, and all staffs use the problem solution process. However, an intelligence estimate is unique in that it cannot be based on the wealth of firm facts which are available to other staff members for estimates of their own forces. The intelligence estimate can never be any better than the basic intelligence which goes into it. If that is unreliable, inaccurate, or incomplete, these deficiencies will be reflected in the estimate.

j. Form for Joint Force Level. Although any of these forms can be used for a joint force intelligence estimate, the "Intelligence Estimate of the Situation" forms in UNAAF and AFSC Pub 1 are considered most adaptable for use at the joint force level. This form is specifically designed to list enemy capabilities in such detail and scope that they can be inserted without change in other planning documents. However, this is not meant to imply that unnecessary detail is included. The form can be used effectively by a large unified command as the intelligence basis for a joint capabilities plan or by a smaller joint force to determine enemy capabilities for insertion in the commander's estimate.

k. Use of the Form

(1) The appropriate treatment of any topic included in the outline which follows is determined by the sense in which, and the extent to which, that topic applies to the particular operation and possible area of operations under consideration. When cogent reasons exist, the estimate may be modified or supplemented to permit appropriate treatment of any topic. If the discussion of any topic is not pertinent nor applicable to the specific estimate, the discussion is omitted and so noted in the estimate.

(2) Keep the intelligence estimate concise, clear, and brief. An estimate is not encyclopedic. Coverage must be adequate, but must also be distinctly limited to the specific mission at hand. Briefness is not necessarily a virtue, but it makes the intelligence estimate a more efficient document for other members of the staff to use. Normally, reference to other intelligence documents in the intelligence estimate should be avoided. The estimate should be a complete document in itself. Persons reading the estimate should not be forced to search other documents to find details pertinent to the estimate. However, annexes may be used, and order of battle overlays may be attached to the estimate to graphically portray enemy dispositions.

l. Distribution

(1) The entire intelligence estimate should be distributed to the other staff sections because paragraph 2 contains information which is useful in keeping them informed on the enemy forces. This information has a bearing on the accomplishment of the friendly mission. Distribution of the entire estimate also enables other staff sections to understand the "why" of the enemy situation as well as the enemy's possible actions. If only the conclusions of the estimate are distributed, the other staff sections do not receive the value derived from understanding the reasoning of the intelligence officer. Staff members have greater confidence in the conclusions of the intelligence officer if his reasoning is made known to them. It is also desirable that other staff officers be aware of less likely enemy capabilities and the reasons why they are not listed as probable. Also, distribution of the entire intelligence estimate helps other staff members keep fully informed on all aspects of the enemy situation, thus reducing speculation and rumor.

(2) If the commander disseminates his commander's estimate to higher echelons for approval or adjacent ones for coordination or information, he does not normally accompany it with the intelligence estimate. This is because the commander's estimate already contains the paragraphs listed.

(3) A numbered air force, a field army, or a naval task force, for example, might reproduce its intelligence estimate in its periodical intelligence publication. That command might think its monthly intelligence publication a proper dissemination medium for the entire intelligence estimate. More likely, however, only the paragraphs dealing with capabilities would be reproduced.

(4) In other instances, the estimate might be included as an appendix to the intelligence annex (see page 21) which is disseminated with the operation plan or order. This is not standard procedure, however, for that portion of the intelligence annex dealing with the enemy situation and capabilities is extracted from the estimate. This is seldom justification for furnishing all of the estimate to those lower units who receive the annex. The entire estimate would be included only if the officer preparing the estimate thought the recipients needed more intelligence than was contained in the annex.

m. Relationship to Commander's Estimate

(1) There is a close relationship between the commander's estimate and the intelligence estimate. In the sequence of the joint or combined planning process, the staff members write their specialized estimates and submit them to their commander. He, in turn, prepares, or has prepared for him, his commander's estimate on which his decision is based. Like the intelligence estimate, the commander's estimate may or may not be a formal written document. However, if it is written, the intelligence estimate and the commander's estimate are closely integrated. The intelligence estimate furnishes much of paragraph 2 of the commander's estimate, "The Situation and Courses of Action." This comes from paragraph 2, "Enemy Situation," and paragraph 3, "Enemy Capabilities," of the intelligence estimate. Normally, these paragraphs can be lifted verbatim and inserted into the applicable portions of the commander's estimate.

(2) Also, most of the intelligence estimate's paragraph 4, "Analysis of Enemy Capabilities," finds itself integrated into paragraph 3 of the commander's estimate, "Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action." The other intelligence estimate paragraphs are important to the commander because they assure him that a sound, orderly thinking process was employed by his intelligence officer. (See AFSC Pub 1 for details concerning the commander's estimate.)

n. Discussion of Sample Form. The following is a detailed discussion of the contents of each of the paragraphs of the intelligence estimate shown in the Joint Staff Officer's Guide (AFSC Pub 1).

**Heading.** The heading and ending are important parts of a written estimate, because they tell when and where the estimate was prepared, its classification, and its author. (For an oral estimate, such information is automatically supplied by the circumstances which exist at the time the estimate is given.) The heading includes the name of the office preparing the estimate, the headquarters in which the estimate is prepared, the name of the place (or APO/FPO Number) where the headquarters is located, and a



date-time group with the name of the month spelled completely. The hour might not be included in this date-time group if the termination of the estimating process cannot be determined precisely or is considered unimportant. However, the date is always important, because it indicates to the reader the day the estimating process ceased (the estimator can always determine the day).

The date is followed by the title "INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE" and its numerical designation. Next, all the maps necessary for an understanding of the situation described in the estimate are listed. Enough information about each map should be included to identify it so that others using the estimate can procure the correct maps. The scale of each map is included. The number and designations of pertinent photography, special charts, etc., used in the estimating process and needed for a complete understanding of the estimate are included.

**"1. MISSION."** In the preparation of an intelligence estimate it is necessary to proceed step by step in an orderly and logical fashion. In paragraph 1 the mission is stated concisely. It may be either that directed by higher authority or that deduced by the commander. Since the principal purpose of the intelligence estimate is to determine the enemy capabilities which are used by the commander in his estimate of the situation, the repetition of the mission here serves to focus the attention of all concerned on it and show the relationship of the remainder of the estimate to the mission. It is placed in the estimate to ensure that the officer preparing the estimate understands the mission and that the reader understands the mission for which the estimate was prepared and the problem confronting the command at the time it was prepared. If the intelligence officer does not have the mission correctly and firmly in mind when preparing his estimate, he may obtain a wonderful solution to the wrong problem. If the mission involves the accomplishment of several tasks, all are stated. If priorities have been assigned, they are indicated. The reason, or reasons, for assignment of the mission to the command is indicated, if known.

**"2. ENEMY SITUATION."** Next the intelligence officer (J-2) must describe and discuss the situation under three main subheadings: Characteristics of the Area of Operations; Enemy Military Situation; Enemy Unconventional and Psychological Warfare Situation. The J-2 must consider the amount of information available to him and whether the factor under consideration is important enough to the commander to require detailed treatment. The degree of detail included in the intelligence estimate will depend on the operating situation in which it is written. When a staff has been working together for a considerable length of time in an operating situation, its members normally will know quite a bit about the current enemy situation as a result of staff meetings, conferences, daily intelligence briefings, weekly intelligence summaries, and other intelligence dissemination devices used in the headquarters. When this situation exists, the intelligence officer need not include extensive detail in his intelligence estimate to bring the staff up to date. For example, if a command has been operating against MIG-21s for 6 to 8 months and their characteristics are known to the staff, it should not be necessary to include those characteristics in the intelligence estimate. On the other hand, when the staff is newly organized, has many new members and a

new commander, or when the situation has undergone a great change, usually it will be necessary to include more detail. The estimate should include under Enemy Situation all of the data used later in the Analysis of Enemy Capabilities. A full list of pertinent facts must be made so that a solution to the problem may be developed. Sufficient data must be presented to indicate all general capabilities of the enemy to affect the mission. (This is necessary to determine possible enemy courses of action.) However, if it is obvious when listing facts in Enemy Situation that these same facts must be repeated in detail in the Analysis of Enemy Capabilities which follows and if exclusion of these facts does not eliminate certain capabilities, then it is permissible to place such facts in the analysis rather than in the situation. In this way, conciseness is aided and clarity is not sacrificed. But, as a general rule, no new intelligence data is inserted after "Situation."

"a. Characteristics of the Area of Operations." The determination of what characteristics will be included in the estimate is based on a consideration of the purpose for which the estimate is intended and the degree to which the characteristic will affect enemy capabilities or the friendly mission. If one of the purposes of the estimate is to disseminate intelligence on the area of operations (remember, this is, at best, only a secondary purpose), characteristics which will have no effect on enemy capabilities or the friendly mission may be included. On the other hand, if the only purpose is to derive enemy capabilities, characteristics which will have no effect are omitted or, if listed, are followed by a short negative statement, for example, "Hydrography. No effect on enemy capabilities or the friendly mission." Normally, however, since the dissemination function of the estimate is of relatively less importance, only those characteristics which will affect enemy capabilities or the friendly mission are listed and discussed. The determination of what characteristics to include in the estimate will depend also on whether the particular characteristic is pertinent or whether it exists in the area of operations. If any characteristic is not applicable or does not exist in the situation, it should be omitted or, if listed, it should be followed by a short negative statement such as "not applicable." For example, there is no requirement for including a discussion of sociology if the area of operations has no inhabitants. If the mission is to maintain open sea routes between two land areas, the ground forces are not likely to affect the sea lanes. On the other hand, sociology may be a characteristic of vital importance if the area of operations is densely populated. Similarly, hydrography and landing beaches would be important in a situation of ground forces facing an amphibious landing.

The decision as to the scope and length of discussion to be devoted to any particular characteristic will depend primarily on the degree to which that characteristic is expected to affect enemy capabilities or the friendly mission, and to a lesser extent, on the purpose of the estimate. For instance, climate and weather always affect enemy capabilities and the friendly mission. However, while their effect in an arctic region or in a tropical zone may be of critical importance, their effect in a more temperate area may be much less important. Hence, an estimate in preparation for operations in the areas affected more by the climate and weather would devote more space to this characteristic than would an estimate in preparation for operation in a temperate zone.

Each significant "Characteristic of the Area of Operations" as it is expected to exist during the conduct of the operations required by the mission should be described. Included should be the effects of each characteristic on possible enemy operations and on the mission of the friendly command. If appropriate, a discussion of the effects of these characteristics (for example: mountainous terrain) on the employment of nuclear and CB weapons should be included.

The discussion of the effects of each characteristic of the area on possible enemy operations normally includes consideration of the effects on the enemy's ability to attack, defend, and withdraw. It may also include consideration of other possible operations and of possible enemy employment of particular weapons, methods, techniques, or forces. The extent of the discussion of the effects of each characteristic on the friendly mission is limited by the nature of the mission. Thus, when the mission is offensive, the discussion does not include the effects of the characteristic on the friendly defense.

Lengthy discussion should be avoided, if possible. Maximum use should be made of maps, charts, graphics, and pictorial presentations. To prevent undue bulk and in the interest of brevity, it may be advisable in certain instances to summarize the main points of the situation for inclusion in paragraph 2 of the intelligence estimate and append detailed studies as addenda to the estimate.

Additional brevity often can be obtained when finishing the estimate by eliminating duplication of analyses. Frequently, an extensive analysis in paragraph 2 of the estimate is repeated in paragraph 4, Analysis of Enemy Capabilities. One of the two can be an abbreviation of the other.

"(1) Military Geography." Terrain features or other factors of military geography in the area of operation almost certainly will affect accomplishment of the mission; therefore, the estimate should describe them. If this portion of the estimate is bulky, it may be treated separately and attached as an appendix.

When other staff members require geographic studies of friendly territory, the intelligence officer should prepare or obtain them. These are presented to the staff in a form other than the intelligence estimate of the situation, since the intelligence estimate is a study of the enemy and not of friendly territory. Further, the estimate format is not suitable for terrain studies.

Military geography has been divided into three subtopics: Topography (terrain), Hydrography and Landing Beaches, and Climate and Weather.

"(a) Topography." When discussing topography, include all possible information concerning the military characteristics of the area, such as critical terrain features, obstacles, avenues of approach, rivers, streams, lakes, and any other natural or man-made features which may have an effect on military operations within the area. Specific mention should be made of the effects on the employment of nuclear and CB weapons.

Weather can be defined as the conditions of the atmosphere at a given time for a given place or region. Weather can be stated factually. Part of the estimate should discuss weather's effect on the enemy's capabilities. When day-to-day intelligence estimates are being prepared, they fit readily into the Enemy Military Situation of the estimate. If the estimate is for a single operation, weather during only the period of that mission needs to be summarized.

For estimates covering a general situation over a longer period of time, a long-range forecast based on a general climatology study of the enemy area for the past years may be used. Climate is defined as the statistical collection of individual conditions of weather and climatic intelligence and the scientific analysis of climate for determining its useful application to intelligence. This intelligence is not factual in the same sense as a weather forecast. It is general and broad in scope and is not as objectively applied. Were climatic intelligence to be included in the body of the intelligence estimate, it would go in the Enemy Situation. However, because of its general and bulky nature, its integration into the estimate normally requires more space than should be allotted to it. The significance of the climatic intelligence element does not warrant greater consideration than other factors are receiving. Were this to occur, the estimate would not be in balance with comparative degrees of importance for each contributing element. It is better to place climatic intelligence in an appendix of the estimate.

No weather officer is assigned to the intelligence staff, so the intelligence estimator must go to the Air Weather Service (AWS) for this information. AWS officers can be assigned to any level of command.

"(2) Transportation." All forms of civil transportation are next described in the estimate. These include roads, railways, airways, pipelines, and inland waterways. The following should be described: capacities, surface conditions, bridges, amount and condition of rolling stock, motor and air transport, barges, freighters, and other inland waterways craft. Vulnerabilities are discussed in as much detail as necessary to present a clear picture.

"(3) Telecommunications." Telecommunications are described from the aspect of the availability and condition of existing systems and equipment, both military and civil. Critical shortages and sensitive bottlenecks are indicated.

"(4) Politics." The political as well as the economic, sociological, and scientific and technical topics which follow are discussed if they have a bearing on enemy capabilities or on the friendly mission. Generally speaking, information on these subjects is furnished by higher authority and only incidentally by the J-2's intelligence agencies. The discussion of the political situation should include a description of the political organization of the area, the extent of civil and military control of the region, the amenability of the civilian population to political control, the political organizations, and the key political figures.

"(5) Economics." Economics of the area are included only to the extent demanded by the operations to be conducted. Certain types of information will be invaluable to the command with regard to resources and facilities in the area available to the enemy or which may be available to friendly forces when occupying or passing through the area. Also indicated is the lack of any specific economic resources which may be necessary for the conduct of the operations.

"(6) Sociology." The sociological factor deals with the people of the area, their psychology, social customs, characteristics, religions, the minority or dissident groups, allegiance to either the enemy or friendly forces, and other items which may indicate military government requirements, the necessity for troop indoctrination, etc.

"(7) Science and Technology." Scientific and technical topics are discussed as a basis for comparison of weapons and equipment and to consider the possibility of the enemy's employment of new weapons, equipment, and techniques during the course of the operations.

"b. Enemy Military Situation." The second subheading and a major consideration is the enemy military situation. Here are described the enemy's military and paramilitary forces, facilities, and equipment with indications of their effect on enemy capabilities and on the friendly mission.

"(1) Strength." This subparagraph, which may be combined with the one following, should include a statement of the combat strength of the enemy forces in terms of manpower levels. It may also include remarks on the state of training and morale, although the Significant Strengths and Weaknesses subparagraph which follows is a more suitable place to cover the latter two factors.

"(2) Composition." In the discussion of the composition of the enemy forces, only a summary of the enemy order of battle is given. Here is included the identification (when known) of all enemy units which may affect the enemy's capabilities and the accomplishment of the friendly mission. Included here will be a summary of the enemy's surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and antiaircraft guns and (if effective against our forces) automatic weapons. If enemy air defenses are of paramount importance to our mission, the fighter interceptors may be listed along with the antiaircraft guns, etc., and a notation made in the enemy air order of battle summary that the interceptors are listed with other air defense weapons.

"(3) Location and Disposition." The location and disposition of the enemy's forces and facilities and logistic installations can best be shown on a map or overlay with a brief written description of those matters not subject to visual portrayal. As a matter of technique for clarity and ease of examination the overlay should have on it all pertinent order of battle and enemy disposition information necessary for a clear picture of enemy capabilities. Sound knowledge as to the disposition of relatively strong and weak units might be the basis for decisions affecting the employment of our own offensive and defensive forces. Again, the knowledge might indicate enemy capabilities for future moves. For example, the movement into a

ground battle area of highly efficient ground support units, while another sector of the front was receiving less well-trained units of the same category, might indicate enemy plans for an offensive in the first area. The known and suspected location of SAM and surface-to-surface missile (SSM) sites is included, together with a summary of missile types and control systems.

Air defenses are relatively impotent without the coordination of early warning and control radars; therefore, a complete intelligence estimate will contain known or probable sites, with a summary of their probable characteristics and employment. Sometimes the communications staff estimate also gives the enemy electronic situation if the mission statement has indicated to the communications officer that he needs this type of information in his estimate. However, that does not eliminate the need for it in the intelligence estimate.

"(4) Availability of Reinforcement." A list is compiled of all known reinforcements available to the enemy. Great care must be exercised in the preparation of this list to ensure that the problem is approached realistically. The enemy cannot be expected to abandon effort on one front just to reinforce another front. It is expected that friendly forces will continue to exert pressure on all fronts in order to prevent such an enemy move.

"(5) Movements and Activities." The factor of movements and activities should include a description of all significant enemy movements which may affect the friendly mission and enemy capabilities and those activities which may give some clue to the relative priority of adoption of enemy capabilities.

"(6) Logistics." The logistics portion of the estimate should treat all elements of the enemy's logistic system, transportation, storage, distribution, levels of supply, critical shortages, and bottlenecks. This paragraph should also include a discussion of the enemy air and naval facilities such as fuel storage, repair facilities, runways, port facilities, etc., as they may affect the enemy capabilities. They are essential factors in the consideration of the enemy's ability to maintain ground forces, aircraft, and naval forces. The availability of air facilities will control the disposition of air forces, and the availability of naval facilities will determine the capability of supporting naval forces.

"(7) Operational Capability to Launch Missiles." In describing the operational capability to launch missiles, mention should be made of numbers and types of missiles; guidance systems; ranges; types of warheads; type of launching sites (if fixed, whether hardened or not); for mobile launchers, the mobility, rate of fire, and readiness time; whether naval surface or submarine launch is a capability; and whether air launch is a capability. If their kill effectiveness has been estimated, it should be included.

"(8) Serviceability and Operational Rates of Aircraft"

(a) It is important to remember in the discussion of serviceability and operational rates of aircraft to express the rates in terms of

sorties per type of aircraft per stated period of time. For example: 500 fighter-bomber sorties per day in the initial period, or 300 medium bomber sorties per day for an indefinite period. The serviceability rate is the percentage of aircraft that the enemy is capable of maintaining in operation for a specific period of time.

(b) Information which leads to estimates on the serviceability factor may come from a number of different sources. Indications may be had from detailed study of photographs of enemy airfields, with due attention paid to partially disassembled aircraft, indications of aircraft movement on the ground from day to day, or signs that maintenance is being performed. Valuable information may be derived from questioning prisoners of war from the enemy air units. Reports dealing with enemy reaction to missions by our forces against critical enemy targets may indicate the approximate numbers of defenders available for a maximum strength interception. Friendly radar may range into enemy territory and give valuable information as to strength and activity at airfields within its coverage.

(c) If information is not available from such sources, the intelligence officer may relate to enemy units the experience of friendly units with aircraft of generally similar types. Probably no other air force surpasses U.S. in-commission status for aircraft. Applying these averages to enemy air forces, then, is likely to give them the benefit of the doubt. Therefore, the estimate will be a conservative one.

"(9) Operational Capabilities of Combatant Vessels." In describing the operational capabilities of combatant vessels such items should be discussed as vessels by type, whether modern or obsolescent, armament, fire control systems, armor, speeds and cruising radii, underway replenishment systems, numbers of vessels on station, aircraft warning and control systems, naval aviation cover or protection, and state of training and morale of crews.

"(10) Technical Characteristics of Equipment." The discussion of technical characteristics of equipment should direct attention to those technical aspects of weapons, weapon systems, and equipment which are different from those of the friendly forces. Superiority and inferiority of those characteristics should be clearly stated.

"(11) Electronics Intelligence." This paragraph should include a discussion of the enemy's electronic and counterelectronic potentials. This concentrates on the enemy's electronic equipment and methods of employment of electronic countermeasures.

"(12) Nuclear and CB Weapons." In the discussion of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, if the information is available, these weapons should be dealt with according to type, yield, numbers, method of delivery, and enemy doctrine concerning their use.

"(13) Significant Strengths and Weaknesses" (See paragraph (1) Strength.)

(a) The discussion of significant strengths and weaknesses should include the material which on analysis may disclose specific enemy vulnerabilities. It should also describe any other peculiarities of the enemy situation which are not properly presented elsewhere in the intelligence estimate and which may influence the friendly commander's choice of a course of action. It should include a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy situation with respect to personnel, units, state of training, intelligence, operations, logistics, civil affairs, and personalities.

(b) Information on the relative effectiveness of combat units facing a commander is of critical importance to him. It would be particularly significant in a large area of operations and where enemy units vary widely in their efficiency.

(c) There is no established method for deriving the relative efficiency factor. In circumstances where it is desirable to estimate enemy effectiveness and where a sufficient quantity of intelligence information is available, any method may be used which would result in a simple comparison of the enemy units being considered. For example, knowledge of the number of assigned enemy aircraft in commission from day to day is desirable, because the availability figure, rather than the table of organization figure, is highly significant in estimating the enemy's air capabilities.

#### **"c. Enemy Unconventional and Psychological Warfare Situation"**

"(1) Guerrilla." In considering the enemy's unconventional and psychological warfare situation the first item to be treated is the enemy's experience and ability to organize and conduct guerrilla warfare against the friendly forces in friendly areas or areas newly seized from the enemy. This will include details concerning methods of organization, control, and support of guerrilla forces. Information concerning the likelihood of the native population's participation in the enemy's guerrilla movement and a discussion of the areas most sensitive to guerrilla warfare should also be included.

"(2) Psychological." The discussion of psychological warfare should deal with enemy methods and facilities for the conduct of propaganda, the susceptibility of the population of the target area, and the major or main line of the enemy's psychological warfare effort.

"(3) Subversion." The treatment of the enemy's subversive warfare effort should again include a study of the susceptibility of the native population to subversion, likely targets among civilian as well as military personnel, methods employed by the enemy, and successes and failures together with the reasons for them.

"(4) Sabotage." The description of the enemy's sabotage effort should include information concerning methods, targets, sensitive targets in the area of operations, and successes and failures.

"3. ENEMY CAPABILITIES." This paragraph is the first of three in the intelligence estimate concerned with enemy capabilities. They are also



considered in the commander's estimate and in the intelligence annex. Enemy capabilities are defined as: "Those courses of action of which the enemy is physically capable and which, if adopted, will affect the accomplishment of our mission. The term 'capabilities' includes not only the general courses of action open to the enemy, such as attack, defense, or withdrawal, but also all the particular courses of action possible under each general course of action. 'Enemy capabilities' are considered in the light of all known factors affecting military operations including time, space, weather, terrain, and the strength and disposition of enemy forces . . . ." (DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms)

The intelligence officer must carefully distinguish between general courses of action, e.g., attack, defense, and withdrawal, and particular courses of action. In many situations an intelligence estimate is prepared on the basis of an assumption that the enemy will attack. Hence, in such situations the general course of action (attack) is assumed—the task is to enumerate the particular courses of action under the category of "attack." However, it should be noted that the intelligence officer does not make or list assumptions in his intelligence estimate. It is the commander who assumes that the enemy will attack. The intelligence officer prepares an intelligence estimate for the defensive friendly posture the commander has assumed.

The primary and ultimate purpose of determining and stating enemy capabilities is to inform the commander what the enemy is physically capable of doing which will affect the accomplishment of the friendly mission. In the joint planning process a statement of enemy capabilities appears in the "Intelligence Estimate" and the "Commander's Estimate."

The scope of enemy capabilities which is expressed in a joint estimate will depend on the level of command, the situation (whether formulated before the outbreak of hostilities or after), and the intelligence available.

A joint estimate at the Joint Chiefs of Staff level considers enemy capabilities on a global basis. A unified command considers enemy capabilities which will affect the mission of the command—usually on a theater basis. A joint task force concerns itself with those capabilities expected in its area of operations.

Before hostilities begin the intelligence available to estimate enemy capabilities will be in less detail than that which can be developed during wartime. After war has begun, sources of combat intelligence open up which facilitate a more complete and definitive statement of enemy capabilities.

The term "affecting the accomplishment of our mission" needs discussing. An enemy course of action may either favor or hinder the accomplishment of the friendly mission. This concept is often overlooked. However, listing of enemy capabilities favoring our mission must be done realistically. The statement "he can surrender" is usually unrealistic and not amenable to analysis. But the enemy, for example, might withdraw his light bombers to support operations against a distant ally of our friendly forces and make accomplishment of our mission easier.

Knowledge of a possible enemy course of action which will aid the accomplishment of the friendly mission may prepare the commander to take advantage of a weakness. Such knowledge will enable him to save men, time, and material. He also may gain a more favorable position from which to continue action against the enemy. The intelligence officer must be alert to situations in which enemy capabilities favorable to friendly forces might have an important bearing on the action. For these reasons, enemy capabilities favoring the accomplishment of the friendly mission should not be overlooked.

In stating enemy capabilities the following considerations are applicable:

Any list of enemy capabilities must be focused on our own mission and must present every significant line of enemy action which will produce a significant effect on the accomplishment of our mission.

The enumeration of enemy capabilities is not intended as an end in itself. Instead, this enumeration serves as a starting point and an integral part of a planning process which enables the commander to weigh the result of each of his own possible future courses against each of the enemy's in order to determine which of his own lines of action is most promising. Therefore, in the intelligence estimate, enemy capabilities should be expressed in terms of what the enemy is capable of doing without considering action on our part to prevent or hinder the execution of that capability. (In the intelligence estimate the enemy capabilities are described without considering our military opposition, whereas in the commander's estimate the effect of that opposition to these capabilities is considered.)

A theater or area joint commander is operationally concerned with a series of operations over a period of time and an extended area (a campaign) encompassing related operations in the air, on the land, and on the sea. Therefore, he needs to know the enemy's total capability to oppose his operations in the air, on the land, and on the sea; the total opposition to the land campaign in particular clearly includes combined action by enemy land and air forces and in some situations by sea forces. Also needed are the enemy's campaign capabilities by logical phases over the entire period of the campaign, that is, from D-day to the ultimate objective of the campaign. This concept may differ somewhat in the case of a joint task force, particularly a smaller one. Here the JTF commander is generally concerned with a single operation (a battle) or a series of closely related operations over a limited area. Again, being a joint commander, he needs to know the enemy's total (joint) capability against his operation, but he is not so concerned with this capability over an extended area or time. Finally, enemy capabilities must be expressed in terms of total force in air, sea, and land campaigns and must be carried through to the ultimate defensive or offensive objective.

However, there will be occasions when the enemy can employ one element of forces in a separate and independent action that would have a significant effect on our mission. An example of this would be an air or submarine campaign with or without concurrent action of the other forces at the disposal of the enemy. In these and similar activities, each should be considered for inclusion as a separate enemy capability.

In the campaign the commander is particularly interested in how much time he has to prepare for various operations. No specific plans for operations on our part have been made; therefore, the statement of enemy capabilities cannot reflect the effect of planned action against him. In determining how fast the enemy can move, we do not consider how long it would take him to penetrate a certain defensive line; on the other hand, we do consider that he is moving under the constant threat of action on our part. This means that, with respect to his ground forces, determination of rate of advance must consider such things as dispersion, security, and consolidation of gains, capacity of lines of communication, and rear area security. Occupation requirements must be considered in determining strengths available. "Unopposed" means unopposed by specific, planned action by our forces but opposed by the threat of action on our part.

Statements of enemy capabilities should be objective. There is already present the human tendency to err—this should not be compounded by undue timidity, undue recklessness, prejudices, preconceived notions, or least of all by what friendly forces would be capable of in similar circumstances.

The statements of capabilities should be concise and to the point with no discussions of order of battle, doctrine, tactics, or strategy. Each capability, however, must contain as much pertinent information as is necessary to answer the following five questions:

**What is the enemy capability that will affect the friendly mission?** If the estimate is based on the assumption that the enemy will attack, then each particular course of action under the category of "attack" must state "what."

**Where?** In the case of ground forces, if the action is extended or continuous, indicate routes to probable objective. In the case of air and naval forces, indicate areas which could be brought under attack.

**In what strength?** In the case of ground forces, if the action is extended or continuous, indicate strengths or reinforcements at key intermediate stages. For air forces, initial strike and monthly sustained sortie rates by type of aircraft should be given. For naval forces, the number of combatant vessels on station should be given. In all cases, maximum forces should be shown.

**When can the enemy execute this capability?** The earliest time the enemy can initiate each capability is computed. Time calculations for the conduct of the operations are considered in the most favorable light from the enemy's point of view and are computed so as to determine the earliest time by which the given capability or parts of it can be effected.

**From where will the enemy initiate this capability?** For example, "Will attack from the east with . . . ." Often this question is answered by replies to queries listed above—What? and Where?

In determining the initial list of capabilities, the following procedures should be considered as a guide.

Consider the overall enemy and strategic situation. Answer such questions as "Is the enemy committed on other fronts? Is this operation a part of a general strategic offensive or defensive? Is this a critical area from the enemy's standpoint? Is this the enemy's major effort?" and others like them to gain a sound understanding of the significance of this area to the enemy.

List all the enemy capabilities which will affect the accomplishment of the friendly mission considering the availability of enemy ground, naval, and air forces. For each separate capability compute "what, where, in what strength, and when" for each component force of the capability. This must be done in consideration of probable enemy objectives which affect the accomplishment of the friendly mission.

Eliminate from the listing the capabilities which are grossly disadvantageous, insignificant, or entirely unreasonable.

Reevaluate the list and then group smaller related capabilities and supporting operations into the major capabilities, indicating possible intermediate and final enemy objectives in light of the friendly mission. This reevaluation is extremely important, because each enemy capability must be analyzed against each friendly course of action in the commander's estimate. Consequently, as a practical matter the number of enemy capabilities should be limited to as few as will state adequately the enemy's combined potential against the friendly command. Further, the possibility of duplication and resultant error is greatly increased when a large number of capabilities is considered.

Reword each capability until it is clear and concise but still adequately expresses the capability. Certain capabilities may be expressed in a simple sentence or two. Some of the joint capabilities may require three or more sentences in order to make the meaning absolutely clear. Use only enough words, phrases, and sentences to ensure that the commander is left in no doubt as to what the enemy capability is.

Finally, state each separate capability as a lettered subparagraph of paragraph 3 of the intelligence estimate. List the capabilities either according to their relative importance in affecting the accomplishment of the friendly mission or in the relative chronological order of their initiation by the enemy.

**"4. ANALYSIS OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES."** In this paragraph the J-2 analyzes each capability separately. He makes the analysis in the sequence in which the capabilities are listed in paragraph 3. Each analysis considers, where appropriate, the effect of all factors discussed under the various subheadings of paragraph 2.

No possible course of action will be eliminated with a statement of "none" or "has no capability." If there is nothing to discuss about a listed capability and if no analysis is possible, it should be removed from paragraph 3. Each capability open to the enemy is worthy of complete, detailed analysis. Whereas paragraph 3 considers broad action, paragraph 4 analyzes details.

Time and space should be carefully analyzed to determine the maximum enemy strength by type of forces during each period or phase and the reinforcement potential in the execution of the capability being analyzed.

The enemy should be given the benefit of the doubt. The intelligence officer must always assume, in the absence of positive facts to the contrary, that the enemy will make the best possible tactical decisions, will conduct a maneuver in the best possible way, and will execute movements in the shortest possible time. Thus, to expect the worst guards against surprise. For example, in estimating the time of a possible enemy attack, the major interest from the intelligence viewpoint is the earliest possible time of attack. If our troops can be prepared to resist an immediate attack, they certainly can be ready at a later time. Such a viewpoint requires a difference in approach by the intelligence officer than by the J-3, whose concern is the capabilities of our own troops.

Throughout this analysis the J-2 should be alert for indications that the enemy will or will not exercise a particular capability. He should also pay particular attention to the effect the exercise of the capability will have on enemy vulnerabilities, that is, conditions or circumstances of the enemy situation which render the enemy especially liable to damage, deception, or defeat. Here the J-2 considers, in addition to those factors listed in the Significant Strengths and Weaknesses subparagraph, such items as characteristics of the area, enemy tactical doctrine, and the J-2's own background knowledge of the enemy. The vulnerabilities considered should be actual ones either known or deduced.

The purposes of this paragraph then are to

List significant known facts regarding each enemy capability.

Examine those facts in order to fully understand the capability.

Determine whether each capability listed is a major one requiring separate listing or should be grouped with others.

Determine which auxiliary capabilities should be analyzed in connection with each major one.

Determine the effect of each capability on the friendly mission.

Point up evidence which indicates the relative order in which the enemy might adopt the capabilities and attempt to determine and give reasons for that order. However, care must be taken that relative probability is stated only when it can be justified by indications. If there are no indications to justify the selection of a particular enemy capability as most likely to be adopted, the intelligence officer should so state. The basis for determining the relative probability must be sound indications and known facts, and not guesswork.

**"5. CONCLUSIONS."** The final paragraph of the intelligence estimate is the statement of the J-2's interpretation of the evaluated information which has

been presented, analyzed, and integrated in the preceding paragraphs. It contains the statement of enemy capabilities which the evidence indicates the enemy is most likely to adopt listed in the relative order of priority of adoption, if this can be determined. If the probability cannot be determined, the J-2 should so state. The paragraph is, in effect, a statement of the conclusions the J-2 has reached through a comparative study of the preceding analysis and discussion of enemy capabilities. Since this determination is based on interpretation of intelligence, it must be fully justified by the analysis and discussion of the enemy capabilities in the pertinent paragraph of the estimate. It is objective. It is not an attempt to guess what the enemy will do. It is an attempt to decide from available evidence what the enemy is most likely to do. Probable capabilities are stated in this paragraph only insofar as available evidence justifies the statement. If the enemy is capable of implementing two or more capabilities simultaneously, that fact should be plainly indicated. This also applies to any combination of the listed capabilities. This paragraph should also include when possible a concise statement of the effects of each enemy capability on the accomplishment of the assigned mission.

Where possible, the five questions should be answered in stating these capabilities: (1) what it is; (2) where (in what area) it can occur; (3) in what strength it can be accomplished; (4) when it can occur; (5) from where it can be carried out.

The final part of the last paragraph of the estimate should list exploitable vulnerabilities. The list is, in fact, a statement of conclusions reached through comparative study of the vulnerabilities discussed in the previous paragraph. The list is confined to vulnerabilities which may be exploited by friendly forces. In determining what should be listed, J-2 must necessarily give some consideration to the feasibility of exploitation by his own commander. However, the recommendation to the commander of courses of action to be adopted is not within the province of the J-2, but belongs to the J-3 after careful coordination and consultation with the J-2. Therefore, in the estimate, J-2 lists those vulnerabilities which may be exploited by the commander and makes no recommendation for specific exploitation.

o. Recapitulation. With regard to the intelligence estimate the following precautions are emphasized:

- (1) State the mission clearly.
- (2) In paragraph 2 do not merely list facts but interpret these facts in the light of possible enemy operations and our own mission.
- (3) State enemy capabilities clearly, concisely, and completely.
- (4) Analyze enemy capabilities from the enemy's point of view and not from the point of view of what friendly forces would do in a similar situation.

(5) In conclusion give the order of probable adoption only when sufficient evidence exists in the estimate to justify such a statement. Otherwise state that no order of adoption can be determined.

(6) Remember, the purpose of the estimate is to assist the commander in his analysis of opposing courses of action and help him to arrive at a sound decision.

## 5.5 INTELLIGENCE INPUTS REQUIRED IN THE JOINT OPERATION PLANNING SYSTEM (JOPS)

### a. General

(1) At each stage of the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS), the intelligence staff officer performs specific tasks designed to assist the command in successful execution of the planning mission. The operational planning task requires preparation of either an OPLAN or a CONPLAN. An OPLAN is an operations plan for the conduct of military operations which can be translated into an operation order with minimum alteration. Complete plans include deployment or employment phases. A CONPLAN is an operations plan in concept, or abbreviated, format, which requires expansion into OPLAN or OPORD before implementation. In either case, development of the basic plan requires intelligence input.

(2) The intelligence input is designed to give all information about the enemy and area of operation which the commander needs to know to successfully accomplish the mission; it disseminates known intelligence and identifies information needed but not yet available, and it gives necessary instructions and directions to ensure the full and proper functioning of the intelligence and counterintelligence aspects of the operation.

(3) Within the text of the plan or order, intelligence input is required in two specific parts regardless of the type of plan. The environmental and enemy situations are set out briefly and concisely in paragraphs 1a and 1b of the plan or order, and the detailed information along with the plan for intelligence aspects of the operation are included in the intelligence annex, which is an integral part of the directive or order. A discussion of both forms of input follows.

### b. Intelligence Input to OPLAN

(1) Paragraph 1a: General Situation. This subparagraph describes the general political/military environment which would establish the probable preconditions for execution of the plan. The intelligence officer serves as a focal point for development of this input. Contents are developed through close coordination with the political advisor (POLAD), if assigned, civil affairs officer, and other interested divisions of the staff.

(2) Paragraph 1b: Enemy Situation. This part identifies the forces that are expected to oppose the execution of the plan and appraises their general capabilities. The subparagraph should give the information essential to a clear understanding of the magnitude of the hostile threat.

Generally, the significant aspects of the enemy situation and the area of operations that affect the accomplishment of the mission are included in condensed form. The location, composition, disposition, strength, recent significant activities and capabilities of the enemy along with conclusions about the area are stated briefly and concisely.

**c. Intelligence Annex**

(1) Material relating to intelligence in the operation plan or order is placed in the intelligence annex (Annex B). This annex is an integral part of the commander's directive, a means for disseminating known intelligence, and the plan for intelligence collection, production, and dissemination of new intelligence to support the directive. It is used by the commander to control and coordinate the joint force intelligence effort. Annexes are prepared for all operations. They are indispensable in operations preceded by long periods of planning.

(2) The intelligence annex has occasionally been titled "Intelligence Plan." While the annex contains plans for the conduct of intelligence activities, the term "Plan" is not sufficiently specific. An intelligence "plan" could be an intelligence collection plan, a plan containing long-term generalized intelligence guidance, or a plan scheduling beginning and completion dates for a variety of intelligence activities. (See Intelligence Schedule of Events, Appendix B, the intelligence annex to an operation plan, as discussed here.) The missions of a joint force commander as they relate to general, limited, and contingency war situations are so diverse that it is impracticable to develop a comprehensive intelligence plan supporting all missions. The primary vehicle for disseminating specific intelligence and intelligence planning guidance has become the intelligence annex to operation plans and orders.

(3) **Discussion of the Form.** The form of the intelligence annex should be simple, yet flexible enough to be adapted to the situation. It consists of three major parts: the heading, the body, and the ending.

**Heading**

Included in the heading are the classification and title of the annex, the identification number of plan or order to which the annex pertains, the name and location of the headquarters issuing the annex, and the date of preparation. Directly below are references to the maps, charts, and documentation needed for understanding the annex. Those references necessary to an understanding of the intelligence concerned with the operation such as special studies, maps, charts, overlays, or photographs may also be cited in addition to related annexes of the plan or order.



## Body

There are five main paragraphs in the body of the annex. In the first, the mission and concept of the intelligence operations are stated. In the second paragraph, information about characteristics of the area of operations, the effects of weather and climate, and the estimate of enemy capabilities which would affect the execution of the plan and accomplishment of the mission are set forth. Paragraph 3 contains the essentials of intelligence activities and tasks which identify total intelligence resources and direct the intelligence effort in support of the OPLAN before and after execution. The fourth paragraph assigns intelligence tasks to meet requirements through orders, requests, and coordinating instructions. The fifth paragraph covers communications/electronics, and miscellaneous instructions are in a sixth, if needed.

## Ending

The third and final part of the annex contains the signature and authentication blocks and lists appendices. It may also give distribution and acknowledgement instructions. Formats for appendices generally follow the model of the annex. They contain subsidiary additions to the annex and give details that are essential yet too bulky or numerous to include.

(4) Discussion of Content. A brief discussion of the contents of each paragraph of the body of the intelligence annex follows.

### PARAGRAPH 1

#### MISSION AND CONCEPT OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

**Mission.** State concisely the command intelligence mission in support of the command mission. Development of the intelligence mission requires detailed analysis of the command mission to determine implied intelligence tasks required for its accomplishment. When Annex B is distributed separately, state the command mission. This is necessary since some units may receive the intelligence annex, but not the OPLAN or order.

**Concept of Intelligence Operations.** Outline the purposes of intelligence operations and summarize the means and agencies to be employed in directing, collecting, processing, producing, and disseminating the necessary intelligence during normal and crisis periods before and during execution of the plan. All intelligence tasks defined during mission analysis must be covered with adequate redundancy either generally in the concept statement or specifically in paragraph 4, Assignment of Intelligence Tasks.

## PARAGRAPH 2

### SITUATION

**Characteristics of the Area.** This paragraph gives pertinent intelligence on the physical, economic, political, medical, social, and psychological aspects and conditions of the area of operations as they may influence the creation of the plan. Information included in the general situation discussed in the basic plan is not repeated. Include sufficient analysis of the area of operations to permit development of appropriate supporting plans. This paragraph may include complete information or preferably reference documents which contain required intelligence. Such references as overlays, maps, charts, and specific studies pertinent to the plan and necessary for comprehension are cited. It may also reference the latest periodic intelligence report or periodic intelligence summary of the situation. An example of such a reference is "See current Periodic Intelligence Report No. 6, 1 August 19—, this headquarters."

**Weather and Terrain.** Summarize prevailing weather patterns and those factors of terrain which may influence the conduct of operations. Climatological studies, tide tables, and other special studies may be referenced or extracts prepared from them for the time frame envisioned. These may be included or attached as appendices. Refer to Annex H (Environmental Services).

**Estimate of Enemy Capabilities.** Using detailed characteristics previously developed, give the enemy order of battle, an evaluation of applicable strategic and tactical doctrine, and estimates of the enemy capabilities and possible courses of action which would affect the execution of the plan and accomplishment of the mission. The enemy's capability to discern friendly OPSEC vulnerabilities should be considered. This paragraph may include complete information, may contain a summary of the enemy situation and refer to a complete enemy situation appendix to this annex, or may refer to documents which contain the required intelligence. This is the most important information of the annex and generally resembles the data in paragraph 2 (Enemy Situation) and paragraph 5 (Conclusion) of the intelligence estimate on which the commander's estimate and the OPLAN are based, except that it must be revised and brought up-to-date to reflect whatever new intelligence may have been developed after to the original estimate. Here the value of expressing enemy capabilities in specific terms of what, when, where, in what strength, and, if possible, from what direction, becomes clear, for the annex is designed primarily to guide and assist subordinate commanders. From their point of view the most important information about the enemy is what he is capable of against their own particular force plus when, where, and to what extent he can initiate action. As in the intelligence estimate, enemy capabilities should not be merely listed, but should also be discussed in terms of their effect on the accomplishment of friendly forces' mission and their relative probability of adoption, although both discussions may be more condensed than they were in the intelligence estimate.

## PARAGRAPH 3

### INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

This paragraph will contain the essentials of intelligence (activities and tasks) which identify intelligence resources and intelligence direction, collection, processing, production, and dissemination effort required to support the operation plan. A major part of the intelligence support to the commander of a military operation is rendered before the operation begins. To ensure that the commander is fully prepared, planning identifies the required intelligence effort, proceeding from the EEI through intelligence operations and capabilities/resources planning to tasking of intelligence elements. The intelligence operations are then conducted to develop the information required for military planning. The supporting intelligence plans will be specifically identified. Areas to be covered in this paragraph include

**Direction.** Give guidance for the determination of intelligence requirements, preparation of a collection plan, issuance of orders and requests to information collection agencies, and checking the productivity of collection agencies.

**Essential Elements of Information (EEI).** List in order of priority those critical items of intelligence (EEI) and other intelligence requirements (OIR) which are not already available but are needed to accomplish the mission. Indicated are agencies or elements having primary and secondary collection responsibilities. The EEI and OIR are included in the annex primarily to focus the attention of commanders of lower units and others to whom it is disseminated on items of intelligence information of special interest to their commander for this specific operation. Units and agencies receiving the annex extract those EEI that they may be able to answer and which pertain to their mission. Using the collection plan (see Chapter 4), the intelligence officer compares all requirements against available information and establishes priorities as a means of directing the efforts of collection agencies toward those most critical to mission accomplishment. Primary and secondary responsibilities are assigned to ensure adequate (intentional redundancy) coverage. EEI and OIR are formed as questions and may be broad in scope. For example, "What is the strength, organization, and disposition of enemy air defense forces in the vicinity of Target Zebra?" and "What is the enemy's minelaying capability in the GASTONIAN SEA?" or they may be narrow. For example, "Will the enemy move his armored units up to reinforce Delta Beach?" Normally EEIs and OIRs are continuously refined during the joint planning process and become less general and increasingly specific, as "Does the enemy have guns defensively positioned in the caves overlooking Blue Beach?" If publication of the annex is deferred, the EEI and other intelligence requirements are listed in the coordinating instruction of the basic plan. When EEI and other intelligence requirements are lengthy and detailed, they are placed in Appendix 1 of the annex.

New requirements. Give specific guidance to ensure that new intelligence requirements are considered both before and during execution of the OPLAN.

**Collection.** Give guidance for the systematic collection of information in support of identified requirements. The intelligence collection requirement procedures contained in DIAM 58-2 will be used where applicable. Give guidance for establishing collection activities not otherwise covered by regulation or standing operating procedures, including reconnaissance, ground sensors, ELINT, COMINT, and HUMINT. Any collection plan written to satisfy the requirements of the OPLAN should be referenced here.

**Signals Intelligence.** Give information and instructions on the assignment and coordination of COMINT and ELINT resources.

**Imagery Intelligence.** Give guidance for establishing and conducting photo, radar, and infrared intelligence activities.

**Human Intelligence Resources.** Give information pertaining to the assignment and coordination of operations using human resources.

**Measurement and Signature Intelligence.** Give guidance on obtaining intelligence by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data derived from specific technical collection sensors (other than those normally associated with SIGINT, IMINT, and HUMINT).

**Other collection activities.** Give guidance for collection by other specialized means that may be required to support plan requirements, e.g., visual, amphibious, reconnaissance means.

**Reporting.** Give guidance on reporting of collected intelligence information by all collection sources to be employed in support of the plan. Reference appropriate regulations, directives, and SOPs that specify reporting procedures. Include communications requirements. Do not confuse with intelligence disseminating reporting described hereafter.

**Processing.** List appropriate guidance for converting intelligence information into usable form. Include required provisions for language and document translation; imagery, signals, and technical sensor processing and interpretation; and other pertinent processing activity.

**Production.** Identify the production effort, including any intelligence products, required to support the operation plan. Include pertinent provisions indicated below.

### **Targeting**

**Procedures:** Give guidance for analyzing and developing conventional weaponeering, as required. Also list information on distribution of target intelligence, target materials, target list(s), control

and maintenance of target lists, and issuance of target materials. This subparagraph may contain all the intelligence targeting data required, or it may refer to materials available in other documents. When the target selection criteria in Annex C of the OPLAN include categories of fixed targets, a list of selected fixed targets which is responsive to those criteria is required and will be in Appendix 4 to Annex B. However, consolidation of target lists for different operation plans is permissible; and, with appropriate references, these lists may be contained in a separate document.

**Concept:** Summarize the guidelines followed in developing or preparing to develop targets (fixed/mobile) which are responsive to target selection criteria contained in Annex C of the OPLAN. Included will be geographic areas, categories, and constraints.

**Other.** Establish procedures by which assigned elements can produce, or nonorganic agencies can furnish, other forms of intelligence required to support the operation. If production capabilities of other agencies are to be exploited, tasking statements and formal agreement for assumption of such responsibilities should be completed. Details of production requirements, schedules, distribution, etc., may be included in appendices. Give consideration to indications and warning intelligence, current or operational intelligence, estimative intelligence, basic intelligence, and scientific and technical intelligence.

**Dissemination.** Furnish necessary guidance for the conveyance of intelligence in a suitable form (oral, graphic, or written) to appropriate agencies. This subparagraph should stipulate the requirements for submission of intelligence reports. Procedures will be established in this annex to satisfy expanded requirements for vertical and lateral dissemination of finished intelligence and spot reports during military operations under all conditions of warfare. Alternate means will be planned to ensure that required intelligence will be given to combat units as well as headquarters during crisis and combat operations. Any of the following may be covered by this subparagraph:

Intelligence Reports required from units (periods covered, distribution, and time of distribution)

Formats for intelligence reports (appendices if required)

Distribution of intelligence studies

**Counterintelligence.** Refer to Appendix 3 of the Intelligence Annex.

## PARAGRAPH 4

### ASSIGNMENT OF INTELLIGENCE TASKS

Orders to Subordinate and Attached Units. Use separate numbered subparagraphs to list detailed instructions for each unit performing intelligence functions, including the originating headquarters, component commands, and separate intelligence support units.

Requests to Higher Adjacent and Cooperating Units. Use separate numbered subparagraphs pertaining to each unit not organic or attached from which intelligence support is requested.

Coordinating Instructions. List any instructions necessary for coordinating the efforts of collection agencies. Include periodic or special conferences for intelligence officers and intelligence liaison, when indicated, with adjacent commands, foreign government agencies, and host countries.

## PARAGRAPH 5

COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS. Summarize those communications and electronics systems and procedures to be used to carry out the intelligence function or reference the appropriate paragraphs of Annex K.

## PARAGRAPH 6

MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUCTIONS. Include here items not included above. Examples of data in this paragraph are SERE, deception, WISP, disclosure of intelligence, public relations, use of specialized intelligence personnel, and composition of the J-2 staff.

### Command Line

The annex may have a command line followed by the name of the chief of staff.

### Appendices and Tabs

Appendices to the intelligence annex and tabs to these appendices are listed in the ending of the form. Material which does not concern all units receiving the annex or which is too detailed to be included in the body of the annex is attached as appendices. It may be enemy situation maps, intelligence summaries, climatologic studies, tide tables, special studies of the area of operations, or other research studies or detailed plans. An appendix may contain any intelligence produced for the operation plan or the operation order. Under no circumstances should any new or vital facts be placed in an appendix without mention in the body of the annex.

### Distribution

Following the list of appendices, the distribution of the annex is shown.

## Authentication

The annex may be authenticated by the signature of the intelligence officer under the word "Official," or it may be signed by the commander himself. The procedure for authentication is determined by the SOP of the headquarters issuing the operation plan or the operation order.

### 5.6 THE SHORT-RANGE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE AND FUTURE PLANNING

#### a. General

(1) The use of the intelligence estimate in the joint planning process has been discussed. As was indicated, enemy capabilities listed in the intelligence estimate were inserted in the commander's estimate of the situation. Then in the commander's estimate each enemy capability is analyzed against each practicable friendly course of action to determine the probable effect. The analysis is then used to compare the advantages and disadvantages of each course of action. Based on the analysis and comparison, a decision is made as to which course of action has the best chance of success and will be adopted.

(2) The accuracy of the enemy capabilities listed depends on the accuracy, completeness, and timeliness of the information contained in paragraph 2 (Situation) of the intelligence estimate. If the Situation paragraph is accurate, complete, and current, the Enemy Capabilities paragraph should be accurate, complete, and current. If the Situation paragraph is inadequate in any of those respects, the Enemy Capabilities paragraph will probably be inadequate in those same respects. For example, enemy capabilities derived from a Situation paragraph that contains "old" information on an enemy situation will be "old" enemy capabilities. Consequently, in the commander's estimate, the analysis of "old" enemy capabilities against "future" practicable friendly courses of action will be misleading, and possibly will cause an improper and faulty commander's decision. The currency of both the enemy situation and the enemy capabilities is therefore of utmost importance in the joint planning process.

#### b. Implications When Planning For Future Operations

(1) From the foregoing it can be seen that current intelligence on the enemy situation and the enemy capabilities is required for the intelligence estimate and its associated commander's estimate. But what are the implications when planning for an operation to take place many months in the future? Under such conditions the word "current" as used in preceding paragraphs is misleading and should be replaced by a term indicating that the Situation paragraph must depict conditions as of the date of the future operation. A good word is "future." (In a sense any intelligence estimate covers a future situation, but when any other than the "immediate future" is concerned, an added difficulty is introduced into the planning process.)

(2) For example, consider circumstances in which a campaign plan prepared by a high-level headquarters lists phased operations to be

conducted during the next two years. Subordinate commands under that headquarters must prepare their plans, and among those plans will be one for Phase II of the campaign plan, scheduled for 18 months after issue of the campaign plan. To prepare their plans, the subordinate commands each use the planning process sequence—enemy capabilities, commander's estimate (decision), and plan. In this process, assume that an intelligence estimate has been made by the subordinate command using the current situation and that the enemy capabilities from that estimate are used in the commander's estimate in the conventional manner. What happens? The enemy capabilities, being based on the current enemy situation, are current capabilities. They are not necessarily enemy capabilities for Phase III, which is some 18 months in the future. If the enemy situation changes appreciably, enemy capabilities will change accordingly. This is an unsatisfactory situation for the commander. It forces him to decide on a friendly course of action and to plan that course on a consideration of the current rather than the future enemy situation. In this instance, it would be more desirable to develop a "future" enemy situation.

(3) Assumptions. How can the enemy situation 18 months in the future be developed? It can be developed only by the use of assumptions. These assumptions, although bridging gaps in knowledge, must be as reasonable and realistic as possible. They should be held to a minimum and include only the assumptions that are absolutely essential to the estimate, for an estimate loses its usefulness if based on a long list of assumptions covering every conceivable contingency. The assumptions should be drawn up only after full consideration of all factors that could have some bearing on their validity. The assumptions should have the concurrence of the J-2 and J-3; they must have the approval of the commander. ("Assumption" is used here in the broadest sense, and the single word encompasses a complex process. For example, in formulating such assumptions, national and joint intelligence estimates are a basis for developing an estimate projected two years into the future.)

c. Types of Essential Assumptions. The types of assumptions that are essential concern the assumed results of friendly operations in previous phases and the effect these operations will have had on the enemy situation. Examples of such assumptions might include that

(1) Air and naval superiority in the area of responsibility has been established and will be maintained.

(2) Pressure on other fronts will prevent substantial enemy withdrawals or reinforcement to or from other areas.

(3) The enemy nuclear weapon stockpile and production level is such that nuclear warfare potential is 50 percent of that held at the beginning of hostilities.

(4) Neither side will resort to chemical, biological, or radiological warfare.

(5) Though the enemy's war-making potential has been seriously reduced and lines of communication disrupted in many areas, he is still capable



of maintaining 65 percent of original strength, equipment, and material for ground, naval, and air forces opposing our forces.

(6) Friendly operations will have reduced enemy ground combat strength by 20 percent and air force strength by 25 percent.

(7) Enemy naval forces must operate from bases over a thousand miles from the area of Phase III operations.

(8) Enemy exercise of governmental functions in the Phase III area of operations will be characterized by an increasing dependence of the central government on the independent, emergency functioning and decisions of local area political chieftains, and a resulting drastic decrease in the currently strong centralized governmental control of those areas.

d. Application of Assumptions. After the assumptions have been developed and approved, they should be applied against the current intelligence estimate. This is the most important step in formulating a short-range estimate. The purpose of applying these assumptions to the current estimate is to determine what important changes will develop. In effect, the short-range estimate deals with, and places emphasis on, these changes. It will therefore not be as complete or detailed as an estimate of the current situation, which may be regarded as a companion document to be referred to for details not repeated in the short-range estimate.

e. Form and Content. The content and form for the short-range estimate will follow that of the intelligence estimate with two principal exceptions:

(1) The assumptions should be stated after the mission (relative to the future operation).

(2) The discussion of those factors included under Characteristics of the Area of Operations, Enemy Military Situation, and Enemy Unconventional and Psychological Warfare Situation will treat only the important changes that can be expected to develop.

f. Other Methods of Using Intelligence Assumptions. The foregoing is one way of estimating which will take into account changes in the enemy situation between the initiation of planning and the initiation of the operation. These assumptions, developed by the coordinated effort of the J-2 and J-3, must be approved by the commander. There are other methods of using the approved assumptions in the planning process. They can be disseminated to all staff divisions, which then apply them to the staff estimate for which each division is responsible, or they can be included in the commander's estimate only along with the other assumptions made by the commander. The use of the short-range intelligence estimate method is preferable.

## CHAPTER 6

### DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE BY JOINT FORCES

#### 6.1 GENERAL

a. Definition. The dissemination step of the intelligence process is defined as the "timely distribution of information and/or intelligence in the most suitable form to those who need it." (DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms)

b. Importance of Timeliness. Rapid transmission of information to both higher and lower echelons is of utmost importance. Procedures must be established to ensure that information received by all echelons is current so that it may serve a useful purpose. Intelligence must be timely, particularly to subordinate units, because of the rapid change of the intelligence picture. This means that intelligence information should be placed in the hands of the consumer in time to permit evaluation and interpretation, formulation of plans, and initiation of action under the existing situation. The problem is dissemination to lower and adjacent units, to higher headquarters, and within the reporting headquarters. Dissemination to lower and adjacent units is usually the more difficult and more critical task.

#### 6.2 MAJOR REQUIREMENTS

a. Efficient dissemination has three major requirements: to get the information to the agencies and individuals who need it, to get it to them promptly, and to get it to them in usable form.

b. Determination of Recipients. Since dissemination is properly a responsibility of command, the distribution list will normally follow the chain of command. This applies to those for higher echelons as well as those drawn up for and approved by the commander of the joint force. In the exercise of this dissemination responsibility, the commander will normally delegate the responsibility to his intelligence staff. These distribution lists are important in getting the information to the place where it is needed and in preventing its indiscriminate circulation to an extent which might endanger security. They must be prepared with care and adhered to scrupulously except in certain emergencies, but they should never be allowed to become an encumbrance. In time of war, rigid restrictions, limited dissemination lists, and overclassification of intelligence will impede the accomplishment of the intelligence mission. It is a responsibility of the intelligence staff to understand and supply the intelligence needs of all forces and agencies subordinate to or cooperating with the force commander. Information does not become intelligence until it is evaluated; it does not become useful intelligence until it has reached the user who needs it.

c. Timely Delivery

(1) Promptness, or timeliness, of information cannot be over-emphasized. This is a problem of means, and the determining factor in the selection of the means of transmitting intelligence should be the immediate

urgency of the item to be sent. If the item is not urgent, such as background material or certain strategic information desirable for future planning, the means of transmission selected should be the most expeditious and economical medium available which completely satisfies the requirements of security.

(2) Intelligence information for dissemination is first classified as either intelligence which must be passed on without delay or intelligence which can wait for periodic publication. If the item is extremely urgent, the most secure means of transmission consonant with the desired speed should be selected. There will be emergencies when a plain language dispatch is preferred, for the sake of speed, to an encrypted one. There will also be emergencies, perhaps frequently in combat situations, when intelligence must be transmitted by voice radio. The intelligence staff must always endeavor to ensure that security is observed, but the staff must also advise communications operators when the urgency of the information precludes certain normal precautions. Considerations of timeliness require not only that needed intelligence be transmitted promptly, but that all information be as up-to-date as possible. Obsolete information may be as dangerous to the command as none at all.

d. Means of Delivery. The nature, importance, and priority of intelligence should be carefully considered when selecting a method for dissemination so as to ensure timely delivery and a minimum of interference with other communications traffic. The means of transmission include wire, radio, courier messenger, liaison officer, facsimile, television, and mail.

e. Selection of Proper Form. The third major requirement of dissemination is that intelligence reach the commands requiring it in the most usable form. Uniformity in the arrangement of routine intelligence reports and publications is a great aid to the usability of the material and assists in locating specific types of intelligence. There are three general forms for disseminating intelligence: written, graphic, and oral.

(1) Written. One of the jobs of an intelligence staff officer is to be able to write in clear, straightforward, readable language. The more common methods of written dissemination are

- (a) Intelligence summaries (INTSUM).
- (b) Intelligence annexes (plans).
- (c) Intelligence estimates.
- (d) Technical intelligence bulletins and summaries.
- (e) Dispatches.
- (f) Letters.
- (g) Studies (weather, terrain, area, etc.).
- (h) Order of battle books and pamphlets.
- (i) Intelligence coverage in operation plans and orders.
- (j) Spot reports (SPIREP--See JCS Pub 6 and paragraph 6.3.)
- (k) Defense Intelligence Notice (DIN--See JCS Pub 6 and paragraph 6.3.)
- (l) Periodic Intelligence reports (PERINTREP).
- (m) Prisoner of war interrogation reports.

- (n) Imagery interpretation reports.
- (o) Special reports.

In addition to using a clear and readable writing style, written material must also be prepared with due regard to legibility and arrangement on the printed page.

(2) **Graphic.** Graphic presentation should be clear, in proportion, unified in purpose, consistent in the use of symbols, and legible in details. Nothing contributes more to the clarity of any graphic presentation than unity of purpose. Intelligence charts should be prepared for a specific purpose, each item of information useful for this purpose should appear, and all other items should be omitted. Accepted military symbols should be used on charts and overlays with a legible key in the margin. Graphic presentation, like any other form of dissemination, should be convincing and attractive as well as clear. Some of the principal methods of graphic dissemination of intelligence are

- (a) Situation maps, overlays, photos.
- (b) Air target materials.
- (c) Motion pictures.
- (d) Posters.
- (e) Weather reports, forecasts, maps.
- (f) Slides.

(3) **Oral.** Intelligence is disseminated orally by

- (a) Lecture.
- (b) Briefing.
- (c) Conference.
- (d) Telephone conversation.
- (e) Radio conversation.
- (f) Closed circuit TV.

## 6.3 DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

The Joint Reporting System in Volume II, Part 10, JCS Pub 6, contains four intelligence reports. A brief description of each report is presented below.

a. **Defense Intelligence Notice (DIN).** The purpose of the DIN is to give the Joints Chiefs of Staff, the unified and specified commands, the Services, and selected agencies timely intelligence on events that could have a significant effect on future planning and operations. This narrative report is submitted by DIA and normally covers a single development, situation, event, or activity. The primary objective is to report an event, to explain why the event occurred, and to make an assessment of what impact the event could have on the United States.

b. **Spot Intelligence Report (SPIREP).** The purpose of the SPIREP is to give the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Military Intelligence Center, the unified and specified commands, the Services, and selected agencies timely intelligence on events that could have an immediate and significant

effect on current planning and operations. Unified and specified commands, Services, and military units of divisional level submit this narrative report whenever a critical development appears imminent or is of unusually high interest to U.S. decisionmakers. The SPIREP is due out as soon as possible, but not later than one hour after the information is received. Further, the report will not be delayed pending verification or the collection of more detail. Amplification or clarification should be sent in a followup SPIREP.

c. **Daily Intelligence Summary (DISUM).** The purpose of the Daily Intelligence Summary (DISUM) is to give the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC), and unified and specified commands, the Services, and selected agencies a daily analysis of an actual or simulated (training exercise) crisis situation and a summary of related intelligence of significance produced during the preceding 24-hour period.

d. **DIA Periodic Intelligence Summary (DIA INTSUM).** The purpose of the DIA Periodic Intelligence Summary (DIA INTSUM) is to give the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the unified and specified commands, the Services, military commanders worldwide, and selected nonmilitary agencies timely periodic intelligence summaries on either actual or simulated (training exercise) foreign crisis situations that could have an immediate actual (or simulated) effect on U.S. plans and operations.

## CHAPTER 7

### THE USE OF COMPUTERS IN INTELLIGENCE

#### 7.1

#### INTRODUCTION

a. Data Storage and Retrieval. The use of computers in intelligence has been motivated by two fundamental factors: convenience and necessity. Foremost is the advantage of the computer to perform routine clerical tasks rapidly. The computer has the capability to reduce significantly the time required to perform numerous intelligence functions. The computer's ability to perform complex functions rapidly and accurately has found many intelligence applications, such as in target analysis, wargaming, weapons allocations, damage assessment, and transportation capacity projections. The discovery via automated file searching of a new target of tactical opportunity, for example, may affect an entire war plan with impact on all the existing data bases mentioned. To update and calculate the changes in these data files manually would be impractical and prohibitively time consuming. The computer performs these updating changes in seconds or minutes.

b. Necessity of Computer Support. Necessity is the second motivating force in computer applications to intelligence. As Communist security measures have tightened during the past 20 years, the United States Intelligence Community has been forced to rely more and more on mass collection equipment: electronic (e.g., radar), photographic, acoustic, multisensor, and many other technologically advanced raw information gathering systems. The tremendous volume and complex nature of the raw data thus obtained has made it imperative to employ more and more automatic data processing equipment. In fact, without the use of computers to manipulate these data inputs into humanly meaningful outputs, the processing of these collection data would be impossible; manual processing techniques would be so slow that the final analysis would be produced months or years after the raw information carried any meaningful current value. The computer gives currency to these types of data, making them useful for instant command decisions.

c. Intelligence Application. The increase in the volume of data collected and the new computer data processing technology have brought into the forefront the need to apply new methods in intelligence analysis processes. In 1962 the Department of Defense authorized a new name for this man-machine intelligence processing cycle, the Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS), defined by JCS Pub 1 as follows:

An information system which processes and manipulates raw information and intelligence data as required. It is characterized by the application of general purpose computers, peripheral equipment, and automated storage and retrieval equipment for documents and photographs. While automation is a distinguishing characteristic of the Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS), individual system components may be either automated or manually operated.

d. Intelligence Community Computer Management

(1) The Department of Defense Intelligence Information System (DODIIS) management structure was established in the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in 1977 to handle the long-range planning and management of the IDHS computers and associated telecommunications (IDHSC) assets. DODIIS component elements consist of the telecommunications networks and the ADP systems developed and managed by DIA--the military Service intelligence commands, staffs and activities and the unified and specified commands and their component commands. They range in size from the major systems at the Strategic Air Command and Defense Intelligence Agency to a small remote terminal facility supporting the Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, Japan.

(2) The basic goal of the DODIIS is

"To provide an integrated information handling capability responsive to the intelligence requirements of the National Command Authorities, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Military Services, Unified and Specified Commands, subordinate joint and Service components, field activities and the United States Intelligence Community."

To achieve this goal the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Communications, Command, Control and Intelligence) and the Director, DIA,\* jointly agreed that the system must be able

-To give better and more timely support to commanders of our combat forces.

-To improve the quality and timeliness of the intelligence input to the decisionmaking process.

## 7.2 SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS

a. ELINT. ELINT is the acronym for Electronic Intelligence. ADP applications for ELINT include information storage and retrieval, automatic report printing, cathode-ray-tube (CRT) presentations, simple measurements, and comparisons to complicated mathematical manipulations, or any number of other analytical requirements--as long as the software is available for the required data-manipulation capability. Its importance as a source of information is well attested to by the presence of Soviet fishing vessels in coastal waters of North America, all visibly equipped with elaborate electronic sensors. Computer systems reduce the collected electronic signals to intelligible information and determine the type and location of the transmitters. The importance of computers in processing the analysis cycle of ELINT information has already been mentioned.

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\*Memorandum, 12 September 1977, for the Secretaries of the Military Departments; Chairman, JCS; Director, NSA; Director, DCA.

b. Photointelligence. Photoreconnaissance has been used ever since the Civil War as a means of visually identifying enemy positions and targets, but its modern counterpart has assumed a key position in the collection and exploitation of information for a variety of purposes, e.g., identification of enemy targets (actual and potential), troop movements, logistic supply concentrations and transfers, munitions factories, and mapping and charting. In many cases the effective exploitation of photointelligence would be virtually impossible without the use of a computer because of the mass database of photoframes. The computer performs three essential support functions: (1) collection management; (2) indexing of photographs; and (3) direct ADP support to photointerpreters.

c. Message and Hard Copy Intelligence Reports. The identification and retrieval of hard copy reports are other applications of automation techniques that reduce the time for retrieval. Computer systems being developed today will give the intelligence analyst/manager the ability to screen incoming material from all sources, correlate it with information held in personal, branch, or other computer data repositories, and produce intelligence documents in both hard copy and message form.

d. Foreign Scientific and Technical (S&T) Intelligence. A specialized field of intelligence involves the analysis of foreign trend patterns in science and technology. The identification of foreign weapon systems and analysis of their characteristics, performance, and capabilities are the major aspects of military S&T intelligence. Modern technology permits the analyst to communicate directly with the computer in calculating/estimating weapon systems' capabilities and other technical problem-solving applications as well as in information searches to identify documents pertinent to analysis. Extensive use is made of computer-indexed microform files for document storage, retrieval, and display. Machine translation of foreign languages plays a significant role in the analysis of S&T intelligence, and current developments emphasize new ideas for electromagnetic sensor data and integrated event analysis.

e. Targeting. Because of the central importance of target intelligence in modern weapon systems and wargaming, automation of intelligence began with targeting, starting with a simple punch card operation in the 1940s, progressing by stages in the 1950s and 1960s through successively larger and more sophisticated computers. This field of study still forms a major part of the total intelligence effort, and the Automated Installation Intelligence File (AIIF) forms a central file from which many other files are derived. The Target Data Inventory (TDI) is just one of many products of AIIF. The updating of this file daily and weekly and the transfer of updated items to derivative files would be impossible without computer support.

f. Ocean Surveillance. Ocean surveillance information is defined as information derived from the systematic observation of sea areas primarily for the purpose of locating, identifying, and determining the movements of friendly and nonfriendly targets proceeding on, under, or above the surface of the world's seas and oceans. The Ocean Surveillance Information System (OSIS), managed by the Naval Intelligence Command, is an integrated naval



intelligence automatic data handling system which processes, stores, retrieves, and disseminates worldwide ocean surveillance information in support of command elements at all levels. This OSIS encompasses ADP equipment and software, communications, displays, and machine-processable databases. Adoption of modern third-generation ADP hardware and software will make possible high volume data filtering, track correlation, and comparison of historical and current information in an operationally responsive environment for analysts and decisionmakers regarding movements of naval interest.

g. Tactical Interface. The preceding paragraph points to the feasibility of a future extension of the on-line system to the IDHS elements of unified and specified commands and through them to tactical field units. With U.S. forces deployed over such widespread areas of the world, timely exchange of all types of intelligence data has become an ever-increasing need as well as a problem. The increasing complexity of the interface between IDHS and tactical intelligence ADP systems is due, in part, to the widespread introduction of "tactical sensors" into our combat forces. An example of tactical interface requirements is the JCS-directed program, Joint Interoperability for Tactical Command and Control Systems (JINTACCS). Within this program, the military Services are coordinating information exchange requirements for interfacing, as well as operational information exchange requirements. The tactical intelligence systems involved in the interface program are

- (1) Naval Intelligence Processing System (NIPS).
- (2) Marine Air/Ground Intelligence System (MAGIS).
- (3) Enemy Situation Correlation Element (ENSCE) (Air Force).
- (4) All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) (Army).

i. Military Geographic Information and Documentation (MGID). Military geographic information is that information concerning physical aspects, resources, and artificial features which is necessary for planning and operations. Documentation is that military geographic information which has been evaluated, processed, summarized, and published. Historically, MGID has been portrayed principally on maps, but maintenance of current and accurate products became unfeasible and costly. The logical next step was to put such information in a computer. Among the files available are those on lines of communication, ports, landing beaches, urban area studies, and helicopter landing/drop zones.

## CHAPTER 8

### COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

#### 8.1 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

a. Mission. The mission of counterintelligence (CI) is to detect, evaluate, counteract, or prevent hostile intelligence collection, subversion, sabotage, international terrorism, or assassination conducted by or on behalf of any foreign power, organization, or person operating to the detriment of U.S. Military Forces. It includes the identification of hostile multidisciplined (HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT) intelligence threat, and the recommendation and evaluation of security measures to defeat that threat. Within jurisdictional areas these activities include safeguarding defense information; protection of those Service functions and property having defense contracts or facilities that have been designated as key defense installations; conducting personnel security investigations for Service personnel and contractor employees under the Defense Industrial Security Program; and conducting counterintelligence surveys, services, and inspections. Counterintelligence operations may be divided into three categories: Counterintelligence Investigations, Counterintelligence Services, and Counterintelligence Special Operations.

b. Jurisdiction and Scope. The jurisdiction and scope of authorized investigative techniques in counterintelligence operations will vary according to legal considerations, operational circumstances, and areas of operations. Limiting directives that may restrict the jurisdiction of counterintelligence elements and preclude or inhibit employment of certain investigative techniques and procedures are

(1) Delimitations Agreement, which prescribes the Services' counterintelligence investigative jurisdiction and coordinating responsibilities with respect to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice.

(2) National Security Directives, which prescribe operation limitations and coordinating responsibilities for U.S. agencies conducting security investigations or intelligence operations in foreign areas. These are set forth in classified policy directives issued by the National Security Council.

(3) Status of Forces Agreements between the United States and foreign nations in which U.S. forces are stationed normally will include clauses delimiting the jurisdiction and scope of activities of counterintelligence agencies.

(4) DOD Directive 5200.27, which is a restatement of the limits applied to military counterintelligence activities, including those persons or organizations affiliated with the DOD.

b. Objective. The objective of counterintelligence is to destroy or minimize the effectiveness of the enemy's intelligence system and to furnish operational security (OPSEC) information about friendly capabilities and

intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting indicators associated with planning and conducting military operations and other activities. CI supports OPSEC by focusing on the hostile intelligence threat and assisting in developing methods of defeating that threat. This requires the establishment and maintenance of an extensive database on both enemy intelligence capabilities and friendly force indicators, signatures, patterns, and profiles. Countermeasures are then developed to counter the enemy intelligence threat in HUMINT, SIGINT, and IMINT. This is accomplished by denying information to the enemy through security measures, camouflage, and concealment; giving false or misleading information to the enemy by means of ruses, demonstrations, and displays; and countering the enemy's sabotage, propaganda, or other subversive activity designed to interfere with the attainment of our established missions. It consists of measures taken by our forces to surprise the enemy through security and deception and includes all the passive and active measures designed to thwart the enemy's intelligence by defeating his efforts to gather information. Counterintelligence is essential to the success of any military operation. The element of surprise in military operations depends not only on reliable intelligence and rapid movement but also on efficient counterintelligence. Also, by denying information to the enemy and thereby decreasing his ability to use combat power effectively, counterintelligence aids in reducing the risks of a command.

d. Measures. Counterintelligence measures, adopted to destroy or neutralize the effectiveness of actual or potential hostile intelligence and subversive activities, include the following broad general measures, each of which includes many other specific detailed measures.

(1) Security. Counterintelligence security operations are classified generally as operations pertaining to military security; civil security; and port, frontier, and travel security.

(a) Military security counterintelligence operations include both passive and active counterintelligence measures taken by a command to protect itself from espionage, enemy observation, subversion, sabotage, or surprise. Typical measures encompass not only those steps taken to prevent disclosure of military information to unfriendly forces, but also those steps taken to insure the physical security of installations. Security of information is ensured by establishing adequate safeguards and by training personnel to observe precautions such as discretion in their talk, care while preparing plans and orders, and withholding information when captured. Control of both assignment to sensitive duties and access to classified military information is another important defensive counterintelligence measure. This control is supported by thorough and timely personnel security investigations of those individuals being considered for such access or assignment. This permits the selective granting of security clearances to only those personnel who have shown themselves loyal, reliable, and otherwise suitable. A related safeguard is the principle that access to particular classified informa-

tion be limited not just to personnel with appropriate clearances, but also to those who clearly require the information for the performance of their duties. The detection of disaffection, treason, and sedition within military ranks and civilian employees is also an important aspect of security. Physical security of installations is ensured by furnishing guard forces to assist in protecting them against dangers resulting from mutinies, riots, strikes, sabotage, espionage, and treason. Additional steps include neutralization of counterintelligence targets in tactical operations, use of passwords, and special handling of evaders and escapees.

(b) Civil security counterintelligence operations include all the counterintelligence activities affecting the civilian population of the area. These operations are extensive in commands with large territorial responsibilities, in heavily populated areas, and in countries faced with insurgency. Typical civil security counterintelligence measures are control of circulation of personnel, censorship, security screening of civilian labor, monitoring of suspect political groups, and industrial plant protection.

(c) Port, frontier, and travel security counterintelligence operations consist of the special application of military and civil counterintelligence measures to the control of airports, seaports, land and sea frontiers, international air boundaries, and all nonmilitary travel into and out of an area of operations. Typical of such operations are military travel permit systems, sea and land frontier patrols, and security screening and control of legal daily frontier crossers.

(2) Concealment. This consists of employing means to hide or disguise personnel, equipment, and installations from the enemy. They include use of natural cover, camouflage, darkness, and smoke.

(3) Censorship. This involves a host of well-known activities such as prescribing authorized channels for private communications, suppressing information which might aid the enemy, and examining the private correspondence of military personnel. This method is useful also as an instrument for collecting information of value to the enemy.

(4) Special Operations. Special operations include the specialized employment of active and deceptive counterintelligence techniques and procedures in the conduct of secret operations against hostile and unfriendly intelligence organizations and activities. Examples of special operations are

(a) Counterespionage--a category of counterintelligence the objective of which is the detection and neutralization of foreign espionage.

(b) Countersabotage--action designed to destroy the effectiveness of foreign sabotage activities through the process of identifying, penetrating and manipulating, neutralizing or repressing individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or capable of conducting such activities.

(c) Countersubversion--that part of counterintelligence which is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical subversion activities through the detection, identification, exploitation, penetration,

manipulation, deception and repression of individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or capable of conducting such activities.

(d) Counterreconnaissance--all measures taken to prevent hostile observation of a force, area, or place.

(e) Counterguerrilla--operations and activities conducted by armed forces, paramilitary forces, or nonmilitary agencies of a government against guerrillas.

(f) Counterinsurgency--those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and other actions taken by a government to defeat subversive insurgency.

d. Planning

(1) The counterintelligence effort is directed towards safeguarding information and material from enemy agents, and detecting agents attempting to transmit information or moving to or from areas in which sabotage, subversion, or espionage can be committed. Counterintelligence planning, therefore, is directed to developing appropriate measures to counter the enemy threat.

(2) Planning the counterintelligence measures for, and support of, any operation is concurrent with the planning and conduct of the operation. It begins with the inception of the operation plan and continues until the operation is completed. An excellent procedure for developing a counterintelligence plan, contained in FM 30-5, Combat Intelligence, consists of the following three phases.

(a) An evaluation is made of the enemy's intelligence, sabotage, and subversion capabilities to determine the relative probability of enemy adoption of these capabilities.

(b) The effect of these enemy capabilities on friendly courses of action is estimated and the effectiveness of existing counterintelligence measures in countering enemy capabilities is considered.

(c) Based on conclusions reached in the counterintelligence plan, the worksheet is a systematic listing of all the counterintelligence measures to be carried out by a command, indicating the agencies responsible for the execution of each task. When completed, it either becomes an appendix to the intelligence annex or is incorporated into the annex as paragraph 7.

8.2

SPECIAL ACTIVITIES

a. General. There are a number of activities, not discussed elsewhere in this publication, which may concern the intelligence officer. The typical J-2 organization may have a Special Activities Office. In some organizations, this office might have a different name. Some joint organizations might have no need for any of its functions.

b. Functions. The Special Activities Offices are normally responsible for the security and dissemination of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)—comprising Special Intelligence (SI) and Special Activities Office (SAO) material--within the joint headquarters.

## APPENDIX A

### INTELLIGENCE GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Here are listed definitions of intelligence terms frequently used in this publication, or likely to be needed in the study of other intelligence works. All except those designated by an asterisk (\*) are adapted from JCS Pub 1, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. The others are from unclassified Service publications. Those requiring specific definitions in areas of classified intelligence are advised to refer to DIAM 58-1, Intelligence Acquisition Manual.

1. air mission intelligence report--a detailed report of the results of an air mission, including a complete intelligence account of the mission.
2. armed forces intelligence--the integrated study of the organized land, sea, and air forces, both actual and potential, of foreign nations.
3. basic intelligence--general reference material for use in planning, concerning enemies or potential enemies, which pertains to capabilities, resources, or potential theater of operations.
4. biographical intelligence--the study of individual foreign personalities of actual or potential importance. People are studied collectively under the sociological and political components of strategic intelligence, and to a lesser degree under economic, armed forces, and scientific intelligence.
5. capability--the ability to execute a specified course of action. (a capability may or may not be accompanied by an intention.)
6. clandestine operation--activities to accomplish intelligence, counterintelligence, and other similar activities sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies, in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment.
7. collection plan--see intelligence collection plan.
8. combat intelligence--that knowledge of the enemy, weather, and geographical features required by a commander in the planning and conduct of tactical operations.
9. counterespionage--a category of counterintelligence the objective of which is the detection and neutralization of foreign espionage.
10. counterintelligence--that aspect of intelligence activity which is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and to the protection of information against espionage, individuals against subversion, and installation or material against sabotage.
11. countersabotage--action designed to destroy the effectiveness of foreign sabotage activities through the process of identifying, penetrating, and manipulating, neutralizing, or repressing individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or capable of conducting such activities.

12. countersign--a secret challenge and its reply.
13. countersubversion--that part of counterintelligence which is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical subversive activities through the detection, identification, exploitation, penetration, manipulation, deception, and repression of individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or capable of conducting such activities.
14. course of action--1. any sequence of activities which an individual or a unit may follow; 2. a possible plan open to an individual or command which would accomplish or is related to the accomplishment of his mission; 3. the scheme adopted to accomplish a job or mission; 4. a line of conduct in an engagement.
15. covert operations--operations which are so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. They differ from clandestine operations in that emphasis is placed on concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation.
16. dissemination (intelligence)--the timely distribution of information and/or intelligence in the most suitable form to those who need it.
17. economic intelligence--intelligence which deals with the extent and use of the natural and human resources and the economic potential of nations.
18. enemy capabilities--those courses of action of which the enemy is physically capable and which, if adopted, will affect the accomplishment of our mission. The term "capabilities" includes not only the general courses of action open to the enemy, such as attack, defense, or withdrawal, but also all the particular courses of action possible under each general course of action. "Enemy capabilities" are considered in the light of all known factors affecting military operations, including time, space, weather, terrain, and the strength and disposition of enemy forces.
19. espionage--overt, covert, or clandestine activity designed to obtain information relating to the national defense with intent or reason to believe that it will be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation. For espionage crimes, see Chapter 37 of Title 18, United States Code. This definition was one of many established by the Defense Investigative Review Council in its Study Report No. 9, dated 5 May 1971, and is to be used by all DOD activities within the purview of DOD Directive 5200.26, subject: Defense Investigative Program, and DOD Directive 5200.27, subject: Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense.
20. essential elements of information (EEI)--the critical items of information regarding the enemy and his environment needed by the commander by a particular time, to relate with other available information and intelligence in order to assist him in reaching a logical decision.
21. guidance--policy, direction, decision, or instruction having the effect of an order when issued by a higher echelon.
22. indications (intelligence)--information in various degrees of evaluation, all of which bears on the intention of a potential enemy to adopt or reject a course of action.



23. information (intelligence)--unevaluated material of every description including that derived from observations, reports, rumors, photographs, and other sources, which, when analyzed, produces intelligence.
24. intelligence--the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all available information which concerns one or more aspects of foreign nations or of areas of operations and which is immediately or potentially significant to military planning and operations.
25. intelligence annex--The intelligence annex (sometimes called intelligence plan) is a document appended to an operation plan, order, or other document for the purpose of furnishing the intelligence needed to support the basic document and for transmitting intelligence orders, requests, and instructions.
26. intelligence collection plan--a plan for gathering information from all available sources to meet an intelligence requirement; specifically, a logical plan for transforming the essential elements of information into orders or requests to sources within a required time limit. See also intelligence process.
27. intelligence collection requirement (ICR)--formerly referred to as Specific Collection Requirement (SICR) was revised by DIAM 58-2, Vol 2, Part 2, October 1972. All references to SICRs should be changed to read ICRs.
28. intelligence cycle--the steps by which information is converted into intelligence and made available to users. There are five steps in the cycle:
- a. Planning and direction--determination of intelligence requirements, preparation of a collection plan, issuance of orders and requests to information collection agencies, and a continuous check on the productivity of collection agencies.
  - b. Collection--acquisition of information and the giving of this information to processing and/or production elements.
  - c. Processing--conversion of collected information into a form suitable to the production of intelligence.
  - d. Production--conversion of information into intelligence through the integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of all source data and the preparation of intelligence products in support of known or anticipated user requirements.
  - e. Dissemination--conveyance of intelligence to users in a suitable form.
29. intelligence estimate of the situation--an appraisal of the elements of intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition with a view to determining the courses of action open to the enemy or potential enemy and the probable order of their adoption. (NATO term is "intelligence estimate.")
30. intelligence plan--See intelligence annex.
31. intelligence process--See intelligence cycle.

32. intelligence requirements--any subject, general or specific, about which there is a need for the collection of information or the production of intelligence. See also essential elements of information.
33. intention--an aim or design (as distinct from capability) to execute a specified course of action.
- \*34. joint intelligence--integrated military departmental intelligence which is of concern to more than one military department and which transcends the exclusive competence of a single military department.
35. joint operational intelligence agency--an intelligence agency in which the efforts of two or more Services are integrated to furnish that operational intelligence essential to the commander of a joint force and to supplement that available to subordinate forces of his command. The agency may or may not be part of such joint force commander's staff.
36. military geographic information--comprises the information concerning physical aspects, resources, and artificial features which is necessary for planning and operations.
37. national intelligence--integrated departmental intelligence that covers the broad aspects of national policy and national security, is of concern to more than one department or agency, and transcends the exclusive competence of a single department or agency.
38. operational intelligence--intelligence required by operational commanders for planning and executing all types of operations.
39. order of battle--the identification, strength, command structure, and disposition of personnel, units, and equipment of military forces.
- \*40. probable courses of action--those courses of action most likely to be followed by an enemy commander or a nation in the accomplishment of its national objectives.
- \*41. scientific intelligence--intelligence or intelligence information regarding scientific research and development in foreign countries.
42. strategic intelligence--intelligence which is required for the formation of policy and military plans at national and international levels. Strategic intelligence and tactical intelligence differ primarily in level of application but may also vary in terms of scope and detail.
43. technical intelligence--intelligence concerning foreign technological developments, performance, and operational capabilities of foreign materiel, which have now, or may eventually have, a practical application for military purposes. It is the end product resulting from the processing and collation of technical information.
- \*44. vulnerabilities--
- a. enemy vulnerability--any condition or circumstance of the enemy situation or the area of operations which makes the enemy especially liable to damage, deception, or defeat,

b. national vulnerabilities--those susceptibilities of a nation to any action, by any means, in peace or war, through which its war potential may be reduced or its will to fight diminished.

## ACTIVITY

PRE-D-60 D-60 D-35 D-30 D-45 D-40 D-35 D-30 D-25 D-20 D-15 D-10 D-5 D-04

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B-1

## APPENDIX B

## B-2

# APPENDIX C

## AN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PLAN


EEI	INDICATIONS	SPECIFIC ORDERS	UNI COMD	AGENCIES					
				A	N	AF	MI DET	JTF	JUWTF
1. Will the en empl nuclear weapons? If so, where and by what delivery system?	1. Type and numbers of weapons available.	1. Req type and number of weapons available for employment in this area.	X				X	X	
	2. Movement into area of specialized dlvr eqp.	1. Rpt mvmt hvy arty within area.		X		X		X	X
		2. Rpt mvmt GM lchr into area.	X		X	X	X		
		3. Rpt arrival special types aircraft or missile ships.	X		X	X	X		
	3. Sudden change in troop disposition along line of contact.	1. Rpt by fastest means any sudden withdrawals of troops now in contact.		X				X	X
		2. Rpt by fastest means adoption any special protective means.		X		X		X	X
	4. Imposition of special sec measures in specific areas.	TO BE COMPLETED							
	5. Const of spec stor facilities.								
	6. Mvmt specialized units or personnel into area.								

## **APPENDIX D**

### **BASIC INTELLIGENCE STUDY FORMAT**


- 1. INTRODUCTION**
  - a. Purpose of the Study
  - b. Table of Contents
- 2. SIGNIFICANCE OF AREA** (Summary of the significant strategic and tactical aspects of the area.)
- 3. MILITARY GEOGRAPHY**
  - a. Geographic Character
  - b. Military Geographic Regions
  - c. Hydrography and Landing Beaches
  - d. Strategic Areas
  - e. Internal Routes
  - f. Approaches
  - g. Urban Areas
  - h. Climate and Weather
- 4. TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS**
  - a. Railways
  - b. Highways
  - c. Inland Waterways
  - d. Petroleum Pipelines
  - e. Ports and Naval Facilities
  - f. Merchant Marine
  - g. Civil Air (including civil air facilities)
  - h. Telecommunications
- 5. SOCIOLOGICAL**
  - a. General
  - b. Population and Manpower
  - c. Structure and Characteristics of the Society
  - d. Health and Sanitation
  - e. Social Problems and Public Welfare
  - f. Cultural Expression (Language, Religion, Education, Art, Public Information Media)
- 6. POLITICAL**
  - a. General
  - b. Structure and Functioning of Government
  - c. Political Dynamics
  - d. National Politics
  - e. Police and Intelligence Services
  - f. Subversion
  - g. Propaganda
  - h. Foreign Intelligence

**APPENDIX E**  
**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STRUCTURE**







**APPENDIX F**  
**INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STRUCTURE**




# APPENDIX DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY




**APPENDIX H**  
**U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND J-2**



**APPENDIX 3**  
**U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND J-2 ORGANIZATION CHART**



**APPENDIX K**  
**A TYPICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE**  
**INTELLIGENCE DIVISION OF A JOINT TASK FORCE**



## APPENDIX L

### BASIC INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTS (BY SOURCES AND AGENCIES)

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)  
Biographic Handbooks

Central Intelligence Bulletin (CIB-Daily)

Weekly Summaries

National Intelligence Estimates (NIE)

Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIE)

National Intelligence Analytical Memorandum (NIAM)

Special Operations Intelligence Handbooks

U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)  
Defense Intelligence Estimate for Joint Planning (DIEJP)

Joint Intelligence Estimates for Planning (JIEP)

Joint Long-Range Estimative Intelligence Document (JLREID)

Defense Intelligence Projections for Planning (DIPP)

Defense Intelligence Estimates (DIEs)

Special Defense Intelligence Estimates (SDIEs)

Defense Intelligence Estimates Memoranda (DIEMs)

DIA Defense Intelligence Summaries (DINSUM) (restricted to D.C. area)

Weekly Summaries (INSUM)

Air Force Intelligence Studies (AFIS)

Aircraft Handbooks (Characteristics and Performance)  
Communist Countries

Soviet/European/Asiatic Communist Aircraft Order of Battle Books

Airfields and Seaplane Stations of the World

Attache Reports and Debriefings

Biographic Data Books

DIA Fact Books

LOC Studies

Military Intelligence Summaries (MIS)

Soviet Missile Order of Battle Books

Naval Forces Intelligence Studies

National Security Agency (NSA)

Daily Special Intelligence Items

SIGINT Summaries

Special Research Detachment (SRD Reports)

National Photo Interpretation Center (NPIC)

Photo Interpretation Reports

Department of State, Intelligence and Research (INR)

Embassy Cables

Special Reports

Weekly Summaries (Country Team)

Military Services, Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence (ACSI)

Intelligence Summaries (INSUM)

Weekly Intelligence Estimate Update (WIEU)

MAGG/MILGP Debriefings

Military Services, Counterintelligence Publications

Strategic Reconnaissance Reports

Scientific and Technical Intelligence Reports

Tactical Units

Patrol Reports

Long-Range Patrol Reports (LRPS)

Ranger Reports

Prisoner and Rallier Interrogation Reports

Clandestine Agent Reports/Debriefings

Document Exploitation Reports

Material Exploitation Reports

Sensor Readouts

Radar (Ground)

Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) Reports

Infra-Red Readouts

Visual Reconnaissance Reports

Radio Research Company Reports

Open Sources

Area Handbooks

Basic/Special Reference Works

Newspapers

Radio Broadcasts

Tourists/Commercial Travelers



<u>CALL NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
00 Period.	<u>Evaluators Newsletter.</u> U.S. Navy. Air Test and Evaluation Squadron Four. (Irr) CONFIDENTIAL.
00 Period.	Gt. Brit. <u>Air Intelligence Review.</u> (Irr) SECRET.
00 4C525 C.7G7	Gt. Brit. <u>Army Technical Intelligence Digest.</u> (Irr) SECRET.
00 Period. No., Date	Gt. Brit. <u>Army Weapons Intelligence Review.</u> (Q) SECRET.
00 Period.	Gt. Brit. <u>N.I.R. (Naval Intelligence Report).</u> (Q) SECRET.
00 U393 .J72	<u>Journal of Defense Research.</u> Battelle Columbus Lab. (Q) SECRET.
0 Period.	<u>Maritime Warfare Bulletin.</u> Canadian Forces Maritime Warfare School. (Q) CONFIDENTIAL.
00 Period	<u>MIJI QUARTERLY.</u> U.S. Joint Electronic Warfare Center. (Q) SECRET. NOFORN.
00 UA15 .U7	<u>Military Intelligence Summary (MIS).</u> U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency. World coverage in 8 volumes. (S-a) SECRET.
00 UB251 .U5U3	<u>Monthly Intelligence Production.</u> U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency. (Q) SECRET.
00 V40 .U29	<u>Naval Forces Intelligence Study (NFIS).</u> U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency. Survey by individual countries, multi-volumes. (A) SECRET.
0 Period	<u>The Naval Intelligence Newsletter.</u> U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence. (Q) SECRET. NOFORN.
00 Period.	<u>Naval Intelligence Quarterly.</u> U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence. (Q) SECRET.
00 Period	<u>Navy Scientific and Technical Intelligence Review.</u> U.S. Naval Intelligence Command. (M) SECRET

## APPENDIX M

### CURRENT CLASSIFIED PERIODICALS AND REPORTS CURRENTLY RECEIVED BY AFSC LIBRARY

LEGEND:	D      Daily	M      Monthly	S-M    SemiMonthly
	W      Weekly	Bi-M   BiMonthly	Irr    Irregular
	Bi-W   Biweekly	Q      Quarterly	A      Annual
			S-A    Semiannual

NOTE:      Security classification of periodical follows the citation.

<u>CALL NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
00 UG630 .U35	<u>Air Force Foreign Technology Bulletin.</u> U.S. Air Force. Foreign Technology Division. (M) SECRET.
00 UG630 .U56	<u>Air Force Intelligence Study (AFIS).</u> U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency. Survey by individual country, multi-volumes. (A) SECRET.
00 UG630 .U422	<u>Air Order of Battle.</u> U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency. World Coverage in 8 volumes. (A-a) SECRET.
00 Period.	<u>Army Scientific and Technical Intelligence Bulletin.</u> U.S. Dept. of the Army, (M) SECRET.
00 Period.	<u>Australia. Joint Intelligence Organization (JIO) Service Intelligence Bulletin.</u> (W) SECRET.
00 Period.	<u>Canada. Intelligence Quarterly.</u> (Q) SECRET.
00 Period.	<u>Cockpit Intelligence.</u> U.S. Air Forces in Europe. (Q) SECRET.
00 Period.	<u>Current Foreign Relations.</u> U.S. Dept. of State. (W) SECRET.
00 UG485 .U387	<u>Electronic Warfare Analysis Report.</u> U.S. Air Force Electronic Warfare Center. (S-m) SECRET. NOFORN.
00 UG485 .U371	<u>Electronic Warfare Evaluation and Education Quarterly.</u> U.S. Air Force Electronic Warfare Center. (Q) SECRET.

<u>CALL NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
00 UB250 .18	<u>Periodic Intelligence Resume</u> '. Inter-American Defense Board. (Irr) SECRET.
00 V214 .U526	<u>Pioneers Progress</u> . U.S. Navy, Air Test and Evaluation Squadron One. (Irr) SECRET.
00 Period.	<u>Scientific Intelligence Weekly Review</u> . (W) SECRET.
00 UF885 .R9U4	<u>Soviet and E. European Communist Missile Order of Battle</u> . U.S. Air Forces in Europe. (S-A) SECRET.
00 VA40 .S8	<u>Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, Supplementary Intelligence Report</u> . (M) SECRET.
00 Period.	<u>TAC Intelligence Digest</u> . U.S. Air Force, Tactical Air Command. (M) SECRET.
00 Period.	<u>Tactical Analysis Bulletin</u> . U.S. Air Force Tactical Fighter Weapons Center. (Irr) SECRET.
0 Period.	<u>Tactics Newsletter</u> . U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Naval Surface Force. (Q) CONFIDENTIAL
00 Period.	<u>U.S. Dept. of State., Bureau of Intelligence and Research Report...</u> (Irr) SECRET.
00 Period.	<u>Weekly Intelligence Summary</u> . U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency. (W) SECRET.

**APPENDIX N**  
**DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY MANUALS**

The DIAM 58 Series of Manuals is in the process of being renumbered and some titles are being changed. The following is a listing of the new numbers and titles cross-referenced to the old manual numbers where applicable.

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>
M58-1	Defense Intelligence Collection (U) SECRET/NOFORN
M58-2	Time-Sensitive Multi-Source Requirements (U) SECRET/NOFORN (formerly DIAM 58-2 Part II - never published)
M58-3	Multi-Source Requirements (General) (U) SECRET/NOFORN (formerly DIAM 58-2 Part I)
M58-5	Imagery Requirements (U) SECRET (formerly DIAM 58-2 Part VI)  SAO Supplement (available through SAO Channels Only)
M58-7	Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) Requirements (U) (available through SI Channels Only) (formerly DIAM 58-2 Parts VII and VIII)
M58-8	Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) Requirements (formerly DIAM 58-2 Part X)
M58-9	National Collection Systems (U) TOP SECRET (available through SAO Channels Only) (formerly DIAM 58-3)
M58-11	Defense Human Resources Intelligence Collection Management Manual (U) SECRET/NOFORN
M58-12	Defense Human Resources Intelligence Collection Management Manual (U) SECRET/NOFORN (formerly DIAM 58-4)
M58-13	Defense Human Resources Intelligence Collection Procedures Manual (U) SECRET/NOFORN (formerly DIAM 58-2 Parts III, IV, V, IX)